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Abstract (Summary of Thesis) 
This thesis studies the effects of using proceeds from asset sales as a source of funding 
for mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
The first empirical chapter investigates the financing decisions made by acquiring firms 
and seeks to test a new theoretical framework proposed by Edmans and Mann (2017) which 
models a firm’s funding choice between asset sales and equity offerings. Their theory identifies 
settings in which a firm may prefer to select one financing source over the other, which may 
result in deviations from traditional financing theories. The predictions of this framework are 
empirically tested in an M&A setting. 
The second empirical chapter provides evidence that mergers and acquisitions occur as 
part of asset restructuring, in which asset sale proceeds are associated with increased 
acquisition probability. Economically, firms with asset sales have a 17.02% higher likelihood 
to subsequently make acquisitions. These results are consistent with the notion that asset sales 
enhance firm capital liquidity, and asset sale proceeds can be used to fund acquisitions, 
particularly for financially constrained firms. Finally, firms conducting acquisitions after sales 
of unrelated assets are more likely to experience improvement in long-run operating efficiency. 
The third empirical chapter establishes that asset sale proceeds are an economically 
important omitted variable that determines the method of payment in acquisitions. Specifically, 
the results show that firms with asset sales are more likely to subsequently conduct cash 
acquisitions, which translates into 42.76% higher likelihood to use cash method of payment. 
This finding is attributed to increased cash liquidity offered by asset sales. This study highlights 
the importance of asset sales on the crucial choice of payment method in acquisitions. 
Overall, the findings of this thesis provide strong evidence that asset sales are an important, 
but commonly overlooked, source of funds in mergers and acquisitions.  
  
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions iii  Nathan P. McNamee 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express my deep gratitude and appreciation to my primary supervisor, 
Professor Dimitris Petmezas, and to my secondary supervisor, Dr. Christos Mavis, who have 
both provided consistent and meaningful support during my PhD studies. Their willingness to 
give of their time and to respond to my questions, anytime both day and night, is very much 
appreciated.  
Additionally, I would like to thank my friend Dr. Nikolaos Karampatsas for his support 
and willing guidance on econometric issues related to my research. I would also like to thank 
Professor Nickolaos G. Travlos, my co-author, who gave particularly valuable direction while 
pursuing the publication of articles inspired by this thesis. Additionally, I am very grateful to 
all those who provided comments on the various versions of the chapters of this thesis as well 
as the associated articles.  
Furthermore, I express my gratitude to the Surrey Business School at the University of 
Surrey for providing me with an outstanding PhD experience and a pleasant environment to 
work and study. In particular, I appreciate the encouraging support of Professor Paul Guest, 
the Head of the Department of Finance and Accounting.  
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Tasha, and my children, Ethan, Maxwell, and 
Aelie, for their patience and unwavering support throughout my studies. I especially thank my 
wife for her willingness to listen to me ramble on about every aspect of my research and for 
her willingness to meticulously read through my thesis to offer sound grammatical advice.  
All shortcomings of this work are my sole responsibility.  
 Table of Contents 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions iv  Nathan P. McNamee 
Table of Contents 
Declaration of Originality i 
Abstract (Summary of Thesis) ii 
Acknowledgements iii 
Table of Contents iv 
List of Tables ix 
List of Figures xi 
Abbreviations & Glossary xii 
1. Introduction 1 
2. Literature Review 7 
 Asset Sales 7 
2.1.1. Asset Characteristics 8 
2.1.2. Asset Seller 14 
2.1.3. Asset Buyer 26 
 Sources of Financing in Mergers and Acquisitions 29 
2.2.1. Sources of Financing 29 
2.2.2. Method of Payment 34 
2.2.3. Synergies 37 
2.2.4. Acquisition Premiums 40 
2.2.5. Target Characteristics 40 
2.2.6. Mode of Acquisition 41 
2.2.7. Timing After Asset Sale 42 
 Table of Contents 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions v  Nathan P. McNamee 
 Conclusion 42 
Tables for the Literature Review 43 
3. Financing Through Asset Sales: Evidence from M&As 46 
 Introduction 46 
 Theory 55 
3.2.1. Balance Sheet Effect 55 
3.2.2. Camouflage Effect 56 
3.2.3. Correlation Effect 57 
 Sample and Data 58 
3.3.1. Asset Sale Measure 59 
3.3.2. Equity Measure 60 
3.3.3. Sample Statistics 61 
 Balance Sheet Effect or Pecking Order? 62 
3.4.1. Main Results for the Balance Sheet Effect 62 
3.4.2. Endogeneity Control for the Balance Sheet Effect 64 
 Camouflage Effect Findings 68 
3.5.1. Main Results for the Camouflage Effect 68 
3.5.2. Endogeneity Control for the Camouflage Effect 69 
 Correlation Effect Findings 71 
3.6.1. Main Results for the Correlation Effect 71 
3.6.2. Endogeneity Control for the Correlation Effect 72 
 Table of Contents 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions vi  Nathan P. McNamee 
 Theoretical Extension for Debt and Additional Robustness Tests 74 
3.7.1. Theoretical Extension for the Choice of Debt Financing 74 
3.7.2. Additional Auxiliary Tests 75 
 Conclusion 77 
Appendix for Chapter 3 79 
Tables for Chapter 3 81 
4. Asset Sales and Merger & Acquisitions 100 
 Introduction 100 
 Sample and Data 106 
4.2.1. Asset Sale Measures 106 
4.2.2. Sample Statistics 109 
 Empirical Findings 109 
4.3.1. Asset Sales and Acquisitions 110 
 Endogeneity Control 111 
4.4.1. Granger Causality Test 112 
4.4.2. Coefficient Stability Approach 113 
4.4.3. Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 115 
4.4.4. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 116 
 Further Findings 117 
4.5.1. Long-run Operating Performance 117 
 Implications at the Industry Level 119 
 Table of Contents 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions vii  Nathan P. McNamee 
 Robustness Tests 122 
 Conclusion 123 
Appendix for Chapter 4 125 
Tables for Chapter 4 128 
5. Asset Sales and Method of Payment in M&As 136 
 Introduction 136 
 Sample and Data 140 
5.2.1. Sample Selection Criteria 140 
5.2.2. Measures of Asset Sales 141 
5.2.3. Variables 143 
5.2.4. Sample Statistics 144 
 Empirical Findings 147 
 Controlling for Endogeneity 149 
5.4.1. Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 149 
5.4.2. Propensity Score Matching 153 
5.4.3. Impact Threshold for a Confounding Variable 154 
 Robustness Tests 155 
5.5.1. Choice of Method of Payment with Target Firm Control Variables 155 
5.5.2. Method of Payment, Corporate Governance, and Ownership 156 
5.5.3. Asset Sale Measurement Comparison 157 
5.5.4. Other Auxiliary Tests 158 
 Table of Contents 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions viii  Nathan P. McNamee 
 Conclusion 158 
Appendix for Chapter 5 160 
Tables for Chapter 5 162 
6. Conclusion 172 
 Summary and Implications 172 
 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 175 
References 178 
 
  
  
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions ix  Nathan P. McNamee 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Motivation and uses of proceeds from asset sales 43 
Table 2.2 Sources of financing in acquisitions 44 
Table 2.3 Payment methods in acquisitions 45 
Table 3.1 Financing source by year 81 
Table 3.2 Sample descriptive statistics by financing source 82 
Table 3.3 Financing choice and the balance sheet effect 83 
Table 3.4 Endogeneity control for the balance sheet effect 84 
Table 3.5 Financing choice and the camouflage effect 86 
Table 3.6 Endogeneity control for the camouflage effect 87 
Table 3.7 Financing choice and the correlation effect 89 
Table 3.8 Endogeneity control for the correlation effect 90 
Table 3.9 Debt financing and the balance sheet, camouflage, and correlation effects 92 
Table 3.10 Financing choice and the balance sheet effect with continuous relative size 93 
Table 3.11 Financing choice and the camouflage effect with asset sale liquidity 96 
Table 3.12 Financing choice and the correlation effect with conglomerate measures 97 
Table 3.13 Financing choice with controls for financial constraint or firm distress 98 
Table 3.14 Financing choice excluding financial firms and regulated utilities 99 
Table 4.1 Sample descriptive statistics by asset sale 128 
Table 4.2 Asset sales and acquisition likelihood 129 
Table 4.3 Granger causality test for asset sales and acquisition probability 130 
Table 4.4 Sensitivity to unobservable characteristics 131 
Table 4.5 Endogeneity control for asset sales and acquisition probability 132 
Table 4.6 Propensity score matching (PSM) 133 
Table 4.7 3 year long-run operating returns and focus increasing asset sales 134 
  
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions x  Nathan P. McNamee 
Table 4.8 Industry asset sale waves and merger waves 135 
Table 5.1 Sample descriptive statistics by payment method 162 
Table 5.2 Sample descriptive statistics by asset sale 163 
Table 5.3 Choice of method of payment 164 
Table 5.4 Endogeneity control for asset sale and cash payment 165 
Table 5.5 Endogeneity control for asset sale and cash percentage 166 
Table 5.6 Propensity score matching 167 
Table 5.7 Impact of unobservable confounding variables 168 
Table 5.8 Choice of method of payment with target firm control variables 169 
Table 5.9 Choice of method of payment, corporate governance, and managerial ownership 170 
Table 5.10 Asset sale measure comparison 171 
  
  
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions xi  Nathan P. McNamee 
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1 Relative size with high industry M/B and the probability to fund 
acquisitions with equity 
94 
Figure 3.2 Relative size with low industry M/B and the probability to fund acquisitions 
with equity 
94 
Figure 3.3 Relative size with high industry M/B and the probability to fund 
acquisitions with asset sales 
95 
Figure 3.4 Relative size with low industry M/B and the probability to fund acquisitions 
with asset sales 
95 
Figure 4.1 Asset sales by year 127 
  
  
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions xii  Nathan P. McNamee 
Abbreviations & Glossary 
2SLS – Two Stage Least Squares 
AMEX – American Stock Exchange 
CAR – Cumulative Abnormal Return 
CRSP – Center for Research in Security Prices (University of Chicago) 
GLM – Generalized Linear Model 
IVs – Instrumental Variables 
LIML – Limited Information Maximum Likelihood 
LPM – Linear Probability Model 
M&A – Mergers and Acquisitions 
MLE – Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
NASDAQ – National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
NPV – Net Present Value 
NYSE – New York Stock Exchange 
OLS – Ordinary Least Squares 
PSM – Propensity Score Matching 
QMLE – Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
SDC – Securities Data Corporation (Thomson Financial) 
SEC – Securities and Exchange Commission 
SIC – Standard Industrial Classification 
S&P – Standard & Poor’s 
VIF – Variance Inflation Factor 
  
Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 1  Nathan P. McNamee 
1. Introduction 
One of the most studied topics and arguably among the most important management 
decisions for firms around the world are those relating to the market for corporate control. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) define corporate control as “[…] the rights to determine the 
management of corporate resources” (p. 5). Two of the most prominent transactions affecting 
corporate control include: i) the sale of assets and ii) mergers and acquisitions (M&A). These 
two transactions have a significant effect on the size and shape of a firm, and the economic 
impact of these transactions remain among the largest of any in the life of a firm.  
The purpose of this thesis is to study the impact of asset sales on subsequent mergers and 
acquisitions, and particularly, on the use of proceeds from asset sales as a source of funds in 
M&As. This thesis brings together two different, but related, threads of literature. An in-depth 
literature review is presented in Chapter 2, which examines existing literature on asset sales, 
including motivations for the sale of assets and common uses of asset sale proceeds, as well as 
the importance of sources of financing in M&A transactions. In particular, asset sales represent 
a major source of corporate funding with recent evidence highlighting an even more prominent 
role than the traditional sources of corporate financing such as equity and debt. Specifically, 
Edmans and Mann (2017) show that in 2012 firms engaged in corporate asset sales valued at 
$131 billion versus $81 billion in seasoned equity issuance. This pattern exists in almost all 
years over their sample period from 1995-2012, demonstrating that firms meet more of their 
financing needs through asset sales than by issuing equity. Moreover, Eckbo and Kisser (2016) 
confirm an overwhelming reliance on internal funds, documenting that proceeds from asset 
sales contribute more to overall corporate funding annually than funds raised by issuing equity 
or debt.1 Despite the importance of asset sales as a funding source, there is little empirical work 
on the use of asset sale proceeds as a funding source for acquisitions aside from Lang, Poulsen, 
                                                 
1 Eckbo and Kisser (2013) find that 31% of corporate financing is derived from the sale of assets, compared to 
only 16% of financing coming from equity issues and 12% from debt. 
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and Stulz (1995) who hint that many firms “[…] seem to sell assets while engaged in a program 
of acquisitions so that the asset sales provide cash for these programs […]” (p. 9), and Kaplan 
and Weisbach (1992) and John and Ofek (1995) who provide brief descriptive statistics 
showing that some firms raise cash through asset sales to fund acquisitions. To address this 
apparent gap in the literature, this thesis empirically investigates the role of asset sale proceeds 
in acquisition funding. 
Chapter 3 considers a new theoretical framework by Edmans and Mann (2017) which 
examines a firm’s funding choice between asset sales and equity issues. Their model identifies 
three new forces, or effects, with possible advantages to selecting one financing source over 
the other. These effects can cause firms to deviate from behaviors predicted by traditional 
financing theory, such as the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984 and Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
In an M&A setting, the first effect, the balance sheet effect, predicts that firms will be 
more likely to use equity to fund acquisitions when the relative size of the target to the bidder 
(i.e., funding need) is large and when good growth opportunities are high. This prediction is in 
direct contradiction with the pecking order theory, which classifies equity as the financing 
source of last resort and does not take into account the size of the funding needed. While work 
by Nachman and Noe (1994), Fama and French (2005), and Fulghieri, Garcia, and Hackbarth 
(2015) find evidence of deviations for the pecking order theory, relative financing need has 
been overlooked in financing choice theory, with the exception of Nanda and Narayanan 
(1999), who include the relative funding need as a determinant of financing choice in their 
theoretical model, but they suggest firms will be more likely to use asset sales to meet larger 
financing needs. 
Second, the camouflage effect suggests that low quality firms are more likely to sell assets 
to fund acquisitions when they can pool those sales with the asset sales of other firms, allowing 
them to camouflage the fact that they are selling the asset because it is of low quality when 
other firms are selling assets for operational reasons. This approach works because, as Akerlof 
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(1970) suggests, it is inherently difficult to distinguish good quality from bad. Further, the 
market liquidity for assets has been shown to be a significant factor when determining whether 
to sell an asset (see Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002).  
Third, the correlation effect predicts that conglomerate firms are more likely to sell assets 
to fund acquisitions and less likely to issue equity because they have non-correlated assets that 
can be sold without implying that the rest of the firm is of low quality. This effect highlights 
one potential benefit of firm diversification, showing that non-core assets that are not correlated 
with the firm’s core operations can be a form of financial slack. Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2001) find that peripheral or non-correlated assets are more likely to be sold by conglomerates. 
Additionally, Gopalan and Xie (2011) highlight benefits to conglomerate firms that can use 
internal markets, rather than external financing, to improve resource allocation including 
acquisitions. 
Using a broad sample of bidding firms collected from the Thomson Financial SDC 
database that engaged in acquisitions over the period from 1990 to 2014, I find strong empirical 
support for the new theories by Edmans and Mann (2017). For the balance sheet effect, the 
relative size of the deal to the bidder is positively associated with equity financing and is most 
pronounced when high growth opportunities exist. Economically, firms with high relative 
financing needs that are from industries with good growth prospects are 4.60% more likely to 
use equity to finance their acquisition, representing an increased likelihood of 18.24% relative 
to the sample mean. Further, relative size is negatively associated with the use of asset sale 
proceeds as a funding source regardless of industry growth opportunities. I also find support 
for the camouflage effect, where low quality firms in industries experiencing asset sale waves 
are more likely to use proceeds from asset sales than equity to fund acquisitions. Empirically, 
I show that the interaction of low firm quality and asset sale waves is positive and significantly 
associated with funding M&As with asset sale proceeds. Finally, in support of the correlation 
effect, I find that conglomerate status is positively associated with the use of asset sales, with 
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conglomerates firms being 1.46% more likely to use asset sale proceeds to fund acquisitions, 
an increase of 48.69% relative to the sample average use of asset sale proceeds. Overall, this 
chapter provides additional insight into the source of funds decisions made by firms and helps 
to explain why firms might choose asset sales or equity issues as the preferred funding source 
for M&As. 
This chapter contributes to the financing choice literature by offering new empirical 
evidence on the importance of asset sales as a funding source. It also offers empirical support 
for this new theoretical framework by Edmans and Mann (2017) 
Chapter 4 examines the effect asset sales have on the likelihood of a firm engaging in a 
subsequent acquisition. Bates (2005) finds that asset sales increase a firm’s liquidity and that 
cash proceeds from a sale can be re-allocated to the unfunded projects of the divesting firm. 
This internal funding source can be particularly helpful for financially constrained firms which 
might not otherwise be able to fund important corporate investments. In this respect, 
Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Borisova and Brown (2013) provide empirical evidence 
that asset sale proceeds are used by financially constrained firms to fund capital expenditures 
and R&D investments, respectively. Therefore, the primary hypothesis of this chapter predicts 
that, ceteris paribus, firms that sell assets are more likely to conduct acquisition investments, 
and this effect should be more pronounced for financially constrained firms. 
Additionally, John and Ofek (1995) show that firms benefit from focus increasing asset 
sales, finding that these types of divestitures lead to an improvement in the operating 
performance of the seller’s remaining assets. Adding to this understanding, this chapter predicts 
that acquisitions following focus increasing asset sales should lead to additional improvement 
in operating efficiency, resulting from the double benefit effect.  
This chapter finds strong empirical support for the hypotheses. Empirical results give 
evidence of a positive relation between an individual firm’s asset sales and the probability of 
the asset seller making a subsequent acquisition bid, and this effect is most pronounced for 
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financially constrained firms. Economically, asset sales by financially constrained firms are 
associated with a 17.02% increase in acquisition probability in the following year, relative to 
the sample mean. Furthermore, evidence of the double benefit effect from this type of firm 
restructuring is identified, showing a 1.81% increase in the three-year operating performance 
for firms that sell an unrelated asset and use the proceeds for a subsequent acquisition, relative 
to those that do not make a post-asset sale acquisition. This result is driven by focus increasing 
acquisitions and is more pronounced for financially constrained firms which experience a 9.11% 
increase in operating performance. 
Contributions from this chapter to the M&A and corporate restructuring literature include 
new empirical evidence on the increased likelihood of acquisitions following asset sales, as 
well as an understanding of the increases to operating efficiency that can be derived from the 
joint restructuring transactions of selling (i.e., asset sales) followed by buying assets (i.e., 
acquisitions). 
Chapter 5 builds on the understanding that method of payment is strongly related to the 
funding source (see  Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). This chapter considers whether a firm’s 
restructuring through asset sales affects the choice of payment method in acquisitions. As is 
shown in the literature, proceeds from asset sales improve a firm’s cash richness, offering 
important internal capital to fund corporate investments (Edmans and Mann (2017)). Thus, if 
firms ultimately decide to proceed to an M&A investment, asset sale proceeds will have 
increased the firm’s cash liquidity, which should in turn have an effect on the choice of payment 
method. Furthermore, Schlingemann (2004) documents that cash acquisitions are financed 
through idle cash generated through a number of financing sources in the period prior to the 
acquisition, but he does not identify asset sale proceeds as a potential source of cash, focusing 
only on free cash flows, equity, and debt. In this respect, Clayton and Reisel (2013), find that 
remuneration from asset sales is almost explicitly in cash, with 81% of asset sales involving 
100% cash transactions. This cash increases firms’ liquidity and enables firms to fund 
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investment projects (Bates, 2005). Therefore, asset sales result predominantly in increased cash 
liquidity, which naturally leads to the prediction of a positive relation between firms’ asset 
sales and cash method of payment in M&As.  
This chapter finds strong empirical support for the hypothesis. In brief, a significantly 
positive relation between asset sales and the choice of cash as the method of payment at the 1% 
significance level is shown. Firms that fund acquisitions through asset sales are approximately 
42.76% more likely to use only cash as the method of payment relative to the cash acquisition 
sample average. Moreover, this chapter finds that firms using asset sale proceeds as the funding 
source exhibit a much higher cash intensity, using approximately 20.38% more cash than those 
funded through other means. 
This chapter contributes to the M&A and method of payment literature by identifying asset 
sales as an economically important determinant of the use of cash as a method of payment in 
M&As.  
Overall, the results of each empirical chapter highlights the importance of asset sale proceeds 
as a source of funds in M&As. 
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides relevant literature relating to the two 
strands of asset sale and M&As. Chapter 3 empirically tests the predictions of the new theoretical 
framework by Edmans and Mann (2017). Chapter 4 examines the effect of asset sales on the 
likelihood of subsequent acquisitions and operating efficiency implications. Chapter 5 investigates 
the effect asset sales have on the use of cash as the method of payment in acquisitions. Each of the 
three empirical chapter are self-contained studies. Finally, Chapter 6 offers final remarks and 
conclusions from this thesis.  
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2. Literature Review 
This literature review summarizes relevant studies relating to two major areas of research 
within the market for corporate control literature, namely asset sales and sources of financing 
in acquisitions. While each study cited in this review may not play an integral part in the 
empirical research of this thesis, this body of research provides the backdrop and colors the 
motivation behind this thesis. Additionally, each empirical chapter in this thesis touches upon 
the literature relevant to that specific study. 
This literature review will be presented as follows: Section 2.1 identifies relevant literature 
on the subject of corporate asset sales, and Section 2.2 reviews literature regarding sources of 
financing in acquisitions.  
 
 Asset Sales 
A considerable amount of literature can be found regarding asset sales, sell-offs, and 
divestitures. This is not surprising based on the substantial effect these transactions have on 
firms. As mentioned previously, Edmans and Mann (2017) and Eckbo and Kisser (2013) 
confirm the relative importance of asset sales. Additionally, Edmans and Mann (2017) suggest 
that asset sales should be considered along with security issuance as a source of funds, and that 
asset sales can have real effects by reallocating physical resources and by changing the firm’s 
boundaries. In like manner, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that asset sales make 
possible the redeployment of assets from firms with lower ability to firms with higher ability. 
Asset sales are considered a form of divestiture. The term divestiture has been defined in 
the literature as being either sell-offs or spinoffs (Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984)). 
Tehranian, Travlos, and Waegelein (1987) define divestitures as “[…] a modification of the 
firm's productive assets and comes in the form of sell-offs or spin-offs […]” (p. 933). Spinoffs 
do not create an opportunity for managers to continue control of the spun off assets, whereas 
selloffs do provide an opportunity for managers to direct the proceeds. Hite and Owers (1983) 
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state that a spinoff “[…] results in the creation of an independent firm with a corresponding 
reduction in the asset base of the divestor” (p. 410). Unless specifically noted, the terms 
divestiture or asset sale, as used in this literature review, are considered to include any sell-offs 
of business segments, product lines, investment assets, or property, plant, and equipment 
(PP&E), and will not refer to spinoff transactions.  
To review relevant literature relating to asset sales, this study looks at three primary areas: 
asset characteristics, including industry, asset type, asset performance, and relative size (see 
Section 2.1.1); asset seller, including seller characteristics and the seller’s motivation to sell 
the asset (see Section 2.1.2); and asset buyer, including payment method and synergies with 
the purchased asset (see Section 2.1.3). 
 
2.1.1. Asset Characteristics 
Several studies look at divested asset characteristics and their relation to the performance 
of asset sales. The literature on asset characteristics is categorized here into a few key areas to 
be covered below, including: asset quality, industry (comprising relatedness to parent, industry 
cyclicality and liquidity, and firm locale), asset type, asset performance, relative size, and 
information asymmetry.  
 
2.1.1.1. Asset Quality 
The quality of an asset is a major determinant of its value. The research regarding asset 
quality recognizes the difficulties of properly identifying an assets value. Akerlof (1970) 
highlights the fact that the difficulty of distinguishing good quality from bad is inherent in 
business. 
Asset quality also affects management’s decision of which segments to divest. Pan, Wang, 
and Weisbach (2015) look at the quality of firm segments for firms that have experienced a 
recent CEO turnover. They find that new CEOs pursue a strategy of optimal disinvestment by 
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divesting lower performing segments. They find there is high disinvestment intensity shortly 
after CEO turnover. 
Similarly, Edmans and Mann (2017) put forward three new forces that affect asset sales, 
two of which deal with asset quality. The first is the camouflage effect that allows firms to hide 
the sale of a low quality asset among the asset sales of other firms. In a market in which many 
firms are selling assets for operational reasons (such as divesting to focus on core 
competencies), low quality firms or firms with low quality assets are able to camouflage their 
asset sales by selling at the same time as high quality firms, thus camouflaging the true reason 
for the asset sale. The second force is the correlation effect. If equity is issued, the market infers 
that the equity is of low quality because the market assumes the firm’s current projects are of 
lower quality, causing management to look outside for better projects. This negative market 
reaction not only affects the new issue, but also the outstanding equity of the firm. In contrast, 
with an asset sale, Edmans and Mann (2017) posit that the sale of a low quality asset need not 
imply that the rest of the firm is of low quality, and the existing equity need not be adversely 
affected by asset sales.  
Additionally, Hege, Slovin, and Sushka (2006) theorize that asset quality helps to 
determine the method of payment. They suggest that firms selling a high quality asset will 
welcome equity as part of the payment for the asset due to the positive expected returns that 
will come as a result of the buyer’s ownership and management of the asset. Alternatively, 
sellers will be more likely to only accept cash if the asset is of relatively low quality in order 
to avoid further exposure to negative effects on equity value.  
 
2.1.1.2. Industry 
Industry effects can also play a role in the value of an asset being sold. Some factors which 
are discussed in this section include: relatedness of the asset to the asset seller and/or buyer, 
the cyclicality and liquidity of the industry, and firm locale. 
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2.1.1.2.1 Relatedness to Asset Seller and/or Buyer 
The relatedness of an asset or segment to the seller and/or buyer will affect the relative 
value the seller or buyer places on the asset. Relatedness has also been referred to in the 
literature in terms of firm focus or firm diversification. For a more complete review of literature 
relating to firm focus or diversification, please refer to Section 2.1.2.2.1. 
Most studies agree that focused firms perform better than diversified firms (see for 
instance Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003), John and Ofek (1995), Megginson, Morgan, and Nail 
(2004), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Desai and Jain (1999)), and that the acquisition of 
related assets results in greater synergies than the acquisition of unrelated assets (Hite, Owers, 
and Rogers, 1987; John and Ofek, 1995). In looking at asset sales, Schlingemann et al. (2002) 
show that 70% of divested segments belong to an industry unrelated to the core activities of 
the parent. 
However, firms may be motivated to acquire outside of their industry due to shocks within 
their industry. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) suggest that firms buy assets outside of their 
main areas of expertise during recessions in an attempt to reduce risk, and thereafter sell 
unrelated assets to firms, focusing on their core business during times of economic growth. 
Similarly, Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) look at corporate focus and spin-off 
events. They find that cross-industry (non-related) spinoffs result in positive and significant 
excess returns at announcement, whereas own-industry (related) spin-offs do not. They show 
this increase comes from performance improvements and support the view that corporate focus 
increases value. 
 
2.1.1.2.2 Cyclicality and Liquidity of Industry 
Industry liquidity and cyclicality also have an effect on asset sales. Schlingemann et al. 
(2002) discuss what determines which segments are selected to be sold. They find that the 
liquidity of the market for that segment is more important than that segment’s performance or 
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any other factors they viewed in determining which segment to sell. They show that if the 
market is liquid, there will be more buyers, and a firm would be more likely to sell the segment 
at or close to the net-present-value of its cash flows. Whereas firms selling into illiquid markets 
will likely be forced to sell at a discount. In order to measure liquidity, they use the volume of 
transactions for a specific industry and create an industry liquidity index by taking the ratio of 
the value of the industry’s corporate transactions (excluding the divested segments analyzed in 
their study) to the value of the industry’s total assets. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) suggest that market liquidity is affected when firms within an 
industry have trouble meeting debt payments and therefore need to sell assets. They find that 
the buyers that are most likely to pay the highest valuation for the asset are typically those 
within the same industry. Because these potential buyers are in the same industry, they are 
likely to be affected by the same negative industry shocks causing distress and therefore are 
unlikely to be able to raise funds to buy the assets. As a result, the assets would need to be sold 
to industry outsiders who won’t know how to manage them well. Consequently, in this situation, 
assets being liquidated will be purchased at prices below their value in best use. The exception 
to this scenario is when the asset is fungible, or redeployable for alternative, but valuable, uses 
outside of the industry. 
 Shleifer and Vishny (1992) also find that industry cash flows affect both value and 
liquidity, drawing a correlation between the liquidity of an industry and its market value. They 
argue that when the cash flow of potential industry buyers is high, these buyers are more likely 
to be able to finance asset purchases. In other words, an asset’s liquidity increases with its 
potential buyer’s cash flow.  
 
2.1.1.2.3 Firm Locale 
Cross border transactions as well as domestic and foreign government intervention can 
also affect asset sales. For instance, Borisova, John, and Salotti (2013) look at divestitures by 
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US firms and find that cross-border asset sales to foreign buyers result in higher abnormal 
returns for the seller. 
 
2.1.1.3. Asset Type 
Assets sold by firms vary in type and value. Hite et al. (1987) define a sell-off as “the sale 
of a subsidiary, division, or other operating assets to a buyer for cash, securities, and/or other 
future consideration” (p. 231). For instance, using the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), 
a database containing detailed information concerning manufacturing firms, Maksimovic and 
Phillips (2001) and Yang (2008) focus on the market for corporate assets by specifically 
looking at the sale and purchase of manufacturing plants, whether in a partial segment sale, full 
segment sale, or M&A transaction.  
An examination of the differing studies shows that data availability varies by the type of 
asset being studied and has a hand in shaping the study of asset sales. For example, some studies 
focus mainly on the sale of business segments (Berger and Ofek (1995) and Borisova et al. 
(2013)), while others look at asset sales from a variety of asset types. For instance, Pan et al. 
(2015)  study asset sales found from Compustat for segment and cash flow data, SDC for sale 
of business units, and Worldscope for international company asset sales.  
 
2.1.1.4. Asset Performance 
Asset performance is also an important determinant of which segments are selected to be 
divested, as well as the value of the asset being divested, and is similar to asset quality in the 
related research (see Section 2.1.1.1). For example, Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) find that 
66.8% of their sample divest the division with cash flows below the median of all segments of 
the firm. 
Hite et al. (1987) state that for shareholders to gain from an asset sale the unit must offer 
the possibility for improved financial performance, and the asset buyer must have a 
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comparative advantage over current management in order to achieve a turnaround. They also 
suggest that the advantages of selling a poorly performing business unit depend on the 
alternative uses and on potential competition.  
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) endeavor to determine the success of an acquisition by 
looking at the subsequent divestitures of those acquisitions. They find that 34% of acquisitions 
that are subsequently divested are divested due to performance related issues. However, while 
asset performance is an important determinant, Schlingemann et al. (2002) find that the worst 
performing segment is less likely to be divested than the most liquid segment, as discussed in 
Section 2.1.1.2.2. 
Additionally, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find that when firms sell valuable assets that are 
not generating current cash flow, it can do so without sacrificing its current income.  
 
2.1.1.5. Relative Size 
Prior studies show that firms are more likely to divest their smaller units. Dittmar and 
Shivdasani (2003) find that 68% of the firms in their sample divested their smallest segment. 
Similarly, Schlingemann et al. (2002) show that almost half (46.9%) of divested segments 
have sales of less than 10% of the firm’s total sales. They also find that a divestiture is more 
likely to occur when the segment is small rather than when it performs poorly. This agrees with 
earlier research by Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (1999) wherein they find that focusing 
firms are much more likely to divest their smallest segment. 
Additionally, Mulherin and Boone (2000) find that the median estimate for the relative 
value of asset sales is 11% and that the wealth creation for both acquisitions and divestitures is 
directly related to the relative size of the restructuring event. 
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2.1.1.6. Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry occurs when management has information that investors do not 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984), or when sellers or buyers have information that the other party does 
not (Edmans and Mann, 2017 and Hege et al., 2006). This asymmetry can make it difficult to 
assign the proper value to assets being sold. Akerlof (1970) presents a theory on quality and 
uncertainty (market for “lemons”) which highlights the challenge buyers have in judging the 
quality of a prospective purchase. This is because there is an incentive for sellers to market 
poor quality products. 
In their two sided asymmetric model for asset sales, Hege et al. (2006) suggest that sellers 
have specific knowledge about the intrinsic quality of the asset, and that buyers have private 
information about the value they expect to generate from their management of the asset. Their 
model accounts for this situation in a double signaling game that will ultimately result in the 
settlement on a purchase price of the asset. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find that there is less asymmetric information with asset sales 
than with new security issuance. They suggest that the problem of information asymmetry for 
new security issues is eliminated when asset sales are used as an alternative way of obtaining 
funds due to the fact that the purchasers are likely informed industry insiders who are the most 
capable of determining the assets value. 
Similarly, Hite et al. (1987) suggest that a direct sale to another firm will lower the cost of 
the asymmetric information problem. This is because the bidder is likely to be given greater 
access to information regarding the asset being sold than will the general market. 
 
2.1.2. Asset Seller 
Seller characteristics and motivations can play a significant role in the expected outcome 
of an asset sale. In this section, I review literature on agency issues, motivation and uses of 
proceeds from asset sales, and seller performance as a result of asset sales. 
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2.1.2.1. Agency Issues 
Agency costs associated with asset sales can be significant depending on management 
motivation for the sale and their intended use of the proceeds. The motivation for asset sales 
will be covered in greater depth in Section 2.1.2.2., but I will first review some of the studies 
relating specifically to agency issues in asset sales.  
Jensen (1986) presents the free cash flow hypothesis in which he predicts that when 
managers have large free cash flows and unused borrowing power they are more likely to 
undertake low benefit or even value destroying transactions rather than pay those cash flows 
out to shareholders. This same effect can be applied in the case of the use of proceeds of asset 
sales. 
Several studies look at the reaction by shareholders to the intended use of those proceeds. 
Bates (2005) suggests that shareholder wealth is negatively correlated with the retention of 
proceeds from an asset sale. Alternatively, he finds positive responses to the use of asset sale 
proceeds to pay down debt or to make distributions to shareholders. Along these same lines, 
Stulz (1990) and Lang et al. (1995) find that, due to agency problems, managers will be inclined 
to retain sale proceeds rather than distribute to existing shareholders or pay off debt. 
Tehranian et al. (1987) look at the effect that executive compensation plans have on 
divestment decisions. Specifically, they look at firms with long-term performance plans versus 
firms with only short-term bonus and options plans. Their findings show a correlation between 
sell-off decisions and the method of remuneration for executives. They find that firms with 
long-term performance plans in place experience significantly positive abnormal returns at 
announcement, suggesting that investors view these as positive net present value decisions. 
Alternatively, they show that announcements of sell-offs by firms without a long-term 
performance plan in place result in negative but insignificant abnormal returns. They propose 
that long-term performance plans can alleviate agency costs by providing for better alignment 
of executive and investor interests for the proceeds. 
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Pan et al. (2015) show the agency costs associated with holding on to assets that should 
have been sold previously. They find evidence for a CEO divestment/investment cycle in which 
during the first three years of tenure for a new CEO, they will divest at a larger rate than at any 
other time. Interestingly, Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994) find that CEO turnover is 
significantly less for firms that use asset sales to repay debt, suggesting that the incumbent 
CEOs studied by Pan et al. (2015) and subsequently replaced by new CEOs might not have 
been removed had they not been reluctant to take action when needed. 
Closely related, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) show an increase in asset sales 
following a merger. They suggest this may be because the merged firm is selling poorly 
performing assets. This may be for a similar reason to that of Pan et al. (2015) wherein new 
management is not tied to poor performing projects of their predecessors. 
In relation to the asset buyer, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that asset sales carry less 
potential agency costs for the buyer than the purchase of new securities. They suggest that asset 
buyers do not have to worry as much about agency problems because, unlike the buyers of new 
securities, control over the assets is turned over to the buyer when assets are sold. 
 
2.1.2.2. Motivation to Sell and Use of Proceeds 
Determining the correct motivation behind an asset sale can be difficult. This is because 
management is not always forthcoming in the reason for the divestment. Some studies attempt 
to identify the reason for the sale based on what has been reported, either directly from the firm, 
or from the headlines. This information must be hand collected by reading announcements to 
see if a stated reason for the sale of the asset can be determined (Lang et al. (1995)). Not all 
purposes for asset sales are clearly reported. Those that have been reported are susceptible to 
inaccuracies as management may be less likely to report motivations that may be negatively 
viewed by the markets, such as asset sales due to financial distress. 
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Following the classifications identified by Borisova et al. (2013), Table 2.1 categorizes 
some potential motivations for asset sales found in the literature. 
[Please See Table 2.1] 
 
2.1.2.2.1 Corporate Focusing 
Corporate focusing occurs when a firm sells an asset that is not related to their core 
operations. One of the main themes to stand out in this literature review is the effect corporate 
focusing has on the performance of firms engaging in inter-firm transactions such as asset sales 
or acquisitions. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that the most common reason for divestitures 
is to change corporate focus, with 42% of their sample selling assets in order to increase focus. 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that firms are motivated to become more focused when 
the prospects in their main industry improve significantly. 
In the related literature, corporate focus is classified either in terms of firm focus or firm 
diversification. I will start by examining the literature on firm focus and will finish with the 
literature regarding firm diversification. 
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) find a pattern of firm focusing, with divested assets tending 
to move from firms with relatively unrelated assets to those with relatively related assets. This 
general shift towards relatedness highlights a pervasive trend in the literature where assets tend 
to move in order to find their place of best use. They find that assets will shift to firms that 
have an advantage in managing that specific asset. 
Similarly, Hite et al. (1987) cite several reasons management would choose to divest 
including, the buyer having a comparative advantage over current management in improved 
performance (best use) or lack of fit between the parent and subsidiary. They assert that asset 
sales are in the best interest of investors when the net sale proceeds exceed the present value 
of the net future cash flows from the continued ownership and operation of the asset. 
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The magnitude of this trend toward focus is significant. As mentioned previously, 
Schlingemann et al. (2002) show that 70% of divested segments belong to an industry unrelated 
to the core activities of the parent. They consider a firm to be focusing when it decreases the 
number of segments reported. This reduction could be due to either divestitures or a dissolution 
of the segment. Likewise, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that 60.2% of the acquisitions in 
which the acquirer and target do not share a primary two-digit SIC code are later divested. 
The empirical results from this shift toward relatedness are mostly positive. John and Ofek 
(1995) find that asset sales lead to improvements in operating performance in firms that 
increase their focus. Comment and Jarrell (1995) find that many of the purported benefits of 
diversification could not be found in their analysis and, in fact, find the opposite. They show 
that the trend toward greater focus is associated with greater shareholder wealth.  
Looking at spinoffs, Desai and Jain (1999) find that firms that increase their focus 
outperform those that don’t by a statistically significant 47.70% in the three-year period 
following the spinoffs. They find that both announcement period and long-run (3 year) 
abnormal returns for focus-increasing spinoffs are significantly larger than those for non-focus-
increasing spinoffs. They also find their operating performance results are consistent with stock 
market performance.  
Campa and Kedia (2002) find that the decision to focus is endogenous. Firms will choose 
to focus when the presence of firm specific characteristics make it more advantageous to focus. 
They find that, even after controlling for endogeneity, focusing is positively correlated with 
firm value. 
This focusing effects both the asset seller and the asset buyer. Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and 
Raman (2003) find that bidders create value when buying assets if the assets purchased are a 
better fit with the buyer than the seller. Megginson et al. (2004) find that focus preserving or 
increasing acquisitions experience positive changes in long-term performance. Their results 
show that the primary determinant of long-term performance in strategic mergers is the degree 
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of change in corporate focus as a result of the merger. Their research shows that with every 10% 
decline in focus there is a corresponding 9% loss in relative stockholder wealth. They conclude 
that increasing focus and cash financing generally lead to positive long-term performance, 
while diversification and stock financing lead to declines in performance. 
Coming at firm focus from a different direction, many studies look at the effects of firm 
diversification rather than focus. Berger and Ofek (1995) estimate the effects diversification 
has on firm value and find a 13% to 15% average value loss. This loss is commonly referred to 
in the literature as the diversification discount. They find the causes of this loss are 
overinvestment and subsidization of poorly performing segments. Advocates of diversification 
point to potential gains from corporate diversification such as tax savings, but Berger and Ofek 
(1995) find these potential gains to be very small and do not offset losses that come from 
diversification. 
Comment and Jarrell (1995) give a plausible reason for the well documented 
diversification discount. They argue that asset turnover is higher at diversified firms, 
suggesting that book values will be marked to market more frequently at diversified firms due 
to this continued step up. They also note that the more segments a firm has, the higher 
percentage of those segments is divested, thus perpetuating this ongoing step up. 
Similarly, Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) look at changes in the degree of diversification 
and how it affects changes in the diversification discount. They put forth the corporate focus 
hypothesis which posits that diversified firms trade at a discount because of the value-
decreasing investments pursued by management and the subsidizing of poor performing 
segments by taking resources away from better performing segments. They find that 
divestitures that increase firm focus lead to large improvements in the allocation of resources 
through the firm. Further, firm diversification is not only a factor of management decisions but 
is also affected by industry trends. Lang and Stulz (1994) find that firm diversification is 
affected by industry characteristics. 
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Moreover, Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) show that certain sources of financing are 
favored depending on the degree of diversification. They find that external financial resources 
are associated with what Rumelt (1974) termed as related diversification, while internal 
financial resources are associated with more unrelated diversification. 
To measure the effects of diversification on the firm, several studies look at the 
diversification discount. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) find that diversified companies have a 
mean discount of 0.33%, significant at the 1% level. Berger and Ofek (1995) also find a 
discount, but not as pronounced at 0.10%. 
Alternatively, Campa and Kedia (2002) present a contradictory view. They suggest that 
the discount often attributed with firm diversification may in fact develop as a result of 
endogeneity and actually caused by other firm specific characteristics. They find that, when 
endogeneity is corrected for, the diversification discount drops in all cases and even results in 
premiums for some. 
Methods found in the literature for measuring firm focus include: i) the number of 
segments reported by management; ii) the number of segments with different four-digit SIC 
codes; iii) changes in the number of reported segments; and iv) the Herfindahl index (both 
revenue- and asset-based).2 
  
2.1.2.2.2 Synergies 
According to Borisova et al. (2013), opportunities for synergies resulting from asset sales 
may come from the elimination of duplicated services or operations, or from synergies realized 
as a result of agreements with other firms stemming from the sale of an asset. However, no 
literature relating to synergies from asset sales could be found. This may be as a result of a gap 
                                                 
2 See also Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) who use the correlation coefficient of monthly stock returns 
between the target and the bidder over the three years prior to the acquisition, and Comment and Jarrell (1995) 
and Desai and Jain (1999) who use variations of the measures identified above. 
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in the literature or a misclassification on my part. Additionally, data on these types of 
transactions may be too difficult to obtain. 
 
2.1.2.2.3 Pay Off Debt 
Firms will often use proceeds from asset sales to retire debt, which is generally viewed 
positively by the markets. Bates (2005) finds the most favorable market reaction at the 
announcement of an asset sale comes as a result of a distribution of proceeds to debt rather than 
to equity or retaining the proceeds. Further, Allen and McConnell (1998) show that the 
expected use of the proceeds has a significant effect on the abnormal announcement returns, 
and find that firms that announced that the proceeds from an asset sale would be used to pay 
down debt or to pay a dividend experienced an excess return of 6.63%, whereas firms which 
announced their intention to use the proceeds for additional investment saw excess returns of -
0.01%. Similarly, Clayton and Reisel (2013) find that asset sales can create value when highly 
leveraged firms use the proceeds to retire debt. This result applies to both stock and bond excess 
returns. 
Related to the motivation to pay down debt is that of financial constraint or distress. Brown 
et al. (1994) discuss financial distress as a reason for asset sales and find the opposite result. 
They find that firms that use asset sale proceeds to repay debt have significantly lower average 
abnormal returns than those firms that retain the proceeds. This result may come because, 
according to Allen and McConnell (1998), managers will only pursue divestitures, due to 
agency issues, when their firms are financially constrained and they have little alternative to 
raise funds. 
Ofek (1993) studies firm response to poor performance and finds three main operational 
responses to distress. First, firms change their asset structure by selling assets, divesting 
divisions, and discontinuing unprofitable operations; second, firms change the size and scope 
of operations by consolidating production facilities and laying off employees; and third, firms 
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change top management. For purposes of this research I focus on the first response, that of 
selling or divesting. Ofek (1993) also finds a positive relation between pre-distress leverage 
and cash-generating actions such as asset sales. 
Lang et al. (1995) suggest that the motivation to sell assets is that asset sales provide funds 
when alternative sources of financing are too expensive. They find that alternative sources are 
too expensive because these firms are poor performers and have high leverage. When viewed 
from the buyer’s perspective, Amira, John, Prezas, and Vasudevan (2013) find a significant 
and positive relation between the stock price reaction of buyers and the seller’s level of 
financial distress. 
Along these lines, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) present a model wherein firms sell assets 
due to distress. They suggest that the potential buyers who would pay the highest valuation will 
probably be in the same industry and affected by the same shock causing the need for cash and 
therefore unable to bid on the asset. The result is that illiquid assets are not always purchased 
by the highest fundamental valuation users. This in turn leads to the sale of the asset to 
inefficient managers at prices below value in best use.  
Further, Smith and Warner (1979) analyze the effect bond covenants have on the use of 
the proceeds from a sale of assets. They find that, for distressed firms, proceeds of sales are 
often required to be used to pay down debt instead of for other uses. Datta et al. (2003) find 
that effective lender monitoring enhances firm value in asset sale transactions. 
Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) analyze ways financially distressed firms avoid 
bankruptcy and discuss asset sales as one potential solution. They find that there are three 
barriers to asset sales: i) conflicts between shareholders and creditors (see also Brown et al. 
(1994)); ii) managerial self-interest; and iii) industry factors such as trying to sell into 
financially distressed industries (Schlingemann et al. (2002) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). 
Borisova et al. (2013) find that for liquidity-constrained asset sellers, cross-border asset 
purchases result in higher abnormal return compared to domestic deals. This may be due to the 
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fact that domestic firms are experiencing similar financial constraints, whereas their foreign 
equivalents may not be (similar to Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). Moreover, Arnold, Hackbarth, 
and Puhan (2015) study the effect business cycles have on asset sales and find firms are more 
likely to finance through asset sales when they have high leverage and are in bad business cycle 
states. Additionally, Schlingemann et al. (2002) find that “growth rates in sales, assets, capital 
expenditures, and cash flow are significantly lower for divesting firms” (p. 123) They point to 
the fact that divesting firms tend to be more financially constrained or may have poorer 
investment opportunities.  
 
2.1.2.2.4 Raise Cash 
Firms may sell assets to strengthen the balance sheet or to generate cash for ongoing 
operations. To this point, Lang et al. (1995) put forward the financing hypothesis wherein 
management sells assets to obtain funds to pursue its objectives when alternative funding is 
either too expensive or unavailable.  
In the literature, firms that sell assets and thereafter do not distribute the proceeds are 
deemed to have retained the proceeds. Bates (2005) looks at the use of the proceeds from an 
asset sale and their effects on shareholder returns at announcement. The use of proceeds are 
sorted into three categories – firms that retain the proceeds, firms that distribute the proceeds 
to debt holders through interest payments or the retirement of debt, and firms that distribute the 
proceeds to equity holders through dividend payments or share repurchases. He finds that firms 
that decide to retain the proceeds experience significantly lower abnormal returns at 
announcement.  
 
2.1.2.2.5 Increase Shareholder Value 
Another motivation for asset sales is to use the proceeds to make distributions to 
shareholders through dividends or share repurchases. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) find that, 
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on average, nearly 20% of the proceeds from asset sales are used to repurchase equity, 
representing 6% of the outstanding market value of firm equity. However, using asset sale 
proceeds to make shareholder distributions is viewed less favorably than when asset sale 
proceeds are used to pay down debt, as shown by Bates (2005). 
 
2.1.2.2.6 Reinvestment 
Firms may also sell assets in order to use the proceeds to enhance the quality or efficiency 
of the remaining assets. Hite et al. (1987) find that at times management indicate that assets are 
being sold to raise capital for expansion of existing lines of business or to reduce high levels 
of debt.  Arnold et al. (2015) find positive significant association between asset sales and 
investment suggesting that financing asset sales are a potential source of investment funding. 
Likewise, Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Borisova and Brown (2013) find asset sales are 
associated with increased capital expenditure and R&D expenses, respectively.   
Similarly, Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) propose that asset sales relax externally imposed 
financial constraints by allowing firms to undertake valuable investments that would otherwise 
go unfunded. They posit that divestitures should be associated with an increase in investment 
for divisions that are unable to finance all their positive net present value projects. Their results 
show that firms increase investment primarily in underinvesting segments, while at the same 
time investment decreases for segments with a history of overinvestment, indicating an 
improved allocation of capital across divisions. Because of this reinvestment, they find that 
divestitures don’t appear to be associated with a permanent shift in capital structure. 
 
2.1.2.2.7 Cost Efficiency 
Another motivation identified in the literature for the disposal of assets is that of cost 
efficiency. Firms may sell assets to improve cost structures, improve margins, or mitigate 
expected operating losses. For instance, Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) suggest that firms 
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experience gains from asset sales through improvement in the management of the firm's 
retained operations. 
 
2.1.2.2.8 Regulatory Requirements  
At times, firms may be forced to sell assets in order to comply with regulatory 
requirements, often to satisfy antitrust approvals. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) identify a possible 
unintended consequence of regulatory requirements. They suggest that these requirements can 
cause illiquidity through regulations that prohibit monopolies, such as antitrust enforcement 
and promoting protectionist practices, preventing foreign firms from buying domestic assets.  
 
2.1.2.2.9 Acquisition Financing 
This thesis identifies the funding of acquisitions as an important motivation for asset sales. 
Despite the apparent importance of asset sales as a funding source, the only reference that could 
be found in the literature specifically suggesting acquisitions are a potential motivation for 
asset sales is a passing comment made by Lang et al. (1995) suggesting that many companies 
"[…] seem to sell assets while engaged in a program of acquisitions so that the asset sales 
provide cash for these programs […]” (p. 9) and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and John and 
Ofek (1995) who provide brief descriptive statistics showing that some firms raise cash through 
asset sales to fund acquisitions. 
 
2.1.2.2.10 Other 
Some asset sales cannot be readily explained by one of the previously mentioned 
motivations. For example, Arnold et al. (2015) look to explain motivations for asset sales and 
find some asset sales can’t be described by the traditional motives. They find the wealth transfer 
problem to be a motivating factor in asset sales. Additionally, Brown et al. (1994) study the 
market reaction to asset sells by distressed firms based on the use of the proceeds. They find 
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that abnormal returns associated with asset sales where proceeds are used for paying down debt 
are negative but not statistically different from zero, while returns associated with other 
corporate purposes are positive and significant. 
 
2.1.3. Asset Buyer 
This thesis is focused on the use of proceeds by an asset seller to make subsequent 
acquisitions, and is not necessarily concerned with the asset buyer. However, the characteristics 
and actions of the buyer can help in determining the value received and the form of payment 
utilized for the asset purchase. First, a few observations from the literature regarding asset 
buyers will be considered. Second, the research on how synergies for the asset buyer may affect 
the value they are willing to pay the seller for their asset will be reviewed. Finally, payment 
method in asset sales will be examined. 
 
2.1.3.1. Observations on Asset Buyer 
Asset sellers may benefit more by selling to buyers outside of the seller’s local market. 
Borisova et al. (2013) find that higher seller returns are related to foreign buyers without a U.S. 
or multinational presence, suggesting that higher asset valuations result from a desire from the 
buyer for market expansion. 
Also, buyers may be able to value the asset more accurately. According to Hite et al. 
(1987), the buyer is likely to have a comparative advantage in valuing the asset, especially 
when compared to an investor, who would be required to value any new equity claims on the 
firm’s overall operations. This will be more pronounced for purchases of assets within the same 
industry. 
Additionally, Amihud, DeLong, and Golubov (2013) show that bids relay negative 
information regarding the bidders’ assets already in place. They suggest that managers try to 
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make acquisitions of assets when their existing projects are not producing satisfactory results 
(see also Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004)). 
2.1.3.2. Synergies for Buyer 
Anticipated synergies for the buyer can have a significant impact on the asset value. Hite 
et al. (1987) define synergy in corporate asset purchases as the “[…] potential productive gains 
that can be realized only by the transfer of the target assets from their current use to the buyer’s 
control” (p. 232). These synergies are seen to have come from the asset buyer’s advantage in 
management of the assets as a result of the assets being closely related to those of the buyer.  
Several studies have found a relation between relatedness and synergies. For instance, 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that roughly 43% of divestitures are sold to related acquirers. 
Further, John and Ofek (1995) suggest that some of the asset seller's gains come from a better 
fit between the divested asset and the buyer. As a result, the buyer will be more likely to pay a 
higher premium. Sicherman and Pettway (1987) look at the effects of purchasing divested 
assets on the buying firm’s shareholders’ wealth and find that the relatedness of the asset being 
acquired has a strong positive and significant effect on abnormal returns at announcement, and 
that firms with higher insider ownership are commonly concentrated on these types of 
acquisitions. They find that relatedness, as measured by SIC codes, is a strong determinant for 
potential synergies.  
Similarly, Rosenfeld (1984) suggests that the buyer of assets is likely to have a competitive 
advantage over the seller, and as a result, the price paid may exceed what the seller sees as the 
present value of the assets’ future cash flows. However, the price the buyer pays will be less 
than what they see as the present value of the assets’ future cash flows if they were to own that 
asset. 
Economically, Amira et al. (2013) find that the cumulative abnormal returns for their 
sample of asset buyers are positive and significant at 1.58% over a 3-day window, indicating 
that asset purchases enhance buyer firm value. Borisova et al. (2013) also find positive 
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abnormal returns for buyers in asset sales with a positive 1.84% over a 3-day window. 
However, they find that returns are larger for the seller than for the buyer in general. Finally, 
Datta et al. (2003) find that buyers gain more in asset acquisitions when they are a high-q buyer 
and the seller has a low-q, suggesting that firms with good growth prospects gain more from 
purchasing assets. 
 
2.1.3.3. Payment Method 
This section reviews literature regarding the payment method used by the buyer in asset 
sales. This relates closely to research on payment methods in mergers and acquisitions which 
look at the methods of cash, equity, and mixed cash/equity. For a more complete discussion on 
payment method relating to acquisitions, see Section 2.2.2. 
Cash is the predominant method of payment in asset sale transactions. Clayton and Reisel 
(2013) find that remuneration from asset sales is almost explicitly in cash, with 81% of asset 
sales involving 100% cash transactions.  
Using cash as a method of payment can affect the total potential gain a seller may 
experience as a result of an asset sale. As discussed in Section 2.1.1.1, Hege et al. (2006) 
develop a model which predicts that cash as a method of payment in asset sales will generate 
only small gains in wealth, with most of the gains going to the seller. Their model suggests that 
only firms selling relatively low quality assets will accept cash as a method of payment. They 
will not be inclined to accept equity as payment because of their expectations of equity returns 
to the buyer due to the buyer’s purchase of low quality assets. In contrast, their model predicts 
that asset sales with equity as the method of payment will result in greater gains and will be 
shared by both buyer and seller. 
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 Sources of Financing in Mergers and Acquisitions 
Research regarding acquisitions is abundant, so in order to make this review most 
effective, it is important to focus on areas that relate closely to the focal point of this thesis. 
These areas of focus are: i) Sources of Financing in Acquisitions, including asset sales, funds 
raised from debt offerings, the issuance of equity, and cash from operations; ii) Payment 
Methods, including cash, equity, and a mixture of cash and equity; iii) Synergies, including 
announcement returns and long-term operating performance; iv) Acquisition Premiums; v) 
Target Characteristics; vi) Mode of Acquisition; and vii) Timing of Acquisition after the source 
of financing is secured. 
 
2.2.1. Sources of Financing 
In this section, we examine theoretical and empirical work on sources of financing with 
the intent of applying this information to asset sales as a potential source of financing for 
M&As. Table 2.2 lists empirical studies for the different sources of financing in acquisitions 
and the general outcomes for each source. 
[Please See Table 2.2] 
Within the literature on acquisitions, the terms source of financing and method of payment 
are often used synonymously, resulting in potentially inaccurate classifications. For example, 
a payment method of cash may have been financed through the firm’s cash flows or by issuing 
new debt or equity. Schlingemann (2004) points out that the form of payment in acquisitions 
has erroneously been used as a proxy for the source of financing. He discusses the fact that, 
even if the takeover is paid with cash, the actual source of the cash may have been overlooked. 
A reason for this may be that there are difficulties in establishing an exact correspondence 
between a dollar raised in time t and a dollar spent on an acquisition in time t+1.  This challenge 
is also a potential issue when examining asset sales as a source of financing. 
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Martynova and Renneboog (2009) demonstrate how payment methods are not the same as 
sources of financing in acquisitions. They examine the sources of equity, debt, and internally 
generated funds but do not consider asset sales. They find that bidders have systematic 
preferences for particular sources of financing which depend on their firm’s characteristics and 
on the characteristics of the takeover. Additionally, Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) suggest 
that studying the chosen sources of financing used for acquisitions can help shed light on a 
firm’s capital structure decisions. 
The following sections will discuss first the pecking order theory for corporate financing. 
Then four major sources of financing, namely asset sales, equity, debt, and internal cash will 
be discussed. One source of acquisition financing that has been overlooked is financing through 
asset sales.  
 
2.2.1.1. Pecking Order 
The pecking order (Myers and Majluf (1984)) posits that firms choose financing sources 
based on its relative cost. This implies that firms would tend to avoid external financing because 
of the higher associated costs. However, studies on the pecking order are contradictory. The 
implications of the pecking order are supported by Eckbo and Kisser (2013) who suggest that 
the cost of external financing must be large because of the much wider use of internal financing. 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) also find that financing decisions are explained by pecking 
order preferences.  
Alternatively, results from Elsas, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2013) provide little support for 
the common interpretation of the pecking order. However, they do find that firms prefer 
internal to external funds, particularly when those firms have experienced higher profitability, 
but also find for large acquisitions these profitable firms tend to issue more debt. Similarly, 
Fama and French (2005) find that over half of their sample violate the pecking order. They also 
find that on average net equity issues outstrip net debt issues. 
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2.2.1.2. Asset Sales 
The extant research on asset sales looks at results from asset sales as well as a large number 
of motivations for those sales. However, none of the research approaches asset sales as a source 
of financing for acquisitions. This represents an obvious gap in the literature and a primary 
purpose of this thesis.  
As discussed in Section 2.1.1.1, new theoretical work by Edmans and Mann (2017) 
highlights the importance of asset sales as a financing source. Their theory predicts that asset 
sales are preferred as a source of financing when other industry firms are concurrently selling 
assets for operation reasons, and when the firm is a conglomerate.  
Empirically, Eckbo and Kisser (2013) find that the average firm raises around 12% of all 
sources of funds externally, and that funds from asset sales contribute more to overall funding 
than do net proceeds from issuing debt. Additionally, Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) 
suggest that asset sales can be viewed as a source of financing, allowing a parent firm to bypass 
the monitoring inherent in a public securities offering. 
As mentioned previously, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Lang et al. (1995), and John and 
Ofek (1995) provide anecdotal or summary statistics suggesting that firms do sell assets to fund 
acquisitions. However, while these studies do identify asset sales as a funding source, no work 
has been done to empirically test the effect of asset sales as a source of financing in M&As.  
 
2.2.1.3. Debt 
Debt financing represents a large source of financing for acquisitions. Harford et al. (2009) 
find that most large acquisitions paid for with cash are actually financed with new debt issues.  
The cost of borrowing can affect the prevalence of debt financing. Alexandridis, 
Mavrovitis, and Travlos (2012) show the primary driver of the 2003-2007 merger wave was 
liquidity, specifically from low financing rates and large corporate cash balances, implying the 
use of debt. In further support for this fact, Uysal (2011) finds a negative and significant 
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relationship between overleveraged firms and their likelihood of making an acquisition. This 
is no surprise as the cost to finance for overleveraged firms is large.  
Further, Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) measure the degree to which the acquisition 
was financed by bank financing and find that tender offers financed by bank debt are associated 
with significantly positive abnormal returns. In contrast, Schlingemann (2004) finds no relation 
to bidder gains and cash raised from debt financing. 
Banking relationships can also affect financing choice. For instance, Faccio and Masulis 
(2005) find when a bidder is on a bank’s board of directors (specifically in continental Europe), 
there is a larger portion of cash as the method of payment. They suggest this is a result of better 
access to debt financing. 
Yook (2003) looks at the relation between the S&P upgrade or downgrade of a firm’s debt 
with the firm’s method of payment in acquisitions. He finds that cash bidders who experience 
a downgrade to their debt encounter larger significant abnormal returns than those firms that 
don’t experience a downgrade. He suggests this is due to the fact that most cash acquisitions 
are financed through the issuance of debt. This brings about the benefit of debt theory which 
states that the creation of debt allows managers to bond their promise to pay out future cash 
flows. 
Additionally, Zhang (2016) provides evidence that a firm’s chosen financing source is 
affected by changes in tax law. Specifically in this study, firms are found to cut cash spending 
and increase debt spending on acquisitions following an IRS 2012 tax change that reduces debt 
restructuring costs and decreases bankruptcy risks. 
 
2.2.1.4. Equity 
Firms often issue equity after significant run-ups in their equity values (see Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986) and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996)). Similarly, Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and 
Teoh (2006) study the effect that equity misvaluation has on takeovers. They find that highly 
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valued bidders are more likely to use stock and less likely to use cash. Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) also find that firms tend to issue equity when the value of their equity is relatively high. 
Alternatively, they find that firms tend to repurchase equity when valuations are low. They 
show that equity market timing has a real effect on financing policy and conclude that a firm’s 
capital structure is influenced by past market valuations. 
As discussed in Section 2.1.1.1, Edmans and Mann (2017) propose a new theory on the 
choice between asset sales and equity for financing needs. As part of their framework, the 
balance sheet effect suggests that higher financing needs push firms towards the use of equity, 
while alternatively, firms with low financing needs will favor asset sales.  
Further, Schlingemann (2004) studies sources of financing in acquisitions and their effect 
on bidder gains, with a focus on equity and debt as the source of financing. He finds that bidder 
gains are positively and significantly related to the level of equity financing during the fiscal 
year prior to the takeover announcement. He suggests this reaction is due to the resolution of 
uncertainty about the use of proceeds. If this reaction is due to the resolution of uncertainty 
about the use of proceeds, I may expect to find a similar lagged reaction when using proceeds 
from asset sales and debt issuance.  
Another motivation to issue equity as a source of financing for acquisitions may be caused 
by the fact that the firms already have too much debt outstanding. In their study of the effects 
on capital structure from financing major investments, Elsas et al. (2013) find that over-levered 
firms issue less debt and more equity when financing large projects. 
Finally, several studies show that stock prices react non-positively to announcements of 
new security offerings (see Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Asquith and Mullins Jr (1986), and 
Masulis and Korwar (1986)). This may be one of the motivations for asset sales over security 
issuance.  
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2.2.1.5. Internal Cash 
Using cash flow data, Eckbo and Kisser (2013) analyze sources and uses of funds and 
document an overwhelming reliance on internal financing in general. They show contribution 
from debt and equity is relatively small and that internal financing is the dominant source. 
Despite this general reliance for internal finance, prior M&A studies show a non-positive 
response to the use internally financed acquisitions (see Schlingemann (2004), Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling (1991), and Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003)). 
 
2.2.2. Method of Payment 
Many studies have investigated the determinants of the method of payment in acquisitions, 
comprising the use of cash, equity, and a mix of cash and equity. The literature discussed in 
this section provides evidence that the chosen method of payment has been shown to affect a 
number of outcomes relating to acquisitions including announcement abnormal returns. Table 
2.3 list studies relating to payment methods in acquisitions as well as the general outcomes for 
each method. 
[Please See Table 2.3] 
 
2.2.2.1. Cash 
The majority of studies exploring the outcomes of cash as the method of payment in 
acquisitions have documented significantly positive abnormal returns. For instance, Travlos 
(1987), Huang and Walkling (1987), Loughran and Vijh (1997) and all show that cash offers 
are associated with significantly and substantially higher returns.  
Similarly, Megginson et al. (2004) find that the cash method of payment is significantly 
related to long-term performance, specifically that payments in cash outperform payments in 
equity. However, Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009), researching the relationship between 
M&A activity and stock prices, note differences in M&A results from high and low valuation 
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markets. They find that cash acquisitions in the 1980s resulted in significantly positively long-
run abnormal returns for bidders, while those in the 1990s resulted in significantly negative 
long-run abnormal returns. They suggest that a portion of the underperformance of the 1990s 
can be explained by the high valuation market from that time period. 
Alternatively, Ghosh (2001) finds that operating performance does not improve after an 
acquisition, but does find a significant cash flow increase when acquisitions are made with cash 
rather than stock. Brown and Ryngaert (1991) find that returns for cash offers are not different 
from zero but are significantly higher than returns for all stock or mixed offers. Chang (1998) 
finds that acquisitions with cash as the method of payment had insignificant abnormal returns. 
This may be due to the fact the targets in his study are privately held, and may not find similar 
results with publicly held targets. 
Additionally, prior studies also provide other observations regarding the use of cash as a 
method of payment. Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) find that the greater the extent 
of information asymmetry experienced by an acquirer in evaluating a target, the greater the 
likelihood that it uses cash as the method of payment. They also find that the use of cash by an 
acquirer discourages rival bids. Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, and Travlos (2013) find that 
smaller targets are more likely to be acquired with cash than equity. Carleton, Guilkey, Harris, 
and Stewart (1983) find that lower dividend payout ratios and lower market-to-book ratios 
increase the probability of a firm being acquired in a cash takeover relative to being acquired 
through equity. 
Moreover, Faccio and Masulis (2005), in their study of European M&As, show that 
method of payment is tied to corporate governance and that bidders prefer cash when voting 
control of their dominant shareholder is threatened. Similarly, Amihud, Lev, and Travlos 
(1990) find that relatively large insider ownership leads to a higher likelihood for that firm to 
finance acquisitions with cash rather than with equity. 
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2.2.2.2. Equity 
Studies by Brown and Ryngaert (1991), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Chang (1998), and 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) find significantly negative bidder shareholder returns when 
equity is the method of payment. However, when estimating this effect for privately held 
targets only, Chang (1998) shows significantly positive abnormal returns.  
In addition,  Alexandridis et al. (2013) find that larger targets are more likely to be acquired 
with equity than cash. Carleton et al. (1983) find that firms with higher dividend payouts appear 
more likely to be acquired with a security exchange than with cash. Further, Faccio and Masulis 
(2005) find instances where the owner of bidder and target are the same. In these cases, where 
the target is already under bidder control, they find that stock financing of the deal is more 
likely. 
As discussed in Section 2.2.1.4, Chemmanur et al. (2009) find that acquirers using equity 
as the method of payment are overvalued, whereas those using cash are correctly valued. They 
use two models to compute intrinsic value: i) the residual income model (D'Mello and Shroff 
(2000)); and ii) the Ohlson model (Ohlson (2005)). 
 
2.2.2.3. Mixed Cash/ Equity 
Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) develop a model to derive the optimal mix of 
cash and stock. This model looks at two-sided asymmetries between the bidder and target firms. 
Their model seeks to identify the true value of the bidder based on the composition of their 
mixed offer. They find significant and positive average announcement returns for mixed offers. 
However, their results do not provide support for their model predictions. 
Additionally, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) provide a theoretical model on 
asymmetric information wherein bidders have information and targets do not. The empirical 
implications of their model suggest that in takeovers financed with a mixture of cash and equity, 
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the higher the amount of cash, the higher the abnormal returns to stockholders of both the 
acquirer and the target. 
 
2.2.2.4. Determinants of Choice of Payment Method 
Eckbo (2009) reviews the literature relating to the choice of payment method in takeovers. 
He finds the hypotheses from the literature can be separated into four main areas: i) taxes and 
payment method; ii) the payment method choice motivated by asymmetric information; iii) 
capital structure and corporate control motives for the payment method choice; and iv) 
behavioral motives for the payment method choice.  
As evidence for point (i) above, Brown and Ryngaert (1991) develop a model to better 
analyze the method of payment decision taking into account the effect of taxes. Their model 
predicts that stock offers (after 1986) should be more likely and should result in smaller 
negative price reactions. 
In relation to point (iii) above, Karampatsas, Petmezas, and Travlos (2014) that credit 
rating are positively related to the use of cash as the method of payment. Also, Amihud et al. 
(1990) find that corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing through cash or debt 
rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing 
control. This finding ties in with other agency considerations also identified. 
 
2.2.3. Synergies 
The literature on the performance of M&As often points to synergies as a potential reason 
for abnormal returns and gains in operating efficiencies. Davis and Thomas (1993) define 
synergy as “[…] super-additivity in valuation of business combinations” (p. 1334). In simple 
terms, they suggest synergy means that the valuation of a combination of businesses exceeds 
the sum of valuations if they were to stand alone. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) define the 
synergistic gain from a successful tender offer as “[…] the sum of the change in the wealth of 
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the stockholders of the target and acquiring firms” (p. 4). Similar to the notion by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992) that asset sales lead to the value in best use, Bradley et al. (1988) argue that the 
tender offer process allocates resources to their highest-valued use.  
In studying relatedness and synergy among pharmaceuticals, Davis and Thomas (1993) 
find that product relatedness does not necessarily imply synergy. They also show patterns of 
synergy for different types of relatedness shifted over time with the lifecycle of the industry. 
Similarly, Bena and Li (2013) look at synergies that result from combining innovation 
capabilities. They find that mergers are more likely to take place between firms with 
overlapping innovation activities. 
Amihud et al. (2013), in researching failed bids, find that stock-market-based measures of 
synergy gains are biased downward. They find that bidders which have failed bid attempts 
experience negative operating and stock performance after the failed bid. They suggest this is 
because the firm’s motivation for attempting an acquisition is because their current projects are 
unattractive. Without an acquisition and the resulting expected synergies, firms experience 
declines. With the acquisition, the combined entity typically experiences gains. If the lower 
expected value of the acquirer without an acquisition is used as the benchmark, synergistic 
gains from the acquisition appear to be greater.  
Additionally, Bouwman et al. (2009) find that acquirers buying in high valuation markets 
have significantly better announcement returns than those in low valuation markets, but also 
find that acquisitions during high valuation markets ultimately underperform those during low 
valuation markets in the two years following the acquisition. They also suggest that the best 
deals are those initiated when markets are depressed. This is because when markets or 
industries are low, targets will accept bids only if the expected synergies outweigh the 
prevailing negative information in the stock price. 
Lastly, Asquith (1983) suggest that a possible source of synergies comes as a result of 
inefficient management of the target firm. An acquisition provides the opportunity to remove 
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inefficient managers and replace them with managers who will best utilize the resources of the 
target firm. 
 
2.2.3.1. Long-term Operating Performance 
Post-acquisition long-term operating performance results are varied. Healy et al. (1992) 
and Linn and Switzer (2001) find positive operating performance, but Ghosh (2001) finds no 
operating improvements, while Megginson et al. (2004) find slightly negative operating 
performance. Furthermore, Ghosh (2001) finds that merging firms do not increase operating 
cash flows following an acquisition. He suggests that previous studies, such as Healy et al. 
(1992), may have biased results due to the fact that sample firms systematically outperform 
industry-median firms over pre-acquisition years due to permanent or temporary factors. 
Barber and Lyon (1996) analyze different accounting-based performance measures used 
in event studies. Specifically, they compare five measures of operating performance: i) return 
on assets (operating income scaled by the book value of assets); ii) return on cash-adjusted 
assets (operating income scaled by the book value of assets less cash and marketable securities); 
iii) return on sales (operating income scaled by sales); iv) return on market value of assets 
(operating income scaled by the market value of assets); and v) cash-flow return on assets 
(operating cash flow scaled by the book value of assets). They find that test statistics based on 
a cash-flow measure of operating income (i.e., cash-flow return on assets) are less powerful 
than those based on the other performance measures. Controlling for firm characteristics such 
as size, they find the one method that yields test statistics that are well specified in every 
sampling situation that they analyze is to match sample firms to control firms on size and pre-
event performance, without regard to industry. 
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2.2.4. Acquisition Premiums 
Premiums paid in acquisitions represent the valuation assumptions and the improvements 
or synergies expected by the bidder. Healy et al. (1992) suggest that managers who anticipate 
cash flow improvements will be more likely to pay a premium to acquire the targets. 
Interestingly, Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2008) find that acquirers paying high premiums do 
not underperform those paying relatively low premiums in the three years following a merger. 
A number of factors can affect the premium paid. Dong et al. (2006) find that highly valued 
bidders are willing to pay more relative to the target market price. Nathan and O'Keefe (1989) 
find that acquisition premiums are negatively related to the business cycle and suggest that 
acquisitions reflect undervaluation and undervaluation is worse in recessions. In addition, 
Huang and Walkling (1987) find that premiums in cash-financed acquisitions are larger. 
Alexandridis et al. (2013) find that target size is negatively associated with offer premiums 
and that acquirers typically pay about 30% lower premiums for larger targets. They suggest 
this is because of possible integration complexity associated with large deals. Even taking this 
into account, they find the larger deals destroy more value for acquiring shareholders.  
Officer (2003) studies target termination fees in relation to takeover premiums and the 
likelihood of successful completion. He finds that deals with target termination fees are 
associated with 4% higher takeover premiums and that target termination fees increase the 
probability of deal completion by almost 20%. He also finds that intra-industry mergers receive 
higher premiums than inter-industry mergers, that premiums are higher for tender offers, that 
bidders with toeholds of more than 5% experience lower premiums, and that bidders with good 
growth opportunities pay higher premiums.  
 
2.2.5. Target Characteristics 
The characteristics of the target can be a determinant of performance in acquisitions. Size 
has been identified as one determinant. In his study on target termination fees, Officer (2003) 
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finds that large bidders pay higher premiums and large targets earn lower premiums. 
Alexandridis et al. (2013) document that acquisitions of large targets are associated with lower 
premiums and that despite the lower premiums paid, these deals destroy more value for 
acquirers. They also find that target size is related to method of payment. Larger targets are 
more likely to be acquired with stock whereas small targets are more likely to be acquired with 
cash. 
Closely related to the review in Section 2.1.2.2.1 of corporate focusing in asset sales, focus 
in acquisitions has significant effect on the outcome of acquisitions. Healy et al. (1992) show 
that transactions with high business overlap have improvements in post-merger performance 
of 5.1%.  
 
2.2.6. Mode of Acquisition 
The mode of acquisition (tender offer or merger) also has an effect on the outcome of an 
acquisition. Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that cash tender offers perform better than do stock 
mergers with acquirers making tender offers earning 43% more than matching firms during a 
five-year period after acquisition. Their explanation for this result is that tender offers, which 
are often hostile to target managers, may create additional value as new managers are 
appointed. 
Alternatively, Huang and Walkling (1987) and Martin and McConnell (1991) find tender 
offers result in higher returns than mergers, but when they control for cash as the method of 
payment, they find no significant difference between tender offers and mergers.  
Additionally, Officer (2003) finds that tender offers result in higher acquisition premiums, 
and he also finds that termination fees are more likely to occur in friendly deals. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 42  Nathan P. McNamee 
2.2.7. Timing After Asset Sale 
In studying sources of financing for acquisitions, timing may also be an issue in identifying 
the financing source for cash acquisitions. How long after a firm offers equity or debt does the 
acquisition occur? Can the equity or debt offering reasonably be believed to be for the purpose 
of financing an acquisition? These same questions can be raised for asset sales. Was the sale 
completed because management wanted to use the cash for an acquisition, or was the 
motivation to sell motivated by another factor as outlined in Section 2.1.2.2?  
Schlingemann (2004) studies sources of financing in acquisitions and their effect on bidder 
gains, with a focus on equity and debt as the source of financing. He finds that bidder gains are 
positively and significantly related to the level of equity financing during the fiscal year prior 
to the takeover announcement. He suggests this reaction is due to the resolution of uncertainty 
about the use of proceeds. If this reaction is due to the resolution of uncertainty about the use 
of proceeds, a similar lagged reaction may be expected when using proceeds from asset sales 
and debt issuance. 
 
 Conclusion 
This literature reviewed examines prior research regarding asset sales and sources of 
financing in M&As. Based on this review, a significant gap in the literature relating to the use 
of asset sale proceeds as a funding source in M&As has been identified. The remaining chapters 
will proceed with the aim of answering some of the open questions related to this literature gap. 
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Tables for the Literature Review 
Table 2.1 
Motivation and uses of proceeds from asset sales. 
 
Motivation/ Use Definition (Borisova et al. (2013)) (p. 342) Related Studies 
Focus “Focus attention and resources on core business and 
assets; divest non-strategic or mature assets; strengthen 
existing operations and expand presence in primary 
market; concentrate on product where it has a 
competitive advantage; realize leadership positions in 
higher growth and more profitable markets; focus on 
expanding other promising business (resize and 
refocus); strategic decision of exiting; sell a loss making 
operation; disposition of non-core assets/business; 
evolution from a conglomerate to a focused operating 
company; furthering our strategy to consolidate and 
restructure around a more focused business model; does 
not complement; focusing on the key growth areas[...]” 
Comment and Jarrell (1995); Kaplan and Weisbach 
(1992); Jain (1985); John and Ofek (1995); Maksimovic 
and Phillips (2001); Megginson et al. (2004); Rumelt, 
1974; Hite et al., 1987; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 
1991; Agrawal, Jaffe, and Gershon (1992); Lang and 
Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Desai and Jain, 
1999; Ghosh, 2001; Linn and Switzer, 2001; Campa and 
Kedia, 2002; Schlingemann et al., 2002; Datta et al., 
2003; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003 
Synergies “Distribution agreement; service agreement; supply 
agreement; sales or marketing agreements; create 
synergies; eliminate duplicate services/operations; 
create significant economies of scale; begin working 
together; valuable partnership.” 
None found in relation to asset sales. 
Pay Off Debt “Pay down/reduce outstanding debt and comply with 
loan agreement provision; increase equity; (the 
acquirer) will assume all liabilities associated with the 
business; repay indebtedness; refinance; reduce 
outstanding short-term indebtedness; proceeds will be 
used to reduce corporate debt; positive effect on debt-
to-EBITDA ratio; strengthening financial and credit 
profile.” 
Lang et al. (1995); Datta et al. (2003); Jain (1985); 
Clayton and Reisel (2013); Smith and Warner (1979); 
Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, and Poterba 
(1988); Shleifer and Vishny (1992); Ofek (1993); 
Asquith et al. (1994); Brown et al. (1994); Allen and 
McConnell (1998); Schlingemann et al. (2002); Dittmar 
and Shivdasani (2003); Bates (2005); Amira et al. 
(2013); Borisova et al. (2013); Arnold et al. (2015) 
Raise Cash “Strengthen balance sheet; raise cash through disposal; 
monetize investment portfolio; increase net working 
capital; reduce cash burn and increase cash position; 
add to capital base; move towards profitability; increase 
overall liquidity; raise cash in conjunction with 
financing of concurrent acquisition; generate cash for 
the company's continuing operations.” 
Slovin et al. (1995); Bates (2005); Lang et al. (1995) 
Increase 
Shareholder Value 
“Distribution to preferred holders; retain proceeds to 
fund distribution to shareholders; distribution of 
sales/net proceeds; fund a substantial distribution to the 
shareholders and not the acquisition or the development 
of new businesses; giving back (funds) to shareholders; 
pay a special dividend; common stock repurchases.” 
Allen and McConnell (1998); Lang et al. (1995); Jain 
(1985); Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) 
Reinvestment “Enhance asset quality; refine portfolio of assets; 
general strategy to take advantage of sound investment 
opportunities; financial flexibility to accelerate the 
development of additional applications of existing 
products; optimize business portfolio; redefine 
manufacturing strategy through significantly improved 
asset utilization and greater supply-chain flexibility; 
expand capabilities; providing resources for advancing 
product pipeline; redeploy the associated capital; boost 
chance to buy more precious material; developing 
specialty pharmacy and other businesses; develop 
suitable infrastructure to sell and support product.” 
Lang et al. (1995); Hite et al. (1987); Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992); Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003); 
Hovakimian and Titman (2006); Arnold et al. (2015) 
Cost Efficiency “Cost savings; lower operating expenses and improve 
margins; improve cost structure; reduce operating 
expenses; reduce future operating losses and liabilities; 
preserve the potential future value; improve financial 
performance by outsourcing; improve the supply chain 
efficiency and bolster financial performance; cut costs 
and beef up profit margins; reduce the cost of inputs.” 
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) 
Regulatory 
Requirements 
“Sale to comply with regulatory requirements; 
satisfying antitrust approval.” 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) 
Acquisition 
Financing 
Sale of assets as a source of financing for Merger and 
Acquisition activity (not included in classifications by 
Borisova et al. (2013)) 
Lang et al. (1995) briefly mention but do not however 
empirically test any implications arising from this 
observation. 
Other  Brown et al. (1994) find positive returns for other 
corporate purposes; Arnold et al. (2015) cite wealth 
transfer effects as motivation; 
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Table 2.2 
Sources of financing in acquisitions. 
 
Source Empirical Studies General Outcomes 
Asset Sales none found Represents a major hole in the 
research. 
Debt Issuance Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003); 
Schlingemann (2004); Harford et al. 
(2009); Yook (2003); Faccio and 
Masulis (2005); Uysal (2011); 
Alexandridis et al. (2012) 
Mixed 
Equity Issuance Martynova and Renneboog (2009); 
Schlingemann (2004); Asquith and 
Mullins Jr (1986); Masulis and Korwar 
(1986); Mikkelson and Partch (1986); 
Jung et al. (1996); Baker and Wurgler 
(2002); Dong et al. (2006); Elsas et al. 
(2013) 
Non-positive 
Internal Cash Stein (1997); Schlingemann (2004); 
Lang et al. (1991); Bharadwaj and 
Shivdasani (2003); Eckbo and Kisser 
(2013) 
Non-positive 
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Table 2.3 
Payment methods in acquisitions. 
 
Method Studies General Outcomes 
Cash Carleton et al. (1983); Huang and 
Walkling (1987); Travlos (1987); 
Amihud et al. (1990); Brown and 
Ryngaert (1991); Loughran and Vijh 
(1997); Chang (1998); Ghosh (2001); 
Megginson et al. (2004); Faccio and 
Masulis (2005); Bouwman et al. 
(2009); Chemmanur et al. (2009); 
Alexandridis et al. (2013) 
Positive 
Equity Carleton et al. (1983); Brown and 
Ryngaert (1991); Loughran and Vijh 
(1997); Chang (1998); Faccio and 
Masulis (2005); Chemmanur et al. 
(2009); Martynova and Renneboog 
(2009); Alexandridis et al. (2013) 
Negative 
Cash/Equity Mix Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990); 
Eckbo et al. (1990) 
Mixed 
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3. Financing Through Asset Sales: Evidence from M&As 
 
 Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) constitute major corporate investments, representing 
perhaps the most economically important transaction in the life of a firm. In 2014 alone, firms 
spent roughly $4.2 trillion on M&A deals worldwide.3 Prior research shows that the chosen 
funding source plays a crucial role in the M&A process. For instance, Schlingemann (2004) 
analyzes debt, equity, and internally generated free cash flows as funding sources and 
demonstrates that announcement returns are significantly related to the source of funds. 
Additionally, Martynova and Renneboog (2009) identify a significant relationship between the 
funding source and the method of payment in M&As. However, only recent theoretical and 
empirical work has highlighted the relative importance of proceeds from asset sale as a funding 
source for corporate investment. Hovakimian and Titman (2006) find that proceeds from asset 
sales are a significant determinant of capital expenditures. In similar manner, Borisova and 
Brown (2013) show a positive link between cash proceeds from asset sales and corporate R&D. 
Additionally, Mavis, McNamee, Petmezas, and Travlos (2017) highlight the use of asset sales 
to fund acquisitions. 
Considering the apparent importance of asset sales as a funding source, Edmans and Mann 
(2017) introduce a new theoretical framework which examines a firm’s funding choice between 
asset sales and equity issues. Their model identifies three new forces which recognize possible 
advantages to selecting one financing source over the other and can result in deviations from 
the traditional pecking order theory (Myers, 1984 and Myers and Majluf, 1984). Given the 
recent prominence of asset sales as a source of funds, the objective of this chapter is to 
                                                 
3 Source: Thomson Financial SDC 
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empirically test the theoretical predictions by Edmans and Mann (2017), relative to existing 
theories4, regarding the financing behavior of firms using an M&A setting. 
In contrast to most studies on firm financing, which model the choice between debt and 
equity issuance, this new theoretical model on determinants of funding choice by Edmans and 
Mann (2017) focuses explicitly on the decision between the use of asset sale proceeds and 
equity issuance. A more in-depth discussion of this new theoretical framework and its 
application in an M&A setting is presented in Section 2.  
The first new force proposed in their framework is the balance sheet effect, which 
represents an advantage to selling equity. They theorize that a firm’s preferred source of 
financing depends on the amount of financing required, relative to the size of the firm. For 
larger amounts, firms will prefer the sale of equity, while for smaller amounts, firms will favor 
asset sales. This is because, unlike asset purchasers, new equity holders receive a stake in the 
firm’s entire balance sheet, which includes not only the existing assets in place (with values 
unknown to new equity holders), but also includes the funds raised from new equity holders. 
Because the value of the new funds raised is known, the information asymmetry related to 
assets in place is mitigated.  
Further, when applied in an M&A setting, their model allows for funds to be raised to 
finance an investment, such as an acquisition, with an expected return that is correlated with 
firm quality, exhibiting information asymmetry. In this scenario, one might expect a weakening 
of the balance sheet effect. However, their implicit assumption is that, when firms fund 
voluntary investment, they will only take on positive NPV investments. Because of this 
                                                 
4 Prior theories on funding choice have been put forward in an attempt to explain why firms may select one funding 
source over another. These theories include the well-known pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984), 
the trade-off theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Leary and Roberts, 2005), the market timing theory (Kayhan 
and Titman, 2007), and the inertia theory (Welch, 2004). However, regardless of the aforementioned recent 
research on asset sales as a source of funds, none of these theories address specifically asset sales as a possible 
funding source. Additionally, prior empirical studies on sources of financing have focused only on free cash flows, 
debt, and equity as possible options for financing, but omit asset sales as a potential funding source 
(Schlingemann, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). 
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certainty, the larger the investment relative to assets in place, the less information asymmetry 
will be exhibited, thus bringing down the cost of financing through equity. If growth 
opportunities are good for all firms, the certainty of the investment increases. Thus, the balance 
sheet effect increases in strength, not only with increases in the amount of financing required, 
but also with the use of proceeds. Therefore, when financing needs are large and growth 
opportunities are good, the balance sheet effect strengthens and potential deviations from the 
pecking order theory occur.5  
Alternatively, the pecking order theory posits that firms choose a funding source based on 
its relative cost without reference to the amount of financing needed and implies that firms will 
tend to avoid funding through external sources because of their higher associated costs. In 
particular, investors look upon equity issuance negatively due to costs related to information 
asymmetry concerns, where management knows more about the value of firm assets and 
opportunities than do outside investors.  
Therefore, on the one hand, according to the pecking order theory, firms would prefer 
asset sales as an internal source of funds over equity issuance. On the other hand, the balance 
sheet effect, which depends on both: i) a firm’s relative financing need and ii) the use of 
proceeds, predicts a positive association between a firm’s relative financing need and the use 
of equity financing and, conversely, a negative association with asset sale proceeds as the 
funding source. This effect is most pronounced when growth opportunities are high (i.e., use 
of proceeds). Therefore, when the firm’s relative financing need is high and good growth 
opportunities exist, equity will be favored, contrary to the predictions of the pecking order 
theory. However, when the financing need is low, and therefore the proportion of funding 
                                                 
5 As with Edmans and Mann (2017), others have found evidence of deviations from the pecking order theory. For 
instance, Nachman and Noe (1994) find that the pecking order for debt and equity only holds when the market’s 
beliefs regarding the productivity of the issuing firm fall within specific ranges. Further, Fama and French (2005) 
observe that the equity decisions of more than half of their sample violate the pecking order. Similarly, Fulghieri 
et al. (2015) show the pecking order is more likely to be violated for younger firms with riskier growth 
opportunities and larger investment needs.  
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needed relative to firm assets is small, the balance sheet effect becomes less pronounced and 
asset sale proceeds more attractive, bringing the firm’s behavior back in line with the pecking 
order theory’s predictions.  
It is important to note that neither the pecking order theory nor other alternative theories 
have considered a firm’s relative financing need as a key determinant of financing choice; the 
only exception is a theory by Nanda and Narayanan (1999), which runs contrary to that of the 
balance sheet effect, suggesting that firms select equity when financing need is low and asset 
sales when financing need is high. They argue this outcome is due to undervaluation caused by 
the diversification effect, suggesting that firms will not want to issue large quantities of 
undervalued equity and will choose to sell assets instead.  
The second new force proposed by Edmans and Mann (2017) is the camouflage effect, 
which represents an advantage to selling assets. This effect suggests that if growth 
opportunities are weak for high quality firms, they will sell assets if the assets are sufficiently 
dissynergistic, rather than issuing equity. When a large number of high quality firms sell assets 
concurrently (i.e., asset sale waves), low quality firms take advantage of the opportunity to 
pool their asset sales at the same time, providing low quality firms with a form of camouflage 
for the motives of their sale. They can camouflage an asset sale driven by overvaluation (i.e., 
the asset is low-quality and has a low value to all firms) as alternatively being driven by 
operational reasons (i.e., it is dissynergistic and only has a low value to the selling firm). Thus, 
low-quality firms will display a clear preference for asset sales. 
 Finally, the third new force from Edmans and Mann (2017) is the correlation effect, which 
also motivates firms to prefer the sale of assets over equity issuance. When firms issue equity, 
they may experience an Akerlof (1970) lemons discount on not only the newly issued equity, 
but on the rest of the firm as well, because the new equity and existing equity are one and the 
same and therefore perfectly correlated. Alternatively, an asset seller may receive a low price 
on the asset sold, but this does not necessarily imply a low valuation for the rest of the firm. 
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Ultimately, Edmans and Mann (2017) suggest that, while the sale of assets may be a negative 
signal about the divested asset, it can in contrast be a positive signal about the retained assets. 
In fact, existing literature provides evidence of the positive market reaction to asset sales,6 as 
well as post-sale improvements in operating efficiency. 7  The main implication of the 
correlation effect is that conglomerate firms sell assets more often and issue equity less often 
to fund investments, such as acquisitions, because they are likely to have more low-correlated 
assets than other firms. 
These three new forces (balance sheet effect, camouflage effect, and correlation effect), 
give rise to several important questions in relation to M&A transactions. First, does the relative 
financing need (i.e., relative size of the target to the bidding firm) and the availability of good 
growth opportunities, play a role in the bidder’s preference to use asset sale proceeds or equity 
as the funding source? Do low quality acquiring firms pool asset sales with the asset sales of 
high quality firms during periods of high industry asset sale liquidity in order to fund 
acquisitions? Finally, are conglomerates more likely to use asset sale proceeds to fund 
acquisition investments? 
Motivated by the evolutionary prominence of asset sales as a funding source, these 
questions are addressed and the theoretical predictions of the three effects proposed by Edmans 
and Mann (2017) are empirically tested in an M&A setting. In fact, M&As constitute an ideal 
setting to test the predictions of this new theory. First, M&As are a known corporate transaction 
that signify an identifiable financing need with multiple funding sources available to the 
acquiring firm, allowing us to test the predictions of each of these effects. Second, specific to 
the balance sheet effect, the relative size of the target to the bidding firm represents the relative 
financing need of a firm in an investment, which Edmans and Mann (2017) theorize is a major 
                                                 
6 Bates (2005) finds that the average 3-day CAR for asset sellers is 1.2% for their entire sample but find the highest 
returns come when firms use asset sales to repay debt. Similarly, Clayton and Reisel (2013) show positive returns 
from asset sales, especially for highly leveraged firms. 
7 John and Ofek (1995) and Daley et al. (1997) document significant improvements in operating returns resulting 
from focus-increasing asset sales. 
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determinant of funding choice. At the same time, information asymmetry is also embedded, as 
the larger the size of the target firm is, the lower its information asymmetry exhibited.8 
This chapter first examines the prediction of the balance sheet effect that firms will be 
more likely to use equity to fund acquisitions when the relative size of the target to the bidder 
(i.e., funding need) is large and when growth opportunities are high. Because asset sale 
proceeds can be viewed as an internal source of capital, the pecking order theory would suggest 
that asset sales would be favored over equity issuance. However, the pecking order theory does 
not take into account the size of the financing need when determining the attractiveness of 
using one source of funds over another. In this respect, Edmans and Mann (2017) show a 
pooling equilibrium where firms of all types will issue equity if the financing need and growth 
opportunities are sufficiently high. This prediction is in direct contradiction with the pecking 
order theory, and if correct, provides additional insight into the source of funds decisions made 
by firms.9 
Second, this chapter tests the prediction of the camouflage effect, which suggests that low 
quality firms are more likely to sell assets to fund acquisitions when they can pool those sales 
with the asset sales of other firms. Schlingemann et al. (2002) find that market liquidity for 
assets being sold is the most important factor when determining whether to sell a particular 
asset. In addition to the firms being of low quality and their industries experiencing sufficient 
asset sale liquidity, the camouflage effect also suggests that firms are most likely to sell assets 
when growth opportunities are poor, complementing the balance sheet effect which shows that 
firms are more likely to issue equity when growth opportunities are high. 
Finally, this chapter examines the prediction of the correlation effect that conglomerate 
firms are more likely to sell assets to fund acquisitions and less likely to issue equity. This 
                                                 
8 Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer (1988) and Aboody and Lev (2000) suggest firm size is a proxy for information 
asymmetry and that larger firms exhibit less information asymmetry.  
9 One potential explanation is that the acquirer is less likely to use asset sales because they would not be large 
enough to cover the larger targets, thus, acquirers will prefer equity. Section 3.4 identifies settings in which firms 
with large financing needs will still select some other source of financing (see specification (6) of Table 3.3). 
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highlights one potential benefit of firm diversification, showing that non-core assets that are 
not correlated with the firm’s core operations can be a form of financial slack. Maksimovic and 
Phillips (2001), using a sample of manufacturing plant data, find that a firm’s internal 
organization has a significant effect on the probability that an asset is sold, and that peripheral 
or non-correlated assets are more likely to be sold by conglomerates. Additionally, Gopalan 
and Xie (2011) highlight benefits to conglomerate firms that can use internal funds, rather than 
external financing, to improve resource allocation including acquisitions. 
This analysis uses a broad sample of bidding firms collected from the Thomson Financial 
SDC database that engaged in acquisitions over the period from 1990 to 2014 and find strong 
empirical support for the new theories by Edmans and Mann (2017). For the balance sheet 
effect, the relative size of the deal to the bidder is positively associated with equity financing 
and is most pronounced when high growth opportunities exist. Economically, firms with high 
relative financing needs from industries with good growth prospects are 4.60% more likely to 
use equity to finance their acquisition, representing an increased likelihood of 18.24% relative 
to the sample mean. Further, the relative size is negatively associated with the use of asset sale 
proceeds as a funding source, regardless of industry growth opportunities. Additionally, I find 
support for the camouflage effect, where low quality firms in industries experiencing asset sale 
waves are more likely to use proceeds from asset sales than equity to fund acquisitions. 
Empirically, the interaction of low firm quality and asset sale waves is positive and 
significantly associated with funding M&As with asset sale proceeds. Finally, in support of the 
correlation effect, the conglomerate status of a firm is positively associated with the use of 
asset sales, with conglomerate firms being 1.46% more likely to use asset sale proceeds to fund 
acquisitions, an increase of 48.69% relative to the sample average use of asset sale proceeds. 
The results of this study could suffer from potential endogeneity bias sourced either from 
reverse causality or omitted variables. For the Balance Sheet Effect, firms that pursue low 
relative size deals are not analogous to those pursuing high relative size deals, indicating that 
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the relative size of the deal may be determined endogenously. Further, for the Camouflage 
Effect, endogeneity may arise from some unobservable factor that affect our main variable of 
interests, firm quality and industry asset sale waves, while simultaneously affecting the choice 
of financing in M&As. Also, for the Correlation Effect, it is plausible that acquisitive firms, 
such as conglomerates, will be more likely to sell assets in the future, giving rise to possible 
endogeneity concerns. To control for these potential sources of endogeneity bias, an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach and a propensity score matching (PSM) technique are used, 
using both observable and unobservable characteristics. Overall, these results provide 
empirical support for the new theoretical framework of Edmans and Mann (2017).  
This study makes several important contributions to the literature on M&As, asset sales, 
and financing choice. First, it offers new empirical evidence on the evolutionary prominence 
of asset sales as a funding source in M&As. Second, these results offer empirical support for 
the theoretical framework of Edmans and Mann (2017) applied in an M&A setting. Specifically, 
they provide new evidence in support of the balance sheet effect on the importance of the 
relative size of the target firm (i.e., relative financing need) to the financing choice in M&As. 
I find that equity issuance will be preferred when the relative size is large and growth 
opportunities are good, while asset sale proceeds will be favored if the relative size is small. 
These results demonstrate that the pecking order theory does not adequately explain the effect 
of some important factors that are shown to drive the financing choice, such as the relative 
financing need. Additionally, the results show that low quality firms take advantage of periods 
of increased industry asset sale activity in order to camouflage their motive for an asset sale in 
accordance with the camouflage effect. Finally, conglomerates are found to be more likely to 
fund acquisitions by selling assets as predicted by the correlation effect. 
This chapter is related to works on financing theory by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), 
Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984), which assisted in the development of the pecking 
order theory. Moreover, I extend the work by Nachman and Noe (1994), Fama and French 
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(2005), Fulghieri et al. (2015), and Edmans and Mann (2017), who provide evidence of 
deviations from the traditional pecking order theory. I support the predictions of the balance 
sheet effect as proposed by Edmans and Mann (2017), which signals significant deviations 
from the pecking order. 
Similar to the work of Nanda and Narayanan (1999), this chapter examines the relationship 
between financing need and the choice of financing. However, their theory runs contrary to 
Edmans and Mann (2017), suggesting that asset sales are favored for larger financing needs. 
This chapter provides empirical evidence in favor of Edmans and Mann (2017) theory. Further, 
while most M&A studies on financing sources and method of payment include relative size as 
a control variable (Schlingemann, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009), none provide 
theoretical backing for the sign or significance of any results, nor do they address the relation 
of relative size to the choice to finance with asset sale proceeds.  
This study extends the work of Chemmanur et al. (2009) who show that the lesser the 
extent of information asymmetry faced by an acquirer in evaluating its target, the greater its 
likelihood of using stock. This runs opposite to the theory by Hansen (1987) which posits that 
bidders will prefer to use equity when targets exhibit more information asymmetry. I find 
evidence in favor of the balance sheet effect proposed by Edmans and Mann (2017), which 
supports the findings of Chemmanur et al. (2009). 
Moreover, Schlingemann (2004) and Martynova and Renneboog (2009) identify free cash 
flows, debt, and equity as financing sources. I add asset sales to these traditional financing 
sources as an important source of funds. Further, Schlingemann et al. (2002) recognize industry 
asset sale liquidity as a determinant of asset sales. I find firms are likely to sell asset in periods 
of high industry asset sale liquidity to fund acquisitions with proceeds.  
Finally, this chapter is related to the works of Gopalan and Xie (2011) and Maksimovic 
and Phillips (2002) who explore efficient resource allocation by conglomerates which highlight 
potential benefits of conglomerate firms when considering funding sources. Specifically, I 
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provide evidence that conglomerates are more likely to sell assets than to issue equity to finance 
their acquisitions. 
The remainder of this chapter will be presented as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the new 
theoretical framework proposed by Edmans and Mann (2017) in greater detail and its 
application in an M&A setting. Section 3.3 identifies my sample and data. Sections 3.4, 3.5, 
and 3.6 test the predictions of the balance sheet effect, the camouflage effect, and the 
correlation effect, with further tests in each section to control for potential endogeneity. Section 
3.7 tests a theoretical extension on the choice of debt and provides additional auxiliary tests to 
further substantiate the robustness of the results. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
 Theory 
The objective of the Edmans and Mann (2017) theoretical framework is to analyze the 
factors that determine whether firms raise capital through asset sales rather than equity. In their 
base model, the firm must raise financing of F in order to meet an exogenous liquidity need, 
regardless of whether the firm sells assets or equity. However, in their extension for voluntary 
capital raising, which applies in this study’s M&A setting and also supports the implications 
of the base model, firms are given the choice of whether to raise financing and are allowed to 
use financing proceeds to fund an investment that exhibits information asymmetry.  
 
3.2.1. Balance Sheet Effect 
To explain the balance sheet effect using this extension, firms raise capital of F to finance 
an investment with expected value of: 
 Rq = F(1+rq),  (1) 
where rq is the rate of return on the voluntary investment and is always positive because 
firms will only take on positive NPV investments, otherwise the firm would always hold cash 
rather than invest. Thus, the value of the firm can be defined as:  
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 Eq = Cq + Aq + F(1+rq),  (2)  
with Cq being the value of the core business and Aq being the value of non-core assets. 
While investors do not know firm quality (q), they do know that the funds they provide will 
increase in value, regardless of quality, because the investment has a positive NPV. Thus, the 
certain component of the firm’s balance sheet is now higher, reducing information asymmetry. 
Therefore, if the value of F is high in relation to assets in place, there is substantially less 
information asymmetry because investors know the funds they provide will increase in value 
because of rq. As a result, at some threshold, equity issuance becomes less costly and more 
attractive than asset sales, and the balance sheet effect becomes more pronounced. 
Alternatively, when the value of F is low in relation to assets in place, the certain component 
of the firm’s balance sheet is lower, resulting in higher information asymmetry, making asset 
sales more attractive than issuing equity, bringing the firm’s behavior in line with the pecking 
order theory. 
When firms voluntarily raise funds for acquisitions, F represents the size of the deal. 
Therefore, when the deal size is large in relation to the bidder size, information asymmetry is 
reduced, causing bidding firms to prefer equity. 
 
3.2.2. Camouflage Effect 
This section explains the camouflage effect. Edmans and Mann (2017) show that if the 
expected return on investment for high quality firms is moderate (i.e., growth opportunities are 
not good), firms with synergistic assets will not raise capital, whether through asset sales or 
equity, because the return on investment is insufficient to outweigh the loss of synergies from 
the asset being sold or the cost to issue equity. This is similar to Myers and Majluf (1984) 
intuition that high quality firms pass up investment opportunities due to the cost of financing. 
However, in low growth opportunity environments, high quality firms will sell sufficiently 
dissynergistic assets, not necessarily to finance investment but for operational reasons. Edmans 
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and Mann (2017) show that the gain from eliminating dissynergies plus the moderate return on 
investment outweighs any capital loss from the sale of assets. When a sufficient number of 
high quality firms are selling dissynergistic assets, low quality firms will also sell assets in 
order to exploit overvaluation, even if the assets being sold are synergistic. The reason is the 
camouflage effect. Since growth opportunities are only moderate, it is too weak to induce high 
quality firms to issue equity. In this environment, the only reason for a firm to issue equity is 
if the firm is of low quality, but equity issuance would then reveal to others that the firm is 
indeed of low quality. Alternatively, asset sales by low quality firms may take place because: 
i) the asset is of low quality (low value to all firms), or ii) the asset is dissynergistic (low value 
to the selling firm only). If the former occurs, the selling price will exceed the value of the low 
quality asset because it can be camouflaged as dissynergistic with the asset sales of high quality 
firm. This high price induces low quality firms to sell assets. 
Thus, low quality firms looking to raise funds for acquisitions will take advantage of 
periods of increased asset sales in order to camouflage their sale of assets in order to pass them 
off as dissynergistic asset sales. This allows low quality firms to realize a higher price than 
they otherwise would have for their asset sale, providing funds for the subsequent acquisition. 
 
3.2.3. Correlation Effect 
The correlation effect will lead conglomerate firms to prefer selling assets over issuing 
equity. Edmans and Mann (2017) suggest this preference for asset sales comes from two 
sources. First, newly issued equity is perfectly correlated with the rest of the firm. Accordingly, 
if a low price is attached to the equity being sold, it is also attached to the firm. However, a 
non-core asset need not be correlated with the rest of the firm. Even if the market infers that 
the asset being sold is of low quality, this does not necessarily imply that the firm as a whole 
is of low quality, because the asset is not a carbon copy of the firm. Second, the firm’s manager 
is concerned with how the equity issued may affect the market’s inference over firm value. 
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Alternatively, an asset sale could still be attractive to the manager if it is not correlated and 
therefore does not imply that the firm is of low quality. When the core and non-core assets of 
the firm are not correlated, this only means that high quality firms are not universally of high 
quality, as they may have low quality non-core assets. This effect does not require the values 
of the firm’s divisions to covary negatively with each other through time. Further, the 
correlation effect does not require that the correlation between the core and non-core assets be 
perfectly negative, only that it is not perfectly positive. 
This preference for asset sales highlights a unique benefit of diversification. Edmans and 
Mann (2017) call this advantage loser-picking10, where a firm can raise capital by selling a low 
quality asset, without implying a low value for the rest of the firm. Thus, diversification into 
non-correlated assets provides greater financial slack than expanding into one’s core business.  
In an M&A setting, it is well documented that acquiring using equity is typically viewed 
negatively by markets.11 Thus, rather than acquiring with equity, conglomerates will sell non-
correlated assets to raise funds for acquisitions.  
 
 Sample and Data 
The acquisition sample for this study consists of deals announced between January 1, 
1990 and December 31, 2014, and is obtained from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database (SDC). Bidders are U.S. public firms, and targets are public, private, or 
subsidiary firms domiciled both in and outside of the U.S. Transactions valued at less than $1 
million are eliminated.12 Bidders are required to own less than 10% of the target’s shares prior 
to the announcement and must be seeking to acquire more than 50% of the target’s shares after 
                                                 
10 Stein (1997) suggests that one advantage of holding assets that are not perfectly correlated to the core business 
is winner-picking, where a conglomerate increases investment in the division with the best investment 
opportunities at the time. 
11 Travlos (1987) shows that bidding firm stockholders in all equity deals experience significant losses at the 
announcement of the takeover proposal. 
12 All dollar variable values have been adjusted to 2014 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI). 
Chapter 3 Financing Through Asset Sales: Evidence from M&As 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 59  Nathan P. McNamee 
the acquisition. All privatizations, leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender 
offers, repurchases, sales of a minority interest, liquidations, restructurings, reverse takeovers, 
bankruptcy acquisitions, going private transactions, exchange offers, acquisitions of partial 
interest, and buybacks are excluded. These restrictions leave 6,212 bidders that conducted 
29,379 acquisitions over the period 1990 to 2014, out of which 27,506 are completed deals.  
 
3.3.1. Asset Sale Measure 
One challenge in observing asset sale proceeds as a funding source for M&As is that there 
is no way to observe an exact correspondence between a dollar raised in time t and a dollar 
spent on an acquisition in time t+τ (Schlingemann, 2004). Similar to Schlingemann (2004), 
rather than attempting to establish a precise correspondence, this study considers the cash made 
available to the firm through asset sales which occurred within 12 months prior to the 
acquisition announcement. For purposes of clarity, asset sales are defined to include any 
divestitures or sell-offs of business segments, product lines, investment assets, or property, 
plant, and equipment.13  
Similar to Edmans and Mann (2017), asset sales are identified from the SDC database to 
construct a dummy variable (asset sale) that is equal to 1 if the asset sale is a completed M&A 
transactions with the form of transaction being either acquisition of assets or acquisition of 
certain assets, and where the acquisition technique field includes at least one out of divestiture, 
property acquisition, auction, or internal reorganization,14 and none out of buyout, bankrupt, 
takeover, restructuring, liquidation, private, tender, unsolicited, and failed, and 0 otherwise. In 
                                                 
13 The term divestiture has been defined in the literature as pertaining to the modification of a firm’s productive 
assets through either sell-offs or spin-offs (Alexander et al., 1984; Tehranian et al., 1987). Hite and Owers (1983) 
observe that a spin-off results in the creation of an independent firm with a corresponding reduction in the asset 
base of the divesting firm. Thus, spin-offs are restructuring events that do not generate proceeds for the divesting 
firm, nor do they create an opportunity for managers to continue the control of spun-off assets, consequently, spin-
offs will not be relevant to my study. Unless specifically noted, where the term divestiture is used in this paper, it 
refers to sell-offs only. 
14 Deviating from Edmans and Mann (2017), spin-offs are excluded for purposes described in footnote 13. While 
spin-offs are nominally excluded, adding this restriction does not remove any observations from the asset sale 
subsample. 
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these transactions, the asset seller is the firm raising funds to be used in a subsequent corporate 
investment (i.e., acquisitions). Additionally, because some asset sales, as defined by Edmans 
and Mann (2017), may also be reported by the asset buyer as an acquisition, any deals in the 
M&A sample that are also found in the asset sale sample are eliminated to avoid them being 
counted as both an asset sale and an acquisition transaction.15  
 
3.3.2. Equity Measure 
Equity financing (equity) is also identified using the SDC database. A dummy variable is 
constructed that is equal to 1 when the bidder uses 100% equity to finance the transaction and 
0 otherwise. This is derived from either the percentage of stock variable for payment method, 
or where common stock issue is identified as the sole source of financing in the sources of funds 
used for financing variable, if the payment method is missing. 
Table 3.1 displays asset sale and equity financing by year over the sample period. Column 
(1) presents the number of deals per year in the full sample. In Column (2), the number of deals 
per year where the source of financing can be identified is provided. Columns (3) and (4) 
display the number and percentage of deals for the financing sources of asset sales and equity, 
respectively, with percentages based on the total number of deals with identified sources of 
financing. The information presented in Table 3.1 provides some initial evidence on the 
increasing importance of asset sale proceeds, as well as an apparent declining importance of 
equity financing in M&A transactions over the sample period. 
[Please See Table 3.1] 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 A total of 10,177 overlapping deals were eliminated from the M&A sample. 
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3.3.3. Sample Statistics 
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics on the independent variables for the overall sample, 
and further partitions the sample by firms with the funding source of asset sales and equity. 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. All non-binary variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles apart from cash reserves and leverage, which have been winsorized 
only at the 99% percentile (right-hand side).16 Panel A provides statistics for the main variables 
of interest, giving initial support for the balance sheet effect and the correlation effect, with 
firms funding acquisitions through asset sales exhibiting lower relative size, coming from 
industries with higher market-to-book ratios, with the status of being a conglomerate.  
In panel B, I present bidder characteristics and observe that there are notable mean and 
median differences in the characteristics between bidders that fund acquisitions through asset 
sales and those that finance through equity. Bidders with asset sales include firms with higher 
return on assets, are more likely to have a credit rating, are larger, have higher leverage, hold 
less cash, have lower growth opportunities, have more collateral, realize lower stock price run-
up, are older firms, and are covered by a higher number of analysts.  
Panel C displays deal characteristics and shows that bids funded by asset sales have targets 
with lower number of analysts, and are more likely to be diversifying deals, tender offers, and 
involve more private targets. Finally, Panel D provides industry characteristics with bids 
funded by asset sales coming from more concentrated industries. 
Because univariate comparisons do not consider any confounding effects of variables 
known to affect source of funds decisions, bidder, deal, and industry-specific characteristics 
need to be controlled for through multivariate regression analyses, as presented in the next 
section. 
[Please See Table 3.2] 
                                                 
16 Note that the natural logarithm of size, which is not winsorized, is used in the regressions.  
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 Balance Sheet Effect or Pecking Order? 
According to the balance sheet effect, firms are more likely to use equity to fund 
acquisitions when their funding need is relatively large and when good growth opportunities 
are high. On the other hand, according to the pecking order theory, which does not consider 
the size of the funding need, internal sources like asset sales will always be favored over equity 
issuance. To test these predictions, I analyze the relation between a firm’s relative financing 
need (i.e., relative size of the target to the bidding firm) and the subsequent decision to select 
asset sale proceeds or equity as the preferred funding source. This section provides results from 
multivariate analysis in order to test the predictions of the balance sheet effect which highlights 
an advantage to using equity as the funding source, contrary to the predictions of the pecking 
order theory. Also presented are tests to control for potential endogeneity. 
 
3.4.1. Main Results for the Balance Sheet Effect 
Table 3.3 reports the results for this analysis. I control for a number of firm-, deal-, and 
industry-specific characteristics which have been identified in the literature as affecting 
financing choice. I also control for year and industry fixed effects. Additionally, 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm-level are used due 
to the presence of repeated firm observations in my sample. Further, probit regressions are run 
and marginal effects are reported to ease interpretation of the results.  
In specifications (1), (3), and (5), the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the firm 
uses asset sale proceeds to fund the acquisition and 0 otherwise, and the dependent variable in 
specifications (2), (4), and (6) takes the value of 1 if the firm uses equity to finance the 
acquisition and 0 otherwise. The main variable of interest is high relative size, which is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm’s relative size is above the industry-year median and 0 otherwise, 
where relative size is the ratio of the deal value to the bidder’s market value of equity 4 weeks 
prior to the acquisition announcement. Specifications (1) and (2) display results for the entire 
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sample, showing that deals with a high relative size are less likely to asset sale proceeds and 
more likely to use equity as the funding source. 
The sample is further split by whether the firm is in an industry with high or low growth 
opportunities as proxied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bidder is from an industry with 
above median market-to-book values in that given industry-year, and equal to 0 if the bidder is 
from an industry with below median market-to-book values. Specifications (3) and (4) show 
results for the subsample of firms operating in industries with good growth opportunities, and 
specifications (5) and (6) for the subsample of firms in industries with poor growth 
opportunities. Controls similar to Martynova and Renneboog (2009) and Morellec and 
Zhdanov (2008) are employed, which consist of ROA, the existence of a credit rating (rated), 
firm size, leverage, cash reserves, market-to-book value, collateral, stock price run-up, age, 
number of analysts, target number of analysts, diversifying deal, hostile deal, tender offer, 
private target, and Herfindahl index.  
The results provide strong support for the balance sheet effect. Specification (4) shows 
that firms with high relative financing needs in industries with good growth opportunities are 
more likely to use equity to fund acquisitions. Specifically, the coefficient on high relative size 
for the high industry market-to-book subsample is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. In economic terms, having higher financing needs in an industry with good growth 
opportunities increases a firm’s probability of selecting equity to finance the acquisition by a 
significant 4.60% overall, which is an increase of 18.24% relative to the mean value of the 
probability in the sample that a firm will use equity.17 For the low industry market-to-book 
subsample, specification (6) provides evidence that relative size is not a significant determinant 
for the use of equity to finance acquisitions, giving further credibility to the predictions of the 
                                                 
17 In the sample of 29,379 deal observations, the mean probability to use equity is 25.22%. 
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balance sheet effect which predicts the size of the financing need is only important where good 
growth opportunities exist.  
Further, specifications (3) and (5) display a strong negative relation between relative size 
and the use of asset sales to fund acquisitions, regardless of whether the firm is in a high or low 
growth industry. Economically, firms with high relative financing needs are 2.54% less likely 
to use asset sales as the source of funds across my full sample. This result continues to hold, 
irrespective of whether the firm is in an industry with high or low median market-to-book.  
The results of the control variables are consistent with prior studies, indicating that firms 
are more likely to use equity to finance their acquisition when they have lower return on assets, 
larger size (for the full sample and high industry M/B subsample), less debt, higher market-to-
book ratios, strong stock performance, are younger firms (for the full sample and high industry 
M/B subsample), are acquiring targets with less information asymmetry, are not hostile deals, 
tender offers, or acquiring private targets, and are from less concentrated industries. 
Alternatively, these results show that firms are more likely to use asset sale proceeds to fund 
acquisition transactions when they are rated, have more debt, less cash reserves, lower market-
to-book ratios, are older firms, are acquiring targets with higher information asymmetry, and 
are tender offers for private targets.  
Overall, these results support the predictions of the balance sheet effect that firms with 
high relative financing need from industries with good growth opportunities are more likely to 
choose equity as their source of financing, while those with low financing needs will favor the 
use of asset sale proceeds to meet their funding needs.  
[Please See Table 3.3] 
 
3.4.2. Endogeneity Control for the Balance Sheet Effect 
These findings, in support of the balance sheet effect, are predicated on the assumption 
that the relative size of the deal to the bidding firm is determined exogenously. However, in 
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unreported descriptive statistics, significant differences between firms pursuing high or low 
relative size deals exist, suggesting that the relative size of the deal could be determined 
endogenously. Further, these results could be biased because of one or more omitted variables 
that could drive both the relative deal size and the financing decision. For example, descriptive 
statistics in Table 3.2 show that smaller firms are more likely to finance through equity, where 
unobserved characteristics of smaller firms could also affect financing decisions. Moreover, 
firms could wait to choose to acquire a particular target after determining the amount of 
financing available to them, giving rise to reverse causality concerns. An instrumental variable 
(IV) approach and a propensity score matching (PSM) technique are employed to alleviate 
potential endogeneity issues.  
 
3.4.2.1. Instrumental Variable Approach for the Balance Sheet Effect 
First, a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach is implemented to mitigate 
concerns that the relation between the relative size of the deal and a firm’s financing choice is 
affected by endogeneity bias. When applying the IV approach, the choice of instrumental 
variables is critical. In particular, the aim is to find an instrument that explains the relative size 
of the target to the bidder, but on the other hand, is not directly related to a firms’ decision to 
use one financing source over another. Inspiration for the chosen instruments comes from 
Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999) who identify determinants of firm size which should in 
turn directly affect the relative size of the bidding firm to the target. Kumar et al. (1999) show 
that firms facing larger markets are larger themselves. They also find a positive relation 
between industry capital expenditures and firm size. Therefore, the chosen instruments are high 
target industry sales (a proxy for large market size), target industry capital expenditures, and 
bidder industry capital expenditures. While, these instruments are shown to affect firm size 
and, by extension, the relative size of two firms, they are not expected to affect an individual 
Chapter 3 Financing Through Asset Sales: Evidence from M&As 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 66  Nathan P. McNamee 
firm’s preferred source of financing and therefore are likely to be exogenous to a firm’s 
financing decisions. 
Panel A of Table 3.4 displays the results of this analysis. The marginal effects from the 
IV first-stage probit regression are reported in specification (1), which includes the 
instrumental variables as well as the other control variables from Table 3.3. The instrumental 
variables carry the expected signs and are statistically significant at conventional levels, giving 
evidence that they are strongly related to relative size. Additionally, based on outcomes from 
the Wald F-test and Hansen J statistic, these results do not suffer from weak instruments or 
overidentification issues.  
The marginal effects of probit regressions are presented in specifications (2), (3), (4), 
and (5), where my main variable of interest is residual high relative size. Using a similar 
methodology to Faulkender and Petersen (2012) and Harford and Uysal (2014), I distinguish 
between firms that are likely to acquire larger targets (i.e., high relative size), but instead 
acquire smaller targets, and firms which acquire larger targets. The coefficient on predicted 
high relative size captures the effect of a firm being more likely to acquire a larger target, and 
the coefficient on the residual high relative size captures the effect of actually acquiring a larger 
firm. The residual and predicted high relative size variables are estimated from specification 
(1). In specification (3), residual high relative size is positively and significantly associated 
with the likelihood that a firm in an industry with good growth opportunities will select equity 
as the financing source at the 1% level. Further, specification (5) shows that residual high 
relative size is not significant for bidders in industries with low growth opportunities. 
Additionally, specifications (2) and (4) show that residual relative size is again negative and 
significant at the 1% level regardless of industry growth opportunities for firms that select asset 
sale proceeds to fund acquisitions. 
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3.4.2.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Approach for the Balance Sheet Effect 
In this section, the propensity score matching (PSM) method is implemented to ensure 
that the observable deal and bidding firm characteristics don’t simply drive both the relative 
size and financing decision. Following Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014), firms with 
high relative size acquisitions (treated) are matched with firms exhibiting similar characteristics 
but with low relative size acquisitions (control). The treatment effect from the PSM estimation 
is the difference between the treated and matched firms, as measured by the high relative size 
coefficient. Firms are matched by calculating a one-dimensional propensity score, which is a 
function of observable characteristics which determine the relative size of the deal, including 
ROA, credit rating existence, firm size, leverage, cash reserves, market-to-book, collateral, 
stock run-up, firm age, number of analysts for the bidding firm, number of analysts for the 
target firm, whether the deal is diversifying, hostile, or a tender offer, whether the target is 
private, Herfindahl index, and year and industry fixed effects. Moreover, a one-to-one (i.e., 
nearest neighbor) matching estimator is used.  
Specification (2) of Panel B in Table 3.4 shows that the treatment effect on the selection 
of equity as the source of financing in deals with high relative size is significantly positive at 
the 1% level for firms in industries with good growth opportunities, while in specification (4) 
no significance is observed in the treatment effect for firms in industries with low growth 
opportunities, corroborating the view that relative size is positively associated with the 
probability of using equity as the source of financing. As with previous tests, asset sales are 
negatively related to high relative size as shown in specifications (1) and (3). 
Overall, the analysis in this section provides strong evidence of the positive effect of 
high relative deal size and high industry growth opportunities on the decision to use equity as 
the financing source in acquisitions, even after controlling for potential bias from endogeneity. 
This finding is consistent with the predictions of the balance sheet effect. 
 [Please See Table 3.4] 
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 Camouflage Effect Findings 
This section tests the predictions of the camouflage effect which highlights an advantage 
to using asset sale proceeds as the funding source. The camouflage effect posits that when a 
larger number of high quality firms are selling dissynergistic assets concurrently, low quality 
firms will also sell assets in order to exploit overvaluation, even if the assets being sold are 
synergistic. In essence, low quality firms camouflage their asset sale with the asset sales of 
high quality firms. Multivariate analysis is run to test these predictions, with additional tests to 
control for potential endogenous relationships. 
 
3.5.1. Main Results for the Camouflage Effect 
To test these predictions, I consider the financing behavior of low quality firms during 
periods of increased asset sale activity. The main variable of interest is the interaction between 
low quality firms, which are identified as firms with return on assets in the bottom quartile of 
their industry-year (i.e., low ROA), and interacted with periods of increased asset sale activity, 
which is characterized as industry-years experiencing an asset sale wave. Asset sale waves are 
identified following Mavis et al. (2017) who use the process presented by Harford (2005) to 
identify merger waves. Over the sample period from 1990 to 2014, there were 82 asset sale 
waves from 40 industries. 
Table 3.5 presents the results of this analysis. Because interpretation of interaction terms 
using marginal effects is problematic, 18  probit coefficient estimates are presented. In 
specification (1), the dependent variable is asset sale, and the interaction term low ROA*asset 
sale wave is positive and significant at the 5% level, providing strong evidence that low quality 
firms do indeed take advantage of periods of increased asset sales in order to benefit from the 
camouflage effect. Conversely, specification (2) shows that high quality firms are not likely to 
                                                 
18 Marginal effects for interaction terms are nonsensical because the value of the interaction term cannot change 
independently of the values of the individual components of the interaction terms, so it is not possible to estimate 
a separate effect for the interaction (Williams, 2012). 
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issue equity during these times. Results for the control variables are in line with previous 
literature.19 
[Please See Table 3.5] 
 
3.5.2. Endogeneity Control for the Camouflage Effect 
Similar to the analysis in Section 3.4.2, I use both an IV approach and the PSM process to 
control for potential endogeneity in my camouflage effect tests. This endogeneity may arise 
from some unobservable factor that may affect firm quality or industry asset sale waves, while 
at the same time, affecting whether a firm chooses equity or asset sales as the source of 
financing in M&As. 
 
3.5.2.1. Instrumental Variable Approach for the Camouflage Effect 
Panel A of Table 3.6 displays the results from the IV approach. As the main variable of 
interest is an interaction term, a slightly different method in the IV analysis than that in the 
previous section must be used. I follow the methodology of Wooldridge (2015) which is ideal 
for nonlinear tests of this type. The chosen instrumental variables are industry distressed, which 
is a dummy variable equal to one if more than half of the firms in a given industry-year are 
distressed, and industry R&D, which is the median value of R&D scaled by total assets in a 
given industry-year. The most commonly identified motivation for asset sales is financial 
distress, where firms sell assets to cover existing financial obligations such as paying down 
debt.20 When a majority of firms in an industry are in financial distress, it is reasonable to 
anticipate a resultant clustering of asset sales (i.e., asset sale wave). Additionally, Borisova and 
Brown (2013) show that R&D expenditures are positively related to asset sales. However, 
                                                 
19 To avoid multicollinearity issues because of the inclusion of the Low ROA variable, ROA is removed as a 
control variable in the camouflage effect specifications. 
20 See for instance Brown et al. (1994), Lang et al. (1995), Bates (2005), Hovakimian and Titman (2006), and 
Atanassov and Kim (2009). 
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while industry distress and higher levels of R&D are positively related to industry asset sales, 
they are not likely to affect the financing decisions of an individual acquiring firm.  
Specification (1) reports the coefficients from the IV first-stage probit regression 
including the instrumental variables and the control variables from Table 3.5. The instrumental 
variables are statistically significant at the 1% level and have the expected signs, showing that 
they are strong determinants of asset sale waves. Further, the reported validity tests demonstrate 
that my instruments are not weak and do not exhibit any overidentification issues.  
Specification (2) presents coefficients from a probit regression where asset sale is the 
dependent variable, and the variable residual asset sale wave, estimated from the 1st-stage 
probit, is included as a control function as specified by Wooldridge (2015). After inclusion of 
the relevant residual, the main variable of interest, low ROA*asset sale wave, remains positive 
and significant at the 5% level. 
 
3.5.2.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Approach for the Camouflage Effect 
As with the balance sheet effect analysis, I implement the propensity score matching 
(PSM) method to control for potential endogeneity using observable characteristics. Firms in 
industries experiencing asset sale waves (treated) are matched with analogous firms in 
industries not in an asset sale wave. Panel B of Table 3.6 displays the results from this analysis. 
Specification (1) shows that the treatment effect on the selection of asset sales as the source of 
financing with firms in industries in an asset sale wave is significantly positive at the 1% level, 
further validating the camouflage effect’s predictions. However, using this method, equity 
financing is also positively related to the interaction term at the 5% level. 
Overall, the results in this section, in support of the camouflage effect, are robust to 
endogeneity concerns and provide evidence of the positive relation of firm quality and 
increased industry asset sale activity to the decision to use asset sales to fund acquisitions. 
[Please See Table 3.6] 
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 Correlation Effect Findings 
This section examines the predictions of the correlation effect, which similarly highlights 
an advantage to using asset sale proceeds as the funding source. According to this effect, 
conglomerates will be more likely to sell assets than to issue equity to generate the desired 
financing. This is because, unlike equity, non-core asset are not necessarily correlated with the 
rest of the firm, so even if the asset being sold is of low quality, this need not infer that the firm 
as a whole is of low quality. Alternatively, newly issued equity is perfectly correlated with the 
rest of the firm, so if a low price is attached to the equity being sold, it is also attached to the 
firm. It has been well documented that stock acquisitions result in negative acquisition 
announcement returns (Travlos, 1987). To avoid this reduction in shareholder wealth, the 
correlation effect predicts that conglomerates are more likely to use asset sale proceeds. To test 
these predictions, I explore the relation between a firm’s status as a conglomerate and the 
subsequent decision to select asset sale proceeds or equity to fund the acquisition. In addition 
to the main tests, supplementary tests are run to further control for potential endogeneity. 
 
3.6.1. Main Results for the Correlation Effect 
Table 3.7 reports the results of this analysis, using the same control variables, year and 
industry fixed effects, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors as in previous tests. 
Further, probit regressions are run and marginal effects are reported to ease interpretation of 
the results. The dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is asset sale, and equity in 
specifications (3) and (4). The main variable of interest is conglomerate, which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder has segments in more than one three-digit SIC 
code, as in Gopalan and Xie (2011), and 0 otherwise. 
The results provide strong support for the correlation effect. Specification (2) shows that 
conglomerate firms are 1.46% more likely to use asset sales to fund acquisitions, which is an 
increase of 48.69% relative to the mean value of the probability to use asset sale proceeds in 
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the full sample.21 This result is significant at the 1% level. Further, specification (4) finds a 
negative relation between conglomerate and the use of equity financing, showing that 
conglomerates are 2.16% less likely to finance acquisitions with equity. As with earlier tests, 
the results of the control variables are in line with previous literature. 
[Please See Table 3.7] 
 
3.6.2. Endogeneity Control for the Correlation Effect 
The main results in this section could suffer from potential endogeneity bias caused 
omitted variables or reverse causality. For instance, it is plausible that firms that make more 
acquisitions, and consequently grow larger, will be more likely candidates to sell assets (see 
for instance Kaplan and Weisbach (1992)). As with Sections 3.4.2 and 3.5.2, I control for 
potential sources of endogeneity by implementing an IV approach and PSM method as 
presented in Table 3.8. 
 
3.6.2.1. Instrumental Variable Approach for the Correlation Effect 
Panel A of Table 3.8 displays the IV approach results, using the same IV methodology as 
in Section 3.4.2.1. following Faulkender and Petersen (2012) and Harford and Uysal (2014). 
The instrumental variables are industry % conglomerate, which represents the percentage of 
firms in a given industry-year that are conglomerates, and industry M&A liquidity, which is the 
sum of acquisitions values for each industry-year divided by the aggregated assets of firms in 
the same industry-year as in Harford and Uysal (2014). Firms in industries with a higher 
percentage of conglomerates are more likely to be conglomerates themselves. Furthermore, 
according to unreported descriptive statistics by conglomerate status, conglomerate firms are 
                                                 
21 In the sample of 29,379 deal observations, the mean probability to use asset sale proceeds is 3.00%. 
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more likely to be from industries with larger firm sizes which acquire firms that are relatively 
smaller resulting in a negative relation between the liquidity measure and conglomerate status.  
Specification (1) reports marginal effects from the IV first-stage probit regression 
which includes the instrumental variables as well as the control variables from Table 3.7. The 
instrumental variables are statistically significant at conventional levels, having the expected 
signs. Additionally, the validity tests give evidence that the results do not suffer from weak 
instruments or overidentification issues.  
Specifications (2) and (3) present the marginal effects of probit regressions where the 
main variable of interest is residual conglomerate, which distinguishes between firms that are 
likely to be conglomerates but instead are either single segment firms or have no deviation in 
3-digit SIC codes among their segment industries and firms which are conglomerates. The 
coefficient for predicted conglomerate identifies the effect of a firm being more likely to be a 
conglomerate, and the coefficient on residual conglomerate captures the effect of actually being 
a conglomerate. The residual and predicted conglomerate variables are estimated from 
specification (1). In specification (2), residual conglomerate is positively and significantly 
associated with the likelihood that a firm will select asset sales as the financing source at the 
1% level. While specification (3) finds that residual conglomerate is negative and significant 
at the 5%. These findings provide strong support for the main correlation effect results. 
 
3.6.2.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Approach for the Correlation Effect 
As with the previous sections, a propensity score matching (PSM) method is used to 
control for potential endogeneity. Conglomerate firms (treated) are matched with analogous 
firms which are not conglomerates (control). The results from this analysis are displayed in 
Panel B of Table 3.8. Specification (1) shows that the treatment effect on the selection of asset 
sales as the source of financing by conglomerate firms is significantly positive at the 1% level, 
providing additional validation of the correlation effect’s predictions. In specification (2), the 
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treatment effect on the selection of equity as the source of financing for conglomerate firms is 
not significant. 
Overall, these results show that conglomerate firms are more likely to use asset sale 
proceeds to fund acquisition investments, providing strong evidence in support of the 
correlation effect, even after controlling for potential bias from endogeneity.  
 [Please See Table 3.8] 
 
 Theoretical Extension for Debt and Additional Robustness Tests 
In this section, a theoretical extension by Edmans and Mann (2017) that models the choice 
of debt in relation to the three effects explored in this study is examined. In addition, to further 
substantiate the results, a number of additional robustness tests are also run. 
 
3.7.1. Theoretical Extension for the Choice of Debt Financing 
In their extension for debt issuance, Edmans and Mann (2017) allow the firm to sell debt, 
in addition to equity and asset sales, as a financing source. They show that the same balance 
sheet, camouflage, and correlation effects which drive the choice between equity and asset 
sales also drive the choice between risky debt and asset sales. To test these predictions, the 
same specifications found in Tables 3.3, 3.5, and 3.7 are run again, but instead use debt in place 
of equity as the financing source. The dependent variable, debt financing, is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the source of financing listed in the sources of funds used for 
financing variable in the SDC database is at least one of borrowings, line of credit, bridge loan, 
foreign lender, debt issue, junk bond issue, or mezzanine financing, and takes the value of 0 
otherwise. The M&A sample comprises 1,837 deals financed by debt. 
Table 3.9 displays the results of this analysis. Specifications (1) and (2) present findings 
for the balance sheet effect and debt financing. A significantly positive relation is identified 
between high relative size (i.e., high financing need) and the use of debt as the source of 
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financing, irrespective of whether the bidder is in an industry with good or poor growth 
opportunities. Specification (3) shows that low quality firms in the midst of an asset sale wave 
are significantly less likely to finance using debt. The coefficient for conglomerate in 
specification (4) shows no significance, suggesting that conglomerate firms are not likely to 
issue debt to fund acquisitions. These results further support the predictions of each of the three 
effects and show that these effects are robust to using debt as the financing source. 
 [Please See Table 3.9] 
 
3.7.2. Additional Auxiliary Tests 
In addition to the above analysis, I perform a number of sensitivity tests to further examine 
the robustness of the results. The first set of tests replaces the main variable of interest in each 
of our main tables with an alternative proxy. To start, the dummy variable, high relative size, 
is replaced with the continuous relative size measure. Table 3.10 displays the results from this 
analysis. Specification (4) supports the results found in Table 3.3, showing a significantly 
positive relation between relative size and the use of equity as the financing source for firms in 
industries with high market-to-book ratios. Moreover, specifications (1), (3), and (5) 
demonstrate the negative association between relative size and asset sales, regardless of 
industry growth opportunities. 
[Please See Table 3.10] 
To better interpret the marginal effects for relationships in Table 3.10 for relative size, 
which is a continuous variable, I graph the probability estimates with upper and lower 
confidence bounds at the 95% level. Figure 3.1 exhibits a positive relationship between relative 
size and equity financing for firms from industries with high market-to-book. Alternatively, 
Figure 3.2 demonstrates a negative relation for firms in low market-to-book industries. Figures 
3.3 and 3.4 show a negative relation between relative size and funding through asset sales for 
firms in both high and low market-to-book industries. 
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[Please See Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4] 
Next, the asset sale wave variable, which is binary in nature, is replaced with asset sale 
liquidity as the measure of asset sale activity, which is the sum of asset sale values for each 
industry-year divided by the aggregated assets of firms in the same industry-year. Table 3.11 
displays similar results to that of Table 3.5, with specification (1) showing the relationship 
between the interaction term, low ROA*industry asset sale liquidity, and asset sales is 
significant at conventional levels.  
[Please See Table 3.11] 
Further, the conglomerate dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the bidder has 
segments in two or more three-digit SIC codes, is replaced with two alternative measures for 
conglomerate status, a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has at least 3 different 3-digit SIC codes 
from among firm segments and 0 otherwise, and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm if the 
firm has at least 4 different 3-digit SIC codes. Specifications (1) and (2) of Table 3.12 show 
that the relationship between conglomerate and asset sales is significant at conventional levels 
even with alternative conglomerate measures. 
[Please See Table 3.12] 
Measures of firm distress and further measures of financial constraints, which are 
commonly cited motivations for asset sales,22 are added in Table 3.13 to specifications from 
the main tables: in particular, I include the distance to default as in Campbell, Hilscher, and 
Szilagyi (2008) in specifications (1), (5), and (9); the Altman Z score as in Altman (1968) to 
control for financial distress in specifications (2), (6), and (10); the Size-Age (SA) index as in 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) in specifications (3), (7), and (11) to capture further financial 
constraint concerns; and the KZ index as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) in specifications (4), 
                                                 
22 For instance, Brown et al. (1994) show that creditors strongly influence asset sale decisions by financially 
distressed firms to pay down debt. Alternatively, Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Borisova and Brown (2013) 
provide evidence that financially constrained firms use proceeds from asset sales for corporate investment. 
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(8), and (12) also for financial constraints. The main results remain qualitatively similar to 
those of the main tables. 
[Please See Table 3.13] 
Finally, financial firms (6000-6999) and regulated utilities (4900-4999) are excluded from 
the sample as in Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Fama and French (2005), and Harford 
and Uysal (2014). Table 3.14 displays the results from this analysis and shows that our results 
are not biased by the inclusion of these firms. 
[Please See Table 3.14] 
In addition to the above tests, I check for the existence of multicollinearity amongst the 
independent variables using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests and confirm there are not any 
multicollinearity issues that would materially affect these estimates. 
Overall, in this section, I confirm that the main findings are robust to various auxiliary 
tests and provide further evidence to substantiate the initial results in support of the balance 
sheet effect, camouflage effect, and correlation effect. 
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter provides evidence in support of the new theory by Edmans and Mann (2017) 
on the choice between asset sale proceeds and equity as a source of funds in an M&A setting. 
In particular, I offer empirical confirmation of the growing importance of asset sales as a 
funding source in M&As. Consistent with Edmans and Mann (2017) theoretical model, I 
provide new evidence that the relative size of the target firm (i.e., relative financing need) is a 
key but often overlooked determinant of financing choice in M&As in support of the balance 
sheet effect with equity preferred when the relative size is large and growth opportunities are 
good and asset sale proceeds favored if the relative size is small. These results highlight 
potential shortcomings of popular theories on financing choice such as the pecking order theory 
which omit relative financing need as a key determinant. Additionally, I give confirmation of 
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the camouflage effect showing that low quality firms take advantage of periods of increased 
industry asset sale activity in order to hide the motives for the sale. Finally, I find support for 
the correlation effect with conglomerates being more likely to fund acquisitions by selling 
assets. 
The findings of this study have important implications for managers and investment 
bankers. In line with the theory by Edmans and Mann (2017), these results indicate that there 
are settings where equity issuance is not the financing source of last resort, but rather can be 
preferred to internal funding sources. Additionally, these results imply that bidding firms 
typically select the funding source only after they have factored in characteristics of the target 
firm, including the target firm’s relative size. Further, asset buyers that purchase assets in times 
of high industry asset sale activity may suffer from the unintentional purchase of low quality 
assets that have been hidden by the camouflage effect. Finally, my results suggest that 
conglomerates take advantage of the financial slack made available from their pool of 
uncorrelated assets in order to fund acquisition investment through asset sale proceeds, which 
can represent an important additional financing sources accessible by these firms. 
Altogether, this chapter provides strong empirical evidence on the importance of asset 
sales as a source of funds in acquisitions and of the validity of the new theory on financing 
choice by Edmans and Mann (2017).  
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Appendix for Chapter 3 
Variable descriptions. 
Variable Description 
Panel A: Dependent variables and variables of interest 
Asset sale A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the asset sale is a completed M&A 
transaction greater than or equal to the value of the merger bid, with the form of 
transaction being either acquisition of assets or acquisition of certain assets, as in 
Edmans and Mann (2017), “[…] where the acquisition technique field includes at least 
one out of Divestiture, Property Acquisition, Auction, Internal Reorganization […]” (p. 
2), and “[…] none out of Buyout, Bankrupt, Takeover, Restructuring, Liquidation, 
Private, Tender, Unsolicited, and Failed […]” (p. 2), and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Equity A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the percentage of stock variable for 
payment method is 100%, or if the payment method is missing, where common stock 
issue is identified as the sole source of financing in the sources of funds used for 
financing variable, and 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson 
Financial SDC. 
High relative size A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s relative size is above the 
industry-year median, and 0 otherwise. Relative size is defined below. This variable is 
created using data from Thomson Financial SDC and the CRSP database.  
Industry M/B The industry median market-to-book ratio. Market-to-book ratio is defined below. This 
variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Asset sale wave A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a given industry was experiencing an asset 
sale wave in that industry-year, and 0 otherwise. Asset sale waves are identified using 
the same methodology used to identify merger waves as in Harford (2005). See also 
Section 2.3. The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC and 
Compustat. 
Low ROA A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm’s ROA is in the bottom quartile 
of that industry-year, and 0 otherwise. ROA is defined below. This variable is created 
using data from Compustat. 
Conglomerate A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder has segments in more than one 
three-digit SIC code, as in Gopalan and Xie (2011), and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
created using data from Compustat. 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Relative size The ratio of the deal value (from Thomson Financial SDC) to the bidder market value of 
equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement (from the CRSP database).  
ROA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by total assets. This 
variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Rated A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is rated at fiscal year-end, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Size Sales at fiscal year-end. This variable is created using data from Compustat. In the 
regressions analysis I use the ln(size). 
Leverage Total debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) divided by total assets at fiscal 
year-end. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Cash reserves Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets at fiscal year-end. This variable 
is created using data from Compustat. 
M/B The market value of equity (common shares outstanding * closing price at fiscal year-
end) divided by the book value of equity at fiscal year-end. Similar to Fama and French, 
book value of equity is total shareholders' equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax 
credit minus the book value of preferred stock. In case this data is not available, 
shareholders' equity is calculated as the sum of common and preferred equity. If none of 
the two are available, shareholders' equity is defined as the differences of total assets and 
total liabilities. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Collateral The ratio of firm's property, plant and equipment to total assets at the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the acquisition announcement from Compustat. 
Run-up Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of the firm over the period starting (−205, −6) 
days prior to the acquisition announcement from CRSP. 
Age Calculated by taking the difference between the year of acquisition and the first year the 
firm appears in the CRSP database. 
Number of analysts The number of equity analysts following the bidding firm replaced by 0 for firms not 
covered by IBES. 
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Panel C: Deal characteristics 
Target number of analysts The number of equity analysts following the target firm replaced by 0 for firms not 
covered by IBES. 
Diversifying deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for intra-industry transactions, and 0 
otherwise. Industries are defined at the 2-digit SIC level from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Hostile deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals defined as hostile or unsolicited, 
and 0 otherwise. This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Tender offer A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals defined as tender offers, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Private target A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals where the target is a private firm, 
and 0 otherwise. This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Panel E: Industry characteristics  
Herfindahl index 
 
Sum of squares of the market shares of all firms sharing the same three-digit SIC, where 
market share is defined as sales of the firm to the aggregated sales of the industry. This 
variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Panel E: Instrumental variables 
High target industry sales A dummy variable equal to 1 if the target industry’s sales are above the median of median 
sales of all industries in that given year.  This variable is created using data from 
Compustat. 
Target industry CAPEX The target industry’s median capital expenditure by employees in that given year. This 
variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Bidder industry CAPEX The target industry’s median capital expenditure by assets in that given year. This 
variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Industry distressed A dummy variable equal to 1 if the mean credit rating in that industry is below 
investment grade (BBB), and 0 otherwise. This variable is created using data from 
Compustat. 
Industry R&D The median value of R&D scaled by total assets in a given industry-year. This variable 
is created using data from Compustat. 
Industry % conglomerate The percentage of firms in a given industry-year that are conglomerates. This variable is 
created using data from Compustat. 
Industry M&A liquidity The sum of acquisitions values for each industry-year divided by the aggregated assets 
of firms in the same industry-year as in Harford and Uysal (2014). This variable is 
created using data from Thomson Financial SDC and Compustat. 
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Tables for Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 
Financing source by year.  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics by year and financing source from a sample of US public and private acquisitions 
announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014, with data drawn from the Thomson Financial 
SDC database. The number of observations and percentage of deals with an identified financing source for each year are 
reported. 
 
 Full sample  
(1) 
 Financing identified 
(2) 
 Asset sale  
(3) 
 Equity  
(4) 
 N  N  N % of deals  N % of deals 
1990 446  236  7 2.97  131 55.51 
1991 554  342  5 1.46  200 58.48 
1992 813  501  16 3.19  297 59.28 
1993 1,064  690  18 2.61  413 59.86 
1994 1,485  853  20 2.34  486 56.98 
1995 1,481  945  32 3.39  561 59.37 
1996 1,810  1,072  46 4.29  646 60.26 
1997 2,428  1,362  83 6.09  778 57.12 
1998 2,587  1,408  101 7.17  750 53.27 
1999 1,990  1,161  77 6.63  703 60.55 
2000 1,804  1,078  47 4.36  721 66.88 
2001 1,082  595  33 5.55  321 53.95 
2002 946  499  27 5.41  171 34.27 
2003 930  482  23 4.77  168 34.85 
2004 1,145  615  33 5.37  155 25.20 
2005 1,227  701  53 7.56  142 20.26 
2006 1,275  722  51 7.06  110 15.24 
2007 1,216  661  48 7.26  115 17.40 
2008 835  479  27 5.64  89 18.58 
2009 543  297  10 3.37  87 29.29 
2010 691  392  22 5.61  79 20.15 
2011 704  393  26 6.62  68 17.30 
2012 736  425  25 5.88  56 13.18 
2013 703  410  23 5.61  71 17.32 
2014 884  534  28 5.24  90 16.85 
Total 29,379  16,853  881 5.23  7,408 43.96 
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Table 3.2 
Sample descriptive statistics by financing source.  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of US public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014, with data drawn from the 
Thomson Financial SDC and Compustat databases. The mean, median, and number of observations are reported for: variables of interest (Panel A), firm characteristics (Panel B), deal characteristics 
(Panel C), and industry characteristics (Panel D). The sample is further classified by whether the financing source was asset sales or equity. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. 
Statistical tests for differences in means and equality of medians for each characteristic between the two categories are also included. 
 
 Full Sample  
(1) 
 Asset Sale  
(2) 
 Equity  
(3) 
 Difference (p-value)  
(2)-(3) 
 Mean Median N  Mean Median N  Mean Median N  Mean Median 
Panel A: Variables of interest               
Relative size 0.190 0.067 19,711  0.058 0.019 659  0.211 0.082 4,346  0.000 0.000 
Industry M/B 1.912 1.730 29,379  1.880 1.711 881  2.071 1.776 7,408  0.000 0.088 
Asset sale wave 0.536 - 29,379  0.620 - 881  0.625 - 7,408  0.484 - 
Low ROA 0.288 - 18,116  0.327 - 541  0.307 - 4,196  0.444 - 
Conglomerate 0.322 - 14,832  0.494 - 549  0.208 - 2,825  0.000 - 
Panel B: Firm characteristics               
ROA 0.088 0.106 18,116  0.092 0.099 541  0.042 0.038 4,196  0.000 0.000 
Rated 0.180 - 29,379  0.414 - 881  0.127 - 7,408  0.000 - 
Size 7,558.93 682.71 19,711  23,798.37 1,894.57 659  9,392.57 744.72 4,346  0.000 0.000 
Leverage 0.214 0.163 19,557  0.323 0.319 660  0.156 0.101 4,251  0.000 0.000 
Cash reserves 0.181 0.087 19,555  0.107 0.057 660  0.217 0.107 4,250  0.000 0.000 
M/B 3.488 2.233 18,722  2.746 1.939 652  4.734 2.687 4,065  0.000 0.000 
Collateral 0.191 0.108 18,192  0.261 0.182 537  0.145 0.071 4,212  0.000 0.000 
Run-up 0.130 0.026 17,032  0.044 -0.017 612  0.243 0.086 3,758  0.000 0.000 
Age 2.115 2.197 19,813  2.631 2.708 660  1.993 2.079 4,370  0.000 0.000 
Number of analysts 3.788 1.000 29,379  5.511 1.000 881  3.851 0.000 7,408  0.000 0.080 
Panel C: Deal characteristics               
Target number of analysts 0.493 0.000 29,379  0.287 0.000 881  0.833 0.000 7,408  0.000 0.000 
Diversifying deal 0.437 - 29,379  0.561 - 881  0.374 - 7,408  0.000 - 
Hostile deal 0.013 - 29,379  0.005 - 881  0.009 - 7,408  0.160 - 
Tender offer 0.034 - 29,379  0.049 - 881  0.009 - 7,408  0.000 - 
Private target 0.783 - 29,379  0.857 - 881  0.642 - 7,408  0.000 - 
Panel D: Industry characteristics               
Herfindahl index 0.123 0.083 19,113  0.111 0.077 659  0.092 0.070 3,987  0.000 0.061 
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Table 3.3  
Financing choice and the balance sheet effect.  
 
This table presents marginal effects from probit regression analysis on the effect of the relative size of the target to the bidding 
firm (i.e., relative financing need) on financing choice. The dependent variables are the financing source dummies with asset 
sale in specifications (1), (3), and (5) and equity in specifications (2), (4), and (6). A sample of US public and private 
acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 are used. The sample is further 
classified by whether the bidder's industry was experiencing high or low growth. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable 
descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 
49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Full sample  High industry M/B  Low industry M/B 
 Asset sale  
(1) 
Equity  
(2) 
 Asset sale  
(3) 
Equity  
(4) 
 Asset sale  
(5) 
Equity  
(6) 
High relative size -0.0254*** 
(-7.02) 
0.0174** 
(2.50) 
 -0.0321*** 
(-5.88) 
0.0460*** 
(4.82) 
 -0.0206*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.0104 
(-1.09) 
ROA -0.0766*** 
(-6.04) 
-0.2660*** 
(-10.03) 
 -0.0688*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.2705*** 
(-7.99) 
 -0.1010*** 
(-5.15) 
-0.3019*** 
(-7.13) 
Rated 0.0110** 
(2.21) 
-0.0202* 
(-1.70) 
 0.0130* 
(1.76) 
-0.0217 
(-1.31) 
 0.0088 
(1.37) 
-0.0121 
(-0.84) 
Ln (size) 0.0040*** 
(2.59) 
0.0086*** 
(2.62) 
 0.0013 
(0.61) 
0.0164*** 
(3.82) 
 0.0072*** 
(3.43) 
-0.0002 
(-0.05) 
Leverage 0.0379*** 
(3.43) 
-0.1278*** 
(-5.46) 
 0.0398** 
(2.51) 
-0.1396*** 
(-4.30) 
 0.0488*** 
(3.22) 
-0.1164*** 
(-3.59) 
Cash reserves -0.0428*** 
(-3.39) 
-0.0149 
(-0.68) 
 -0.0418** 
(-2.44) 
-0.0149 
(-0.53) 
 -0.0398** 
(-2.21) 
-0.0385 
(-1.13) 
M/B -0.0016*** 
(-2.91) 
0.0071*** 
(8.00) 
 -0.0016** 
(-2.19) 
0.0063*** 
(5.92) 
 -0.0022** 
(-2.01) 
0.0080*** 
(4.76) 
Collateral -0.0003 
(-0.02) 
0.0083 
(0.30) 
 0.0180 
(0.94) 
-0.0429 
(-1.07) 
 -0.0135 
(-0.92) 
0.0401 
(1.18) 
Run-up -0.0085** 
(-2.34) 
0.0345*** 
(6.73) 
 -0.0071 
(-1.36) 
0.0362*** 
(5.13) 
 -0.0067 
(-1.29) 
0.0333*** 
(4.40) 
Age 0.0129*** 
(5.02) 
-0.0113** 
(-2.33) 
 0.0172*** 
(4.24) 
-0.0188*** 
(-2.81) 
 0.0085*** 
(2.58) 
-0.0018 
(-0.28) 
Number of analysts -0.0001 
(-0.25) 
0.0006 
(0.88) 
 0.0002 
(0.43) 
0.0009 
(1.05) 
 -0.0004 
(-0.88) 
0.0004 
(0.44) 
Target number of analysts -0.0020** 
(-2.10) 
0.0077*** 
(4.94) 
 -0.0011 
(-0.84) 
0.0072*** 
(3.31) 
 -0.0034** 
(-2.37) 
0.0084*** 
(3.78) 
Diversifying deal 0.0041 
(1.32) 
-0.0005 
(-0.08) 
 0.0029 
(0.63) 
0.0018 
(0.19) 
 0.0064 
(1.45) 
-0.0066 
(-0.69) 
Hostile deal -0.0107 
(-0.75) 
-0.1589*** 
(-5.19) 
 -0.0254 
(-0.93) 
-0.2161*** 
(-5.52) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.01) 
-0.1103*** 
(-2.64) 
Tender offer 0.0176** 
(2.28) 
-0.2984*** 
(-12.45) 
 0.0209* 
(1.82) 
-0.3420*** 
(-10.46) 
 0.0157 
(1.45) 
-0.2449*** 
(-7.90) 
Private target 0.0182*** 
(3.65) 
-0.1510*** 
(-17.35) 
 0.0248*** 
(3.35) 
-0.1633*** 
(-12.64) 
 0.0144** 
(2.12) 
-0.1359*** 
(-12.37) 
Herfindahl index -0.0440** 
(-2.53) 
-0.1871*** 
(-4.51) 
 -0.0520* 
(-1.84) 
-0.1598*** 
(-2.65) 
 -0.0424* 
(-1.89) 
-0.2337*** 
(-4.27) 
         
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 14,775 15,038  7,496 7,802  6,618 7,141 
Pseudo R2 0.1689 0.2711  0.1821 0.2876  0.1842 0.2647 
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Table 3.4  
Endogeneity control for the balance sheet effect.   
 
This table presents results from an instrumental variable (IV) approach and propensity score matching approach to control for potential 
endogeneity. Panel A shows first and second stage results from the IV approach. Specification (1) shows the first stage probit where the 
dependent variable is a dummy where above median relative size of the target to the bidding firm is equal to 1 and 0 otherwise, with 
instrumental variables shown to impact the size of the target firm. Specifications (2), (3), (4), and (5) provide marginal effects from the second 
stage probit analysis, with asset sales as the dependent variable in specifications (2) and (4) and equity as the dependent variable in 
specifications (3) and (5). Panel B presents marginal effects from probit analysis from the PSM approach. A one-dimensional propensity score 
is calculated, which is a function of observable characteristics used in Table 3, using a one-to-one (i.e., nearest neighbor) matching estimator. 
The dependent variable in specifications (1) and (3) is asset sale, and the dependent variable in specifications (2) and (4) is equity. The sample 
period is between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 for the universe of US publicly listed firms. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable 
descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on fiscal year and Fama-French 49 industry 
classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Instrument variable (IV) approach 
   2nd stage probit 
   High industry M/B  Low industry M/B 
 1st stage probit  
(1) 
 Asset sale  
(2) 
Equity  
(3) 
 Asset sale  
(4) 
Equity  
(5) 
High target industry sales 0.0266*** 
(3.05) 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Target industry CAPEX 0.2019** 
(2.42) 
   
 
  
 
 
 
Bidder industry CAPEX -0.6853* 
(-1.93) 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Residual high relative size  
 
 -0.0134*** 
(-5.88) 
0.0196*** 
(4.94) 
 -0.0080*** 
(-3.91) 
-0.0039 
(-0.96) 
Predicted high relative size  
 
 0.0296 
(0.65) 
-0.1644 
(-1.46) 
 0.0683 
(1.49) 
-0.1308 
(-1.33) 
ROA -0.0209 
(-0.62) 
 -0.0634*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.2723*** 
(-8.02) 
 -0.0965*** 
(-4.83) 
-0.3031*** 
(-7.10) 
Rated 0.0237** 
(2.04) 
 0.0119 
(1.62) 
-0.0183 
(-1.03) 
 0.0078 
(1.18) 
-0.0090 
(-0.61) 
Ln (size) -0.1247*** 
(-41.44) 
 0.0081 
(1.41) 
-0.0083 
(-0.55) 
 0.0176*** 
(2.97) 
-0.0148 
(-1.14) 
Leverage 0.0804*** 
(3.19) 
 0.0365** 
(2.23) 
-0.1234*** 
(-3.68) 
 0.0386*** 
(2.58) 
-0.1060*** 
(-3.13) 
Cash reserves 0.0296 
(1.20) 
 -0.0415** 
(-2.42) 
-0.0117 
(-0.40) 
 -0.0416** 
(-2.32) 
-0.0343 
(-1.00) 
M/B -0.0019* 
(-1.70) 
 -0.0018** 
(-2.31) 
0.0059*** 
(5.29) 
 -0.0023** 
(-2.31) 
0.0077*** 
(4.52) 
Collateral 0.0475 
(1.56) 
 0.0132 
(0.68) 
-0.0351 
(-0.85) 
 -0.0143 
(-0.96) 
0.0413 
(1.20) 
Run-up -0.0014 
(-0.21) 
 -0.0065 
(-1.25) 
0.0360*** 
(5.08) 
 -0.0066 
(-1.29) 
0.0342*** 
(4.54) 
Age -0.0088* 
(-1.69) 
 0.0173*** 
(4.30) 
-0.0206*** 
(-3.08) 
 0.0090*** 
(2.79) 
-0.0034 
(-0.52) 
Number of analysts 0.0002 
(0.32) 
 0.0002 
(0.29) 
0.0012 
(1.43) 
 -0.0005 
(-1.10) 
0.0005 
(0.47) 
Target number of analysts 0.0442*** 
(17.07) 
 -0.0034 
(-1.57) 
0.0155*** 
(2.99) 
 -0.0072*** 
(-3.11) 
0.0132*** 
(2.83) 
Diversifying deal -0.0246*** 
(-3.05) 
 0.0042 
(0.87) 
-0.0023 
(-0.24) 
 0.0081* 
(1.77) 
-0.0109 
(-1.11) 
Hostile deal 0.1983*** 
(4.83) 
 -0.0388 
(-1.39) 
-0.1934*** 
(-4.60) 
 -0.0070 
(-0.37) 
-0.0954** 
(-2.22) 
Tender offer -0.0182 
(-0.87) 
 0.0210* 
(1.84) 
-0.3440*** 
(-10.54) 
 0.0185 
(1.64) 
-0.2446*** 
(-7.84) 
Private target -0.2245*** 
(-19.70) 
 0.0358*** 
(3.29) 
-0.2075*** 
(-7.02) 
 0.0314*** 
(2.58) 
-0.1641*** 
(-6.64) 
Competing deal 0.1206*** 
(3.49) 
 0.0025 
(0.14) 
0.0169 
(0.47) 
 -0.0537** 
(-2.19) 
0.0108 
(0.32) 
Herfindahl index -0.0241 
(-0.61) 
 -0.0508* 
(-1.80) 
-0.1604*** 
(-2.66) 
 -0.0385* 
(-1.72) 
-0.2452*** 
(-4.40) 
        
Year & industry fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 15,011  7,484 7,790  6,598 7,121 
Pseudo R2 0.2110  0.1825 0.2890  0.1883 0.2666 
Wald F-test 6.486       
LIML size of nominal 10% Wald 6.46       
Hansen J statistic 2.479       
(p-value) (0.2896)       
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Panel B: Propensity score matching (PSM) 
 High industry M/B  Low industry M/B 
 Asset sale  
(1) 
Equity  
(2) 
 Asset sale  
(3) 
Equity  
(4) 
High relative size -0.0190*** 
(-3.27) 
0.0695*** 
(5.41) 
 -0.0203*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.0146 
(-1.01) 
ROA -0.0458** 
(-2.12) 
-0.2980*** 
(-6.23) 
 -0.0905*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.4056*** 
(-7.31) 
Rated 0.0095 
(1.11) 
-0.0195 
(-0.93) 
 0.0220*** 
(2.62) 
-0.0180 
(-0.81) 
Ln (size) 0.0054** 
(2.23) 
0.0209*** 
(3.38) 
 0.0077*** 
(2.67) 
-0.0029 
(-0.42) 
Leverage 0.0537*** 
(2.81) 
-0.1029** 
(-2.10) 
 0.0506*** 
(2.81) 
-0.0611 
(-1.43) 
Cash reserves -0.0293* 
(-1.66) 
-0.0026 
(-0.08) 
 -0.0042 
(-0.19) 
-0.0915* 
(-1.91) 
M/B -0.0008 
(-1.09) 
0.0060*** 
(4.14) 
 -0.0015 
(-1.11) 
0.0106*** 
(4.36) 
Collateral 0.0080 
(0.42) 
-0.0064 
(-0.14) 
 -0.0545*** 
(-2.65) 
0.0361 
(0.69) 
Run-up -0.0032 
(-0.72) 
0.0401*** 
(4.06) 
 -0.0017 
(-0.30) 
0.0433*** 
(3.66) 
Age 0.0119*** 
(2.73) 
-0.0164* 
(-1.94) 
 0.0111** 
(2.48) 
-0.0067 
(-0.73) 
Number of analysts -0.0003 
(-0.48) 
-0.0022 
(-1.60) 
 -0.0009 
(-1.36) 
0.0010 
(0.77) 
Target number of analysts 0.0012 
(0.68) 
0.0058* 
(1.92) 
 -0.0075*** 
(-3.50) 
0.0069** 
(1.96) 
Diversifying deal 0.0014 
(0.24) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
 0.0079 
(1.16) 
-0.0008 
(-0.05) 
Hostile deal -0.0265 
(-1.16) 
-0.2639*** 
(-5.88) 
 0.0418** 
(2.16) 
-0.1369** 
(-2.36) 
Tender offer 0.0170 
(1.06) 
-0.3527*** 
(-9.15) 
 0.0117 
(0.74) 
-0.2681*** 
(-7.19) 
Private target 0.0459*** 
(4.07) 
-0.1861*** 
(-9.97) 
 0.0011 
(0.12) 
-0.1718*** 
(-10.26) 
Herfindahl index -0.0541* 
(-1.90) 
-0.0876 
(-1.14) 
 -0.0565* 
(-1.78) 
-0.2208*** 
(-2.78) 
      
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 6,866 7,638  5,553 6,993 
Pseudo R2 0.1869 0.3210  0.2834 0.2849 
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Table 3.5 
Financing choice and the camouflage effect.  
 
This table presents the coefficients of probit regression analysis on the effect of firm quality and industry asset sale activity on 
financing choice. The dependent variables are the financing source dummies, with asset sale in specification (1) and equity in 
specification (2). A sample of US public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2014 is used. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The 
z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Asset sale  
(1) 
Equity  
(2) 
Low ROA*Asset sale wave 0.1870** 
(2.12) 
0.0314 
(0.60) 
Asset sale wave -0.0192 
(-0.22) 
0.0063 
(0.13) 
Low ROA 0.3001*** 
(4.48) 
0.2078*** 
(5.15) 
Relative size -1.3248*** 
(-4.26) 
0.0826 
(1.64) 
Rated 0.1934** 
(2.46) 
-0.0549 
(-0.99) 
Ln (size) 0.0467* 
(1.95) 
0.0134 
(0.87) 
Leverage 0.6705*** 
(3.83) 
-0.5388*** 
(-4.82) 
Cash reserves -0.6135*** 
(-3.25) 
0.0802 
(0.80) 
M/B -0.0243*** 
(-2.60) 
0.0329*** 
(8.35) 
Collateral 0.0125 
(0.07) 
0.0050 
(0.04) 
Run-up -0.1631*** 
(-2.82) 
0.1663*** 
(6.95) 
Age 0.2068*** 
(5.01) 
-0.0547** 
(-2.42) 
Number of analysts -0.0010 
(-0.18) 
0.0025 
(0.74) 
Target number of analysts -0.0241 
(-1.55) 
0.0375*** 
(5.13) 
Diversifying deal 0.0712 
(1.43) 
-0.0005 
(-0.02) 
Hostile deal -0.0977 
(-0.42) 
-0.7538*** 
(-5.23) 
Tender offer 0.2351* 
(1.90) 
-1.4076*** 
(-12.41) 
Private target 0.2581*** 
(3.27) 
-0.7105*** 
(-16.80) 
Herfindahl index -0.7314*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.8708*** 
(-4.28) 
Constant -2.8688*** 
(-6.89) 
-0.6406 
(-1.33) 
   
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 14,746 15,007 
Pseudo R2 0.1778 0.2645 
 
  
Chapter 3 Financing Through Asset Sales: Evidence from M&As 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 87  Nathan P. McNamee 
Table 3.6 
Endogeneity control for the camouflage effect.   
 
This table presents results from an instrumental variable (IV) approach and propensity score matching approach to control for potential 
endogeneity. Panel A shows first and second stage results from the IV approach. Specification (1) shows the first stage probit measuring the 
probability of asset sale waves, with instrumental variables shown to impact asset sale likelihood. Specifications (2) and (3) provide results 
from the second stage probit regressions, with asset sales and equity as the dependent variable, respectively. Panel B presents coefficients 
from probit analysis from the PSM approach. A one-dimensional propensity score is calculated, which is a function of observable 
characteristics used in Table 4, using a one-to-one (i.e., nearest neighbor) matching estimator. The dependent variable in specification (1) is 
asset sale, and the dependent variable in specification (2) is equity. The sample period is between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 for 
the universe of US publicly listed firms. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed, are based on fiscal year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics 
reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Instrumental variable (IV) approach 
  2nd stage probit 
 1st stage probit  
(1) 
Asset sales  
(2) 
Equity  
(3) 
Industry distressed 0.5073*** 
(7.71) 
 
 
 
 
Industry R&D 8.6470*** 
(9.00) 
 
 
 
 
Low ROA*Asset sale wave  
 
0.2390** 
(2.49) 
0.0595 
(1.03) 
Asset Sale Wave  
 
-0.2366 
(-0.68) 
0.4782** 
(2.29) 
Residual asset sale wave  
 
0.0754 
(0.51) 
-0.1963** 
(-2.17) 
Low ROA  
 
0.2872*** 
(3.96) 
0.1961*** 
(4.32) 
Relative size 0.0487 
(0.82) 
-1.3231*** 
(-4.11) 
0.0963* 
(1.68) 
Rated -0.0506 
(-0.85) 
0.2003** 
(2.31) 
-0.1349** 
(-2.14) 
Ln (size) 0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.0446* 
(1.72) 
0.0124 
(0.73) 
Leverage 0.0404 
(0.33) 
0.5155*** 
(2.72) 
-0.5268*** 
(-4.25) 
Cash reserves 0.0045 
(0.04) 
-0.7984*** 
(-3.79) 
0.0805 
(0.74) 
M/B 0.0075* 
(1.66) 
-0.0218** 
(-2.26) 
0.0342*** 
(8.14) 
Collateral -0.1027 
(-0.62) 
0.1053 
(0.51) 
0.0735 
(0.54) 
Run-up 0.0615** 
(2.01) 
-0.1489** 
(-2.47) 
0.1801*** 
(7.04) 
Age 0.0048 
(0.19) 
0.1930*** 
(4.30) 
-0.0864*** 
(-3.48) 
Number of analysts -0.0015 
(-0.46) 
-0.0016 
(-0.26) 
0.0035 
(0.98) 
Target number of analysts -0.0037 
(-0.44) 
-0.0327* 
(-1.89) 
0.0372*** 
(4.23) 
Diversifying deal -0.0384 
(-1.09) 
0.0213 
(0.39) 
0.0267 
(0.76) 
Hostile deal -0.2422* 
(-1.77) 
-0.0205 
(-0.08) 
-0.6885*** 
(-4.41) 
Tender offer 0.0586 
(0.70) 
0.3067** 
(2.24) 
-1.5116*** 
(-11.97) 
Private target -0.0596 
(-1.13) 
0.2781*** 
(2.99) 
-0.7826*** 
(-14.67) 
Herfindahl index 0.2150 
(1.14) 
-0.8123*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.7956*** 
(-3.80) 
Constant -4.8095*** 
(-5.57) 
-2.9982*** 
(-5.83) 
-0.3412 
(-0.66) 
    
Year & industry fixed effects    
No. of obs. 11,773 11,262 11,635 
Pseudo R2 0.4473 0.1744 0.2579 
Wald F-test 79.227   
LIML size of nominal 10% Wald 8.68   
Hansen J statistic 0.0490   
(p-value) (0. 8249)   
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Panel B: Propensity score matching (PSM) 
 Asset sale  
(1) 
Equity  
(2) 
Low ROA*Asset sale wave 0.3026*** 
(2.79) 
0.1820** 
(2.55) 
Asset sale wave 0.0447 
(0.42) 
0.0696 
(0.96) 
Low ROA 0.2461** 
(2.39) 
0.0222 
(0.29) 
Relative size -1.1842*** 
(-3.24) 
0.0106 
(0.13) 
Rated 0.2240** 
(2.08) 
-0.1244 
(-1.41) 
Ln (size) 0.0844*** 
(2.87) 
-0.0040 
(-0.18) 
Leverage 0.3131 
(1.35) 
-0.5714*** 
(-3.27) 
Cash reserves -0.5734** 
(-2.23) 
-0.1041 
(-0.62) 
M/B -0.0328** 
(-2.42) 
0.0336*** 
(6.86) 
Collateral 0.1306 
(0.52) 
-0.0511 
(-0.22) 
Run-up -0.1652** 
(-2.21) 
0.1556*** 
(4.29) 
Age 0.2079*** 
(4.27) 
-0.1522*** 
(-3.90) 
Number of analysts -0.0038 
(-0.57) 
0.0065 
(1.32) 
Target number of analysts -0.0563** 
(-2.32) 
0.0616*** 
(3.33) 
Diversifying deal 0.0123 
(0.17) 
0.0523 
(0.94) 
Hostile deal 0.0023 
(0.01) 
-0.6303*** 
(-2.61) 
Tender offer 0.3640** 
(2.17) 
-1.6803*** 
(-9.63) 
Private target 0.2355* 
(1.71) 
-0.9062*** 
(-11.11) 
Herfindahl index -0.6538* 
(-1.87) 
-0.7225** 
(-1.99) 
Constant -3.0964*** 
(-7.06) 
0.2781 
(0.54) 
   
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 10,664 10,033 
Pseudo R2 0.2336 0.2629 
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Table 3.7 
Financing choice and the correlation effect.  
 
This table presents marginal effects from probit regression analysis on the effect of conglomerate status on financing choice. 
The dependent variables are the financing source dummies, with asset sale in specifications (1) and (2) and equity in 
specifications (3) and (4). A sample of US public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 
and December 31, 2014 is used. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The 
z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Asset sale  Equity 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Conglomerate 0.0307*** 
(5.60) 
0.0146*** 
(2.68) 
 -0.0372*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.0216** 
(-2.20) 
Relative size  
 
-0.1094*** 
(-4.46) 
  
 
0.0128 
(1.09) 
ROA  
 
-0.0883*** 
(-5.76) 
  
 
-0.2189*** 
(-8.01) 
Rated  
 
0.0132** 
(2.15) 
  
 
-0.0322** 
(-2.45) 
Ln (size)  
 
0.0014 
(0.76) 
  
 
0.0091** 
(2.52) 
Leverage  
 
0.0375*** 
(2.76) 
  
 
-0.1028*** 
(-4.14) 
Cash reserves  
 
-0.0502*** 
(-3.27) 
  
 
-0.0047 
(-0.20) 
M/B  
 
-0.0013** 
(-1.97) 
  
 
0.0069*** 
(7.57) 
Collateral  
 
-0.0023 
(-0.16) 
  
 
-0.0042 
(-0.15) 
Run-up  
 
-0.0102** 
(-2.40) 
  
 
0.0333*** 
(6.17) 
Age  
 
0.0133*** 
(4.16) 
  
 
-0.0143*** 
(-2.68) 
Number of analysts  
 
-0.0000 
(-0.01) 
  
 
0.0006 
(0.87) 
Target number of analysts  
 
-0.0023** 
(-2.10) 
  
 
0.0076*** 
(4.26) 
Diversifying deal  
 
0.0008 
(0.23) 
  
 
0.0071 
(0.97) 
Hostile deal  
 
-0.0125 
(-0.69) 
  
 
-0.1417*** 
(-4.42) 
Tender offer  
 
0.0190** 
(2.07) 
  
 
-0.2955*** 
(-11.98) 
Private target  
 
0.0112* 
(1.81) 
  
 
-0.1623*** 
(-15.39) 
Herfindahl index  
 
-0.0618*** 
(-3.01) 
  
 
-0.1455*** 
(-3.32) 
      
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 14,327 11,015  14,827 11,438 
Pseudo R2 0.0874 0.1739  0.1598 0.2470 
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Table 3.8  
Endogeneity control for the correlation effect.   
 
This table presents results from an instrumental variable (IV) approach and propensity score matching approach to control for 
potential endogeneity. Panel A shows first and second stage results from the IV approach. Specification (1) shows marginal 
effects from the first stage probit measuring the probability of a firm being a conglomerate, with instrumental variables shown 
to impact conglomerate status. Specifications (2) and (3) provide marginal effects from the second stage probit, with asset 
sales and equity as the dependent variables, respectively. Panel B presents marginal effects from probit analysis from the PSM 
approach. A one-dimensional propensity score is calculated, which is a function of observable characteristics used in Table 5, 
using a one-to-one (i.e., nearest neighbor) matching estimator. The dependent variable in specification (1) is asset sale, and 
the dependent variable in specification (2) is equity. The sample period is between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 
for the universe of US publicly listed firms. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed 
effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on fiscal year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, 
respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Instrumental variable (IV) approach 
  2nd stage probit 
 1st stage probit  
(1) 
Asset sale  
(2) 
Equity  
(3) 
Industry % conglomerate 0.5372*** 
(3.30) 
 
 
 
 
Industry M&A liquidity -0.1575* 
(-1.93) 
 
 
 
 
Residual conglomerate  
 
0.0060*** 
(2.64) 
-0.0093** 
(-2.29) 
Predicted conglomerate  
 
0.0492 
(1.15) 
0.0223 
(0.31) 
Relative size 0.0008 
(0.05) 
-0.1099*** 
(-4.43) 
0.0147 
(1.24) 
ROA -0.1400*** 
(-3.12) 
-0.0831*** 
(-5.19) 
-0.2125*** 
(-7.38) 
Rated 0.0656*** 
(2.99) 
0.0101 
(1.46) 
-0.0354** 
(-2.39) 
Ln (size) 0.0420*** 
(6.55) 
-0.0002 
(-0.06) 
0.0077 
(1.60) 
Leverage -0.0236 
(-0.61) 
0.0389*** 
(2.81) 
-0.1018*** 
(-4.05) 
Cash reserves -0.2887*** 
(-7.07) 
-0.0381* 
(-1.85) 
0.0070 
(0.24) 
M/B -0.0075*** 
(-4.69) 
-0.0010 
(-1.34) 
0.0072*** 
(7.08) 
Collateral -0.1147** 
(-2.46) 
0.0024 
(0.15) 
0.0018 
(0.06) 
Run-up -0.0101 
(-1.13) 
-0.0105** 
(-2.41) 
0.0337*** 
(6.15) 
Age 0.0985*** 
(10.96) 
0.0094* 
(1.69) 
-0.0192** 
(-2.20) 
Number of analysts -0.0068*** 
(-4.72) 
0.0003 
(0.49) 
0.0009 
(0.98) 
Target number of analysts -0.0018 
(-0.75) 
-0.0023** 
(-2.06) 
0.0074*** 
(4.10) 
Diversifying deal 0.0620*** 
(6.00) 
-0.0015 
(-0.32) 
0.0052 
(0.60) 
Hostile deal 0.0310 
(0.97) 
-0.0138 
(-0.75) 
-0.1392*** 
(-4.33) 
Tender offer 0.0111 
(0.53) 
0.0186** 
(2.02) 
-0.2948*** 
(-11.91) 
Private target 0.0127 
(0.88) 
0.0106* 
(1.68) 
-0.1630*** 
(-15.31) 
Herfindahl index 0.1834*** 
(3.13) 
-0.0673*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.1563*** 
(-3.36) 
    
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 11,359 10,940 11,355 
Pseudo R2 0.2331 0.1760 0.2471 
Wald F-test 10.924   
LIML size of nominal 10% Wald 8.68   
Hansen J statistic 0.165   
(p-value) (0.6843)   
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Panel B: Propensity score matching (PSM) 
 Asset sale  
(1) 
Equity  
(2) 
Conglomerate 0.0244*** 
(3.57) 
0.0018 
(0.20) 
Relative size -0.1937*** 
(-3.25) 
0.0074 
(0.57) 
ROA -0.1375*** 
(-5.29) 
-0.1896*** 
(-5.41) 
Rated 0.0042 
(0.43) 
-0.0303** 
(-2.26) 
Ln (size) 0.0029 
(0.96) 
0.0052 
(1.29) 
Leverage 0.0455** 
(2.12) 
-0.0330 
(-1.14) 
Cash reserves -0.0923*** 
(-3.50) 
0.0263 
(0.90) 
M/B -0.0023** 
(-2.12) 
0.0042*** 
(3.58) 
Collateral 0.0175 
(0.75) 
0.0160 
(0.44) 
Run-up -0.0035 
(-0.47) 
0.0327*** 
(5.03) 
Age 0.0131*** 
(2.69) 
-0.0179*** 
(-3.16) 
Number of analysts 0.0008 
(1.42) 
0.0008 
(1.01) 
Target number of analysts -0.0014 
(-0.49) 
0.0051*** 
(2.86) 
Diversifying deal -0.0002 
(-0.03) 
0.0079 
(0.95) 
Hostile deal -0.0014 
(-0.05) 
-0.1026*** 
(-3.30) 
Tender offer -0.0095 
(-0.29) 
-0.2000*** 
(-8.81) 
Private target 0.0141 
(0.97) 
-0.1266*** 
(-11.54) 
Herfindahl index -0.0994*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.0873** 
(-2.00) 
   
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 8,345 8,611 
Pseudo R2 0.1606 0.2583 
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Table 3.9 
Debt financing and the balance sheet, camouflage, and correlation effects.  
 
This table presents marginal effects from probit regression analysis on financing choice. The dependent variable for all 
specifications is debt. A sample of US public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2014 is used. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The 
z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Balance sheet effect  Camouflage effect  Correlation effect 
 
High industry M/B 
(1) 
Low industry M/B 
(2)  (3)  (4) 
High relative size 0.0581*** 
(9.29) 
0.0516*** 
(7.84) 
    
Low ROA*Asset sale wave    -0.2603*** 
(-3.61) 
  
Asset Sale Wave    0.0531 
(0.98) 
  
Low ROA    -0.1544*** 
(-2.99) 
  
Conglomerate      -0.0049 
(-0.86) 
Relative size    0.6266*** 
(12.94) 
 0.0754*** 
(12.17) 
ROA 0.0646** 
(2.23) 
0.1325*** 
(3.65) 
   0.1227*** 
(4.52) 
Rated -0.0061 
(-0.69) 
-0.0235*** 
(-2.64) 
 -0.1744*** 
(-2.78) 
 -0.0179** 
(-2.29) 
Ln (size) -0.0053** 
(-2.30) 
-0.0050* 
(-1.92) 
 -0.0351** 
(-2.14) 
 -0.0049** 
(-2.33) 
Leverage 0.0275* 
(1.69) 
0.0240 
(1.29) 
 0.1705 
(1.41) 
 0.0061 
(0.40) 
Cash reserves -0.2066*** 
(-7.97) 
-0.1979*** 
(-4.85) 
 -2.0111*** 
(-9.58) 
 -0.2347*** 
(-8.98) 
M/B -0.0009 
(-1.24) 
-0.0002 
(-0.25) 
 -0.0069 
(-1.22) 
 -0.0010 
(-1.40) 
Collateral 0.0421** 
(2.32) 
0.0371* 
(1.80) 
 0.3928*** 
(2.92) 
 0.0501*** 
(3.12) 
Run-up -0.0033 
(-0.64) 
-0.0023 
(-0.42) 
 -0.0015 
(-0.04) 
 -0.0019 
(-0.44) 
Age 0.0008 
(0.21) 
-0.0038 
(-0.91) 
 -0.0190 
(-0.70) 
 0.0006 
(0.19) 
Number of analysts -0.0013** 
(-2.20) 
-0.0004 
(-0.56) 
 -0.0092** 
(-2.28) 
 -0.0010** 
(-2.01) 
Target number of analysts 0.0048*** 
(3.82) 
0.0052*** 
(3.88) 
 0.0444*** 
(4.89) 
 0.0046*** 
(4.04) 
Diversifying deal -0.0059 
(-0.99) 
-0.0008 
(-0.13) 
 -0.0329 
(-0.81) 
 -0.0024 
(-0.48) 
Hostile deal -0.0150 
(-0.85) 
-0.0480** 
(-2.15) 
 -0.4314*** 
(-2.95) 
 -0.0510*** 
(-2.85) 
Tender offer 0.0797*** 
(7.33) 
0.0907*** 
(6.85) 
 0.8447*** 
(10.32) 
 0.1023*** 
(10.16) 
Private target 0.0044 
(0.53) 
0.0216** 
(2.41) 
 0.1428** 
(2.35) 
 0.0212*** 
(2.65) 
Herfindahl index -0.0316 
(-1.28) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
 -0.1287 
(-0.75) 
 -0.0133 
(-0.61) 
Constant    -1.8585*** 
(-6.57) 
  
       
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs. 7,750 7,025  14,974  11,362 
Pseudo R2 0.2122 0.1931  0.1983  0.1836 
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Table 3.10 
Financing choice and the balance sheet effect with continuous relative size measure.  
 
This table presents marginal effects from probit regression analysis on the effect of the relative size of the target to the bidding 
firm (i.e., relative financing need) on financing choice. The dependent variables are the financing source dummies with asset 
sale in specifications (1), (3), and (5) and equity in specifications (2), (4), and (6). A sample of US public and private 
acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 is used. The sample is further 
classified by whether the bidder's industry was experiencing high or low growth. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable 
descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 
49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Full sample  High industry M/B  Low industry M/B 
 Asset sale  
(1) 
Equity  
(2) 
 Asset sale  
(3) 
Equity  
(4) 
 Asset sale  
(5) 
Equity  
(6) 
Relative size -0.0831*** 
(-4.25) 
0.0140 
(1.28) 
 -0.1186*** 
(-3.12) 
0.0425*** 
(2.70) 
 -0.0650*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.0129 
(-0.88) 
ROA -0.0811*** 
(-6.20) 
-0.2644*** 
(-9.97) 
 -0.0737*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.2638*** 
(-7.81) 
 -0.1076*** 
(-5.31) 
-0.3038*** 
(-7.15) 
Rated 0.0117** 
(2.34) 
-0.0202* 
(-1.70) 
 0.0136* 
(1.86) 
-0.0218 
(-1.31) 
 0.0094 
(1.45) 
-0.0118 
(-0.82) 
Ln (size) 0.0032** 
(2.07) 
0.0076** 
(2.26) 
 0.0005 
(0.23) 
0.0139*** 
(3.17) 
 0.0064*** 
(2.99) 
-0.0001 
(-0.03) 
Leverage 0.0405*** 
(3.63) 
-0.1280*** 
(-5.45) 
 0.0439*** 
(2.73) 
-0.1397*** 
(-4.30) 
 0.0512*** 
(3.36) 
-0.1153*** 
(-3.54) 
Cash reserves -0.0422*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.0144 
(-0.65) 
 -0.0404** 
(-2.37) 
-0.0137 
(-0.49) 
 -0.0403** 
(-2.25) 
-0.0387 
(-1.14) 
M/B -0.0016*** 
(-2.83) 
0.0071*** 
(7.98) 
 -0.0015** 
(-2.06) 
0.0061*** 
(5.82) 
 -0.0022** 
(-2.01) 
0.0080*** 
(4.78) 
Collateral -0.0001 
(-0.01) 
0.0086 
(0.31) 
 0.0183 
(0.92) 
-0.0418 
(-1.04) 
 -0.0130 
(-0.87) 
0.0401 
(1.18) 
Run-up -0.0097*** 
(-2.66) 
0.0346*** 
(6.75) 
 -0.0087* 
(-1.69) 
0.0362*** 
(5.14) 
 -0.0072 
(-1.36) 
0.0332*** 
(4.37) 
Age 0.0130*** 
(5.06) 
-0.0116** 
(-2.37) 
 0.0178*** 
(4.35) 
-0.0198*** 
(-2.96) 
 0.0084*** 
(2.58) 
-0.0017 
(-0.27) 
Number of analysts -0.0000 
(-0.03) 
0.0006 
(0.84) 
 0.0004 
(0.71) 
0.0008 
(0.92) 
 -0.0004 
(-0.88) 
0.0005 
(0.46) 
Target number of analysts -0.0016 
(-1.60) 
0.0080*** 
(5.10) 
 -0.0008 
(-0.57) 
0.0082*** 
(3.74) 
 -0.0028* 
(-1.87) 
0.0085*** 
(3.75) 
Diversifying deal 0.0041 
(1.28) 
-0.0007 
(-0.10) 
 0.0023 
(0.49) 
0.0018 
(0.19) 
 0.0066 
(1.47) 
-0.0064 
(-0.67) 
Hostile deal -0.0037 
(-0.25) 
-0.1609*** 
(-5.25) 
 -0.0182 
(-0.66) 
-0.2265*** 
(-5.90) 
 0.0073 
(0.39) 
-0.1082** 
(-2.56) 
Tender offer 0.0171** 
(2.19) 
-0.2979*** 
(-12.39) 
 0.0194* 
(1.68) 
-0.3414*** 
(-10.38) 
 0.0157 
(1.45) 
-0.2457*** 
(-7.94) 
Private target 0.0163*** 
(3.22) 
-0.1528*** 
(-17.34) 
 0.0228*** 
(2.94) 
-0.1670*** 
(-12.62) 
 0.0130* 
(1.90) 
-0.1353*** 
(-12.31) 
Herfindahl index -0.0450*** 
(-2.58) 
-0.1879*** 
(-4.52) 
 -0.0515* 
(-1.79) 
-0.1591*** 
(-2.63) 
 -0.0450** 
(-1.98) 
-0.2325*** 
(-4.25) 
         
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 14,775 15,038  7,496 7,802  6,618 7,141 
Pseudo R2 0.1758 0.2708  0.1906 0.2859  0.1908 0.2647 
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Figure 3.1  
Relative size with high industry M/B and the probability to fund acquisitions with equity. 
 
This graph presents estimated probabilities with upper and lower confidence bounds at the 95% level for the relation between 
high relative size and equity as the funding source for firms in industries with high market-to-book ratios.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 
Relative size with low industry M/B and the probability to fund acquisitions with equity. 
 
This graph presents estimated probabilities with upper and lower confidence bounds at the 95% level for the relation between 
high relative size and equity as the funding source for firms in industries with low market-to-book ratios.  
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Figure 3.3 
Relative size with high industry M/B and the probability to fund acquisitions with asset sales. 
 
This graph presents estimated probabilities with upper and lower confidence bounds at the 95% level for the relation between 
high relative size and asset sales as the funding source for firms in industries with high market-to-book ratios.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 
Relative size with low industry M/B and the probability to fund acquisitions with asset sales. 
 
This graph presents estimated probabilities with upper and lower confidence bounds at the 95% level for the relation between 
high relative size and asset sales as the funding source for firms in industries with low market-to-book ratios.  
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Table 3.11 
Financing choice and the camouflage effect with asset sale liquidity.  
 
This table presents the coefficients of probit regression analysis on the effect of firm quality and industry asset sale activity on 
financing choice. The dependent variables are the financing source dummies, with asset sale in specification (1) and equity in 
specification (2). A sample of US public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2014 is used. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The 
z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Asset sale  
(1) 
Equity  
(2) 
Low ROA*Industry asset sale liquidity 7.0086* 
(1.95) 
-0.2271 
(-0.10) 
Industry asset sale liquidity -2.8995 
(-1.03) 
0.4198 
(0.28) 
Low ROA 0.2551*** 
(3.26) 
0.2184*** 
(4.62) 
Relative size -1.3336*** 
(-4.21) 
0.0812 
(1.61) 
Rated 0.1925** 
(2.45) 
-0.0544 
(-0.98) 
Ln (size) 0.0435* 
(1.81) 
0.0130 
(0.84) 
Leverage 0.7022*** 
(3.99) 
-0.5332*** 
(-4.78) 
Cash reserves -0.5996*** 
(-3.20) 
0.0816 
(0.81) 
M/B -0.0247*** 
(-2.64) 
0.0327*** 
(8.31) 
Collateral -0.0334 
(-0.17) 
-0.0099 
(-0.08) 
Run-up -0.1596*** 
(-2.72) 
0.1673*** 
(7.00) 
Age 0.2047*** 
(4.97) 
-0.0553** 
(-2.45) 
Number of analysts -0.0010 
(-0.19) 
0.0025 
(0.73) 
Target number of analysts -0.0244 
(-1.57) 
0.0374*** 
(5.15) 
Diversifying deal 0.0696 
(1.41) 
-0.0012 
(-0.04) 
Hostile deal -0.1118 
(-0.48) 
-0.7530*** 
(-5.23) 
Tender offer 0.2376* 
(1.93) 
-1.4058*** 
(-12.37) 
Private target 0.2507*** 
(3.16) 
-0.7106*** 
(-16.83) 
Herfindahl index -0.7439*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.8779*** 
(-4.34) 
Constant -2.8776*** 
(-6.91) 
-0.6548 
(-1.35) 
   
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 14,775 15,033 
Pseudo R2 0.1770 0.2640 
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Table 3.12 
Financing choice and the correlation effect with conglomerate measures.  
 
This table presents marginal effects from probit regression analysis on the effect of conglomerate status on financing choice. 
The dependent variables are the financing source dummies, with asset sale in specifications (1) and (2) and equity in 
specifications (3) and (4). A sample of US public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 
and December 31, 2014 is used. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The 
z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Asset sale  
(1) 
Asset sale  
(2) 
Equity  
(3) 
Equity  
(4) 
Conglomerate (3+ different SIC codes) 0.0096* 
(1.92) 
 
 
-0.0097 
(-0.81) 
 
 
Conglomerate (4+ different SIC codes)  
 
0.0103* 
(1.79) 
 
 
-0.0091 
(-0.53) 
Relative size -0.1098*** 
(-4.46) 
-0.1102*** 
(-4.46) 
0.0126 
(1.07) 
0.0127 
(1.08) 
ROA -0.0877*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.0871*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.2184*** 
(-7.96) 
-0.2183*** 
(-7.94) 
Rated 0.0133** 
(2.17) 
0.0137** 
(2.23) 
-0.0335** 
(-2.54) 
-0.0339*** 
(-2.58) 
Ln (size) 0.0017 
(0.92) 
0.0017 
(0.90) 
0.0087** 
(2.39) 
0.0086** 
(2.38) 
Leverage 0.0369*** 
(2.71) 
0.0373*** 
(2.74) 
-0.1024*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.1023*** 
(-4.10) 
Cash reserves -0.0521*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.0531*** 
(-3.47) 
-0.0013 
(-0.05) 
-0.0002 
(-0.01) 
M/B -0.0014** 
(-2.09) 
-0.0014** 
(-2.13) 
0.0070*** 
(7.65) 
0.0071*** 
(7.66) 
Collateral -0.0037 
(-0.26) 
-0.0038 
(-0.27) 
-0.0026 
(-0.09) 
-0.0026 
(-0.09) 
Run-up -0.0103** 
(-2.38) 
-0.0103** 
(-2.39) 
0.0333*** 
(6.17) 
0.0333*** 
(6.18) 
Age 0.0139*** 
(4.39) 
0.0140*** 
(4.43) 
-0.0158*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.0162*** 
(-3.10) 
Number of analysts -0.0001 
(-0.15) 
-0.0001 
(-0.16) 
0.0007 
(0.99) 
0.0007 
(1.02) 
Target number of analysts -0.0024** 
(-2.14) 
-0.0024** 
(-2.17) 
0.0076*** 
(4.28) 
0.0077*** 
(4.30) 
Diversifying deal 0.0010 
(0.26) 
0.0012 
(0.32) 
0.0063 
(0.86) 
0.0060 
(0.82) 
Hostile deal -0.0128 
(-0.70) 
-0.0121 
(-0.67) 
-0.1419*** 
(-4.43) 
-0.1422*** 
(-4.44) 
Tender offer 0.0193** 
(2.09) 
0.0191** 
(2.08) 
-0.2954*** 
(-11.97) 
-0.2955*** 
(-11.97) 
Private target 0.0116* 
(1.87) 
0.0113* 
(1.83) 
-0.1628*** 
(-15.44) 
-0.1627*** 
(-15.42) 
Herfindahl index -0.0605*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.0607*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.1495*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.1500*** 
(-3.40) 
     
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 11,015 11,015 11,438 11,438 
Pseudo R2 0.1715 0.1712 0.2464 0.2464 
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Table 3.13  
Financing choice with controls for financial constraint or firm distress.  
 
This table presents the coefficients of probit regression analysis on financing choice. The dependent variables are the financing source dummies, with equity in specifications (1) through (4) and 
asset sale in specifications (5) through (12). A sample of US public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 is used. Refer to Appendix 
for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. 
The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Balance sheet effect (High industry M/B)  Camouflage effect  Correlation effect 
 Equity  
(1) 
Equity  
(2) 
Equity  
(3) 
Equity  
(4) 
 Asset sale  
(5) 
Asset sale  
(6) 
Asset sale  
(7) 
Asset sale  
(8) 
 Asset sale  
(9) 
Asset sale  
(10) 
Asset sale  
(11) 
Asset sale  
(12) 
High relative size 0.2033*** 
(4.51) 
0.2075*** 
(4.75) 
0.2110*** 
(4.81) 
0.2107*** 
(4.81) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low ROA* 
Asset sale wave 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.1681* 
(1.86) 
0.1762** 
(1.99) 
0.1873** 
(2.12) 
0.1929** 
(2.19) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asset Sale Wave  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.0494 
(-0.56) 
-0.0078 
(-0.09) 
-0.0192 
(-0.22) 
-0.0203 
(-0.24) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low ROA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.2944*** 
(4.30) 
0.2854*** 
(4.12) 
0.2990*** 
(4.47) 
0.3017*** 
(4.50) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conglomerate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.2207*** 
(2.84) 
0.2028*** 
(2.69) 
0.2079*** 
(2.73) 
0.2118*** 
(2.76) 
Distance to default -0.0008** 
(-2.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.0005 
(-1.43) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.0008* 
(-1.90) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Z score  
 
0.0021 
(1.23) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
-0.0185 
(-1.42) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
-0.0136 
(-1.20) 
 
 
 
 
SA index  
 
 
 
0.2564*** 
(2.82) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
0.0302 
(0.25) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
-0.0718 
(-0.54) 
 
 
KZ index  
 
 
 
 
 
0.0057** 
(2.13) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0040 
(-1.01) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0033 
(-0.79) 
Constant -0.5498 
(-0.87) 
-0.6205 
(-1.03) 
-0.3499 
(-0.58) 
-0.6294 
(-1.04) 
 -2.6812*** 
(-6.36) 
-2.8296*** 
(-6.74) 
-2.8288*** 
(-6.30) 
-2.8618*** 
(-6.87) 
 -2.0083*** 
(-4.67) 
-2.1843*** 
(-5.11) 
-2.2970*** 
(-4.95) 
-2.2066*** 
(-5.19) 
               
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yr & ind fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 7,527 7,802 7,802 7,802  14,377 14,746 14,746 14,746  10,803 11,015 11,015 11,015 
Pseudo R2 0.2909 0.2878 0.2889 0.2883  0.1845 0.1818 0.1778 0.1782  0.1777 0.1766 0.1740 0.1741 
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Table 3.14 
Financing choice excluding financial firms and regulated utilities.  
 
This table presents marginal effects from probit regression analysis on financing choice. The dependent variables are the 
financing source dummies with equity in specifications (1) and (2) and asset sale in specifications (3) and (4). A sample of US 
public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 is used. Refer to 
Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on 
calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Balance sheet effect  Camouflage effect  Correlation effect 
 High industry M/B  
(1) 
Low industry M/B  
(2) 
   
(3) 
   
(4) 
High relative size 0.0439*** 
(4.37) 
-0.0102 
(-0.96) 
  
 
  
 
Low ROA*Asset sale wave  
 
 
 
 0.2303** 
(2.26) 
  
 
Asset Sale Wave  
 
 
 
 -0.0759 
(-0.79) 
  
 
Low ROA  
 
 
 
 0.3493*** 
(4.82) 
  
 
Conglomerate  
 
 
 
  
 
 0.0126** 
(2.19) 
Relative size  
 
 
 
 -1.1615*** 
(-3.69) 
 -0.0885*** 
(-3.69) 
ROA -0.2430*** 
(-7.22) 
-0.2279*** 
(-5.89) 
  
 
 -0.0774*** 
(-5.02) 
Rated -0.0494*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.0190 
(-1.21) 
 0.1739* 
(1.89) 
 0.0079 
(1.27) 
Ln (size) 0.0155*** 
(3.50) 
-0.0006 
(-0.13) 
 0.0292 
(1.06) 
 0.0015 
(0.81) 
Leverage -0.0930*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.0949*** 
(-2.64) 
 0.5772*** 
(2.96) 
 0.0387*** 
(2.85) 
Cash reserves -0.0082 
(-0.29) 
-0.0066 
(-0.19) 
 -0.6072*** 
(-2.87) 
 -0.0345** 
(-2.22) 
M/B 0.0063*** 
(5.62) 
0.0075*** 
(4.45) 
 -0.0266** 
(-2.33) 
 -0.0015** 
(-1.97) 
Collateral -0.0391 
(-0.89) 
0.0444 
(1.26) 
 0.3003 
(1.42) 
 0.0194 
(1.31) 
Run-up 0.0344*** 
(4.90) 
0.0297*** 
(4.10) 
 -0.1286** 
(-2.09) 
 -0.0075* 
(-1.78) 
Age -0.0242*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.0099 
(-1.55) 
 0.2851*** 
(6.08) 
 0.0161*** 
(4.91) 
Number of analysts 0.0011 
(1.16) 
-0.0000 
(-0.01) 
 -0.0027 
(-0.41) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.52) 
Target number of analysts 0.0072*** 
(3.06) 
0.0073*** 
(2.80) 
 -0.0452** 
(-2.42) 
 -0.0032*** 
(-2.89) 
Diversifying deal 0.0018 
(0.19) 
0.0027 
(0.27) 
 0.0712 
(1.28) 
 0.0030 
(0.80) 
Hostile deal -0.2043*** 
(-5.26) 
-0.1180** 
(-2.52) 
 -0.0544 
(-0.23) 
 -0.0100 
(-0.59) 
Tender offer -0.3197*** 
(-9.95) 
-0.2110*** 
(-7.87) 
 0.2150 
(1.58) 
 0.0175* 
(1.94) 
Private target -0.1665*** 
(-11.62) 
-0.1453*** 
(-11.14) 
 0.1795* 
(1.82) 
 0.0077 
(1.23) 
Herfindahl index -0.1065* 
(-1.79) 
-0.2115*** 
(-3.91) 
 -0.9710*** 
(-3.09) 
 -0.0650*** 
(-3.04) 
Constant  
 
 
 
 -2.7743*** 
(-6.13) 
  
 
       
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs. 6,944 4,335  11,151  9,672 
Pseudo R2 0.2776 0.2344  0.1687  0.1695 
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4. Asset Sales and Merger & Acquisitions 
 
 Introduction 
Asset sales represent major sources of corporate funding with recent evidence highlighting 
an even more prominent role than the traditional sources of corporate financing (i.e., equity 
and debt). In particular, Edmans and Mann (2017) show that in 2012 firms engaged in corporate 
asset sales valued at $131 billion versus $81 billion in seasoned equity issuance (this pattern 
exists in almost all years over their sample period from 1995-2012), demonstrating that firms 
meet more of their financing needs through asset sales than via equity issues. Furthermore, 
Eckbo and Kisser (2016) confirm an overwhelming reliance on internal funds, documenting 
that proceeds from asset sales contribute more to overall corporate funding annually than funds 
raised by issuing equity or debt.23  
The importance of asset sales as a means for corporate restructuring has been documented 
by existing research on divestitures, showing that asset sale proceeds can become a significant 
source of allocable capital for firms, with proceeds frequently used to fund corporate 
investments.24 The objective of this chapter is to examine the effects of asset sale proceeds on 
M&A investments.25 In particular, the prominence of asset sales as a source of funding raises 
several important questions in relation to M&As. Do asset sales affect acquisition investments? 
Do asset sales and the use of proceeds for acquisitions increase operating efficiency? Finally, 
do asset sales affect the choice of payment method in M&As, leading to more cash deals? 
                                                 
23 Eckbo and Kisser (2013) estimate a sizable 31% of all corporate financing is sourced from the sale of assets, 
compared to only 16% of financing stemming from equity issues and another 12% from net debt. 
24 See for instance, Bates (2005), Hovakimian and Titman (2006), Borisova and Brown (2013), and Arnold et al. 
(2015). 
25 Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms sell assets with the intent to pursue M&A deals. For instance in 2011, 
Boston Scientific sold its stroke-treating neurovascular business for $1.5 billion with the intent of using a large 
part of the after-tax proceeds for acquisitions. Following the completion of the deal, Boston Scientific acquired 
three firms using $490 million of cash proceeds derived from the asset sale (Source: The Wall Street Journal, 
“Stryker to Buy Boston Scientific Unit”, October 28, 2010, and Thomson Financial SDC). 
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Prior research on the use of proceeds from asset sales as a potential source of funds in 
M&As is, at best, sparse. For example, Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) hint that many firms 
“[…] seem to sell assets while engaged in a program of acquisitions so that the asset sales 
provide cash for these programs […]” (p. 9), and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and John and 
Ofek (1995) provide brief descriptive statistics showing that some firms raise cash through 
asset sales to fund acquisitions. I focus on the effects of asset sale proceeds on M&A 
investments for three main reasons. 
First, prior research on funding sources for M&As has focused only on operating cash 
flows, cash holdings, debt, and equity (see, e.g., Jensen, 1986; Amihud, Lev, and Travlos, 1990; 
Harford, 1999; Schlingemann, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009), and has overlooked 
proceeds from asset sales as a potential source of funds. This is surprising given the magnitude 
and importance of M&A transactions.26 Second, M&As following asset sales represent pure 
asset restructuring events, which are not confounded by capital structure effects associated with 
proceeds being used for retiring corporate debt, or with payout policy implications related with 
distribution of cash to shareholders (i.e., dividends or stock repurchases). Third, this type of 
selling-to-buy asset restructuring (i.e., asset sales followed by acquisitions) can have a 
significant effect on firm operating efficiency; in fact, any firm that sells an asset, which is not 
related to its core operations, and uses the proceeds to buy an asset that improves operating 
efficiency, experiences a double benefit effect: the first benefit coming from disposing of an 
unwanted, inefficient operation,27 and the second stemming from buying an asset which can 
further improve the operating efficiency of the firm. 
Motivated by the lack of empirical evidence on the subject, I consider the apparent 
importance of asset sales as a source of corporate funding in M&As, contending that asset sales 
                                                 
26 The U.S. takeover market has experienced 396,056 deals worth almost $80 trillion over the period between 
1990 and 2014 (Source: Thomson Financial SDC).   
27 Daley et al. (1997) show evidence that focusing through asset sales improves operating performance and makes 
the firm’s remaining segments more efficient. 
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improve firms’ cash richness offering important internal funds to finance corporate investments 
(Edmans and Mann (2017)). This is in line with Bates (2005), who argues that asset sales 
increase firms’ liquidity and that cash proceeds from a sale can be re-allocated to the unfunded 
projects of the divesting firm. Asset sales are particularly helpful for financially constrained 
firms which might not otherwise be able to fund important corporate investments. In this 
respect, Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Borisova and Brown (2013) provide empirical 
evidence that asset sale proceeds are used by financially constrained firms to fund capital 
expenditures and R&D investments, respectively. Additionally, it has already been 
documented in the literature that cash-richness (Harford (1999)), free cash flows (Jensen 
(1986)), and cash windfalls (Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994)) are positively 
associated with corporate acquisitions. Therefore, given that i) cash proceeds from asset sales 
are expected to increase firms’ liquidity and cash-richness; and ii) financially constrained firms 
can use asset sales when other funding sources may be difficult or too expensive to obtain, I 
predict that, ceteris paribus, firms that sell assets are more likely to conduct acquisition 
investments, and this effect should be more pronounced for financially constrained firms. 
Furthermore, John and Ofek (1995) identify the benefits to a firm resulting from focus 
increasing asset sales, showing that these types of divestitures lead to an improvement in the 
operating performance of the seller’s remaining assets. 28  Adding to this understanding, I 
predict that acquisitions following focus increasing asset sales should lead to improved 
operating efficiency, resulting from the double benefit effect.  
This study uses a broad sample of US acquisitions over the period from 1990 to 2014, and 
find strong empirical support for the hypotheses. The results provide evidence of a positive 
relation between an individual firm’s asset sales and the probability of the asset seller making 
                                                 
28 Schlingemann et al. (2002) also find that firms often prefer to dispose of assets or operations which are not 
related to the firm’s core industry. 
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a subsequent takeover bid. This effect is most pronounced for financially constrained firms. 
Economically, asset sales by financially constrained firms are associated with a 17.02% 
increase in acquisition probability in the following year, relative to the sample mean.  
Additionally, this study confirms the double benefit effect from this type of firm 
restructuring, showing a 1.81% increase in the three-year operating performance for firms that 
sell an unrelated asset and use the proceeds for a subsequent acquisition, relative to those that 
do not make a post-asset sale acquisition. This result is driven by focus increasing acquisitions 
and is more pronounced for financially constrained firms which experience a 9.11% increase 
in operating performance.  
These results hold with alternative measures of asset sales. In addition, they are robust 
after controlling for potential endogeneity bias arising either from reverse causality or from the 
choice of asset sales being correlated with potentially omitted variables. In particular, I 
implement a Granger causality test which is a test for determining whether one time series is 
useful in forecasting another. With this approach, I am able to test whether asset sales are useful 
in forecasting acquisitions. There is a strong positive time-series relation between asset sales 
and acquisitions, but not vice versa, showing that asset sales are useful in forecasting M&As, 
but acquisitions are not useful in forecasting asset sales. To control for unobservable 
characteristics, an instrumental variable approach is implemented using heteroskedasticity-
based instruments generated using the Lewbel’s (2012) method, and run the coefficient stability 
approach of Oster (2016); finally, a propensity score matching technique is performed to 
control for observable characteristics. The results show that omitted variables do not affect the 
results. Finally, an exhaustive set of additional checks is provided to confirm the robustness of 
the main findings.  
As a further implication of the importance of asset sales as a source of financing in M&As, 
the occurrence of asset sales clustering by industry in time (i.e., asset sale waves) is examined, 
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finding that asset sale waves are positively associated with subsequent merger waves, 
suggesting that asset sales facilitate the participation in merger waves of firms that might 
otherwise not be able to participate, potentially amplifying the merger wave. 
This study makes several important contributions to the source of funds, asset sale, M&A, 
restructuring, and method of payment literature. First, it provides empirical evidence that 
proceeds from asset sales are likely to be used as a funding source in the most important 
corporate investment that a firm can undertake, i.e., M&As. Second, it contributes to the 
understanding of the operating efficiency derived beyond asset sale restructuring only, 
stemming from the joint restructuring transactions of both selling and buying assets.  
This study is related to the work on the uses of asset sale proceeds by Bates (2005), 
Hovakimian and Titman (2006), and Borisova and Brown (2013). Bates (2005) identifies 
distributions to debt or equity holders, retention of proceeds by management, and financing of 
capital expenditure as potential uses of asset sales. Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and 
Borisova and Brown (2013) also show that asset sale proceeds are deployed to finance capital 
expenditure investments and R&D, respectively, especially for financially constrained firms. 
This study provides evidence that financing acquisitions is another use of asset sale proceeds.  
Moreover, this work is related with studies which provide associations between increases 
in firms’ cash liquidity and acquisition bids, such as Jensen (1986) with free cash flows, 
Blanchard et al. (1994) with cash windfalls, and Harford (1999) with cash holdings. 
Particularly, this study shows that proceeds from asset sales, which increase firms’ liquidity, 
lead to a higher probability of takeover bids.  
In addition, this chapter expands the work on asset restructuring and firm focus by John 
and Ofek (1995) and Daley et al. (1997), who study the performance of firms with asset sales 
(without also examining subsequent acquisitions), by illustrating an additional advantage to 
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simply selling unrelated assets, as identified by the double benefit effect of disposing unrelated 
assets and using the proceeds to acquire a firm that would improve operating efficiency. 
Further, this study extends the work on determinants of the choice of payment method in 
acquisitions by Amihud et al. (1990), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Harford et al. (2009), 
Chemmanur et al. (2009), and Karampatsas et al. (2014), highlighting the importance of asset 
sales as an overlooked determinant of method of payment in acquisitions.  
Finally, this study is related to the work on merger wave determinants by Gort (1969), 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Harford (2005), and Garfinkel and Hankins (2011). The first 
three studies find that merger waves are caused by industry shocks, with Harford (2005) also 
providing evidence that capital liquidity is an important catalyst in conjunction with industry 
shocks. This study provide evidence in support of the findings of the above studies and show 
that asset sale waves are related with merger waves. Additionally, this analysis is in line with 
the work of Mulherin and Boone (2000) and Brauer and Wiersema (2012), who find evidence 
of asset sale clustering and waves. This study also identifies asset sale waves in my sample 
period and show that they are positively associated with the subsequent occurrence of merger 
waves. 
The remainder of this chapter will be presented as follows: Section 4.2 identifies the 
sample and data. The main empirical findings are presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 controls 
for potential endogeneity, and key implications of this type of selling-to-buy asset restructuring 
are presented in Section 4.5. Additional auxiliary tests to further substantiate the robustness of 
the results are presented in Section 4.7. Section 4.6 examines implications of the effect of asset 
sales on acquisition activity at the industry level. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Asset Sales and Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 106  Nathan P. McNamee 
 Sample and Data 
The initial sample consists of all NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq firms listed on the Compustat 
annual industrial file from 1989 through 2013. The sample is composed of 32,033 firms for a 
total of 330,106 firm/year observations. The acquisition sample consists of deals announced 
between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014, and is obtained from the Thomson Financial 
SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database (SDC). There is a one-year lag between the sample 
period of the overall sample and the M&A sample because acquisition-related dependent 
variables in a specific year are associated to the firm’s asset sales and other control variables 
at the end of the previous year. Bidders are US public firms, and targets are public, private, or 
subsidiary firms domiciled both in and outside of the US. Transactions valued at less than $1 
million are eliminated.29 Further, bidders must own less than 10% of the target’s shares prior 
to the announcement and must be seeking to acquire more than 50% of the target’s shares after 
the acquisition. All privatizations, leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender 
offers, repurchases, sales of a minority interest, liquidations, restructurings, reverse takeovers, 
bankruptcy acquisitions, going private transactions, exchange offers, acquisitions of partial 
interest, and buybacks are excluded. After matching the two samples, I find that 6,212 bidders 
(14,883 firm-year observations) conducted 29,379 acquisitions over the period 1990 to 2014, 
out of which 27,506 are completed transactions.  
 
4.2.1. Asset Sale Measures 
One challenge in observing asset sale proceeds as a funding source for M&As is that it is 
difficult to observe an exact correspondence between a dollar raised in time t and a dollar spent 
on an acquisition in time t+τ (Schlingemann, 2004). Similar to Schlingemann (2004), rather 
than attempting to establish a precise correspondence, I consider the cash made available to the 
                                                 
29 All dollar variable values have been adjusted to 2014 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI). 
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firm through asset sales which occurred within 12 months prior to the acquisition 
announcement. For purposes of clarity, I define asset sales to include any divestitures or sell-
offs of business segments, product lines, investment assets, or property, plant, and equipment.30  
Asset sales data is collected from the SDC and Compustat databases. Definitions for the 
asset sale measures are outlined in the Appendix. Similar to Edmans and Mann (2017), asset 
sales are identified from the SDC database (SDC asset sale) as completed M&A transactions31 
with the form of transaction being either acquisition of assets or acquisition of certain assets, 
and where the acquisition technique field includes at least one out of divestiture,32 property 
acquisition, auction, or internal reorganization,33 and none out of buyout, bankrupt, takeover, 
restructuring, liquidation, private, tender, unsolicited, and failed. In these transactions, the asset 
seller is the firm raising funds to be used in a subsequent corporate investment (i.e., 
acquisitions). Because some asset sales, as defined by Edmans and Mann (2017), could also be 
reported by the asset buyer as an acquisition, any deals in the M&A sample that are also found 
in the asset sale sample are eliminated to avoid them being counted as both an asset sale and 
an acquisition transaction.34 
Additionally, I identify asset sales using financial accounting data from the Compustat 
database (Compustat asset sale), following Eckbo and Kisser (2016), calculated as i) the sale 
of investments (siv), plus ii) the absolute value of the minimum of the change in short-term 
                                                 
30 The term divestiture has been defined in the literature as pertaining to the modification of a firm’s productive 
assets through either sell-offs or spin-offs (Alexander et al., 1984; Tehranian et al., 1987). Hite and Owers (1983) 
observe that a spin-off results in the creation of an independent firm with a corresponding reduction in the asset 
base of the divesting firm. Thus, spin-offs are restructuring events that do not generate proceeds for the divesting 
firm, nor do they create an opportunity for managers to continue the control of spun-off assets, consequently, spin-
offs will not be relevant to my study. Unless specifically noted, where the term divestiture is used in this paper, it 
refers to sell-offs only. 
31 The majority of the deals (i.e., 52.1%) excluded from the asset sale sample are classified as mergers in the 
acquisition technique field in SDC and are included in the M&A sample discussed previously. 
32 The 98.7% of the asset sale sample appears in the acquisition technique field as divestiture. 
33 Deviating from Edmans and Mann (2017) spin-offs are excluded for purposes described in footnote 30. While 
spin-offs are nominally excluded, adding this restriction does not remove any observations from my asset sale 
subsample. 
34 A total of 10,177 overlapping deals (approximately 25%) are eliminated from the M&A sample. 
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investments and 0 (min[ivstch,0]), plus iii) the absolute value of the minimum of the investing 
activities and 0 (min[ivaco,0]), plus iv) the sale of property, plant and equipment (sppe), 
according to the formula:  
                         Asset sales = siv + min[ivstch,0] + min[ivaco,0] + sppe  (1) 
After creating both the SDC and Compustat asset sale measures, in an attempt to include 
all possible asset sale information in one measure, I then create the main variable of interest 
for this study, which is a composite asset sale dummy variable using the SDC and Compustat 
asset sale measures. This variable (asset sale) takes the value of 1 if the asset sale is either an 
SDC asset sale, following Edmans and Mann (2017), or a Compustat asset sale, following 
Eckbo and Kisser (2016). The dummy is set to 0, otherwise.35 Figure 4.1 displays graphically 
the volume of asset sales reported by year, which demonstrates that asset sales tend to occur in 
waves. Out of the 10,780 firm-year observations with acquisition transactions, 771 
observations involve firms with an SDC asset sale, 7,767 involve firms with a Compustat asset 
sale, and 7,963 involve bidders with my composite asset sale measure, which suggests that as 
much as 73.87% of the firm-year observations in my sample with acquisitions are likely to be 
funded in part by asset sale proceeds from asset sales in the preceding year. In contrast, 179,410 
firm-year observations had no acquisitions, with 96,680 of those experiencing an asset sale in 
the year prior, showing that a much smaller 53.89% of no acquisition firm-year observations 
are preceded by asset sales. The difference in asset sales between the acquisition and no-
acquisition sub-samples is statistically significant at the 1% level and gives my first indication 
that asset sales are positively associated with acquisitions in the following year. 
[Please See Figure 4.1] 
 
                                                 
35 As shown in the robustness checks below, using instead separately either SDC asset sale or Compustat asset 
sale as the main variable of interest leads to qualitatively similar results. 
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4.2.2. Sample Statistics 
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics on dependent and control variables for the overall 
firm-year sample and further partitions the sample by those firm-years with asset sales and 
those without asset sale. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. All non-binary 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, apart from cash reserves and leverage, 
which are winsorized only at the 99% percentile (right-hand side).36  
Panel A provides statistics for the dependent variable, acquisition probability, which offers 
an initial indication that firms with asset sales are more likely to engage in acquisitions in the 
following year. Additionally, there are notable mean and median differences in the 
characteristics between firms with asset sales and those without. Panel B displays firm 
characteristics and shows that firms with asset sales are more likely to have a credit rating,  are 
larger in size, have higher cash reserves, tend to have lower leverage (in mean terms only), 
higher stock returns, have more growth opportunities, and higher ROA. Panel C provides 
industry characteristics, and finds that firms with asset sales come from industries with slightly 
less acquisition liquidity and are slightly less concentrated.  
[Please See Table 4.1] 
However, because univariate comparisons do not consider any confounding effects, they 
can be misleading. Consequently, to discover the net effect of asset sales on the dependent 
variable, firm- and industry-specific characteristics need to be controlled for through 
multivariate regression analysis, as presented in the next section. 
 
 Empirical Findings 
This section provides results from multivariate analysis to identify the relation between 
asset sales and the likelihood of acquisitions. 
                                                 
36 Note that some regressions use the natural logarithm of size which is not winsorized.  
Chapter 4 Asset Sales and Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 110  Nathan P. McNamee 
4.3.1. Asset Sales and Acquisitions 
This analysis seeks to identify the relation between a firm’s asset sales and subsequent 
acquisition investments, while controlling for a number of firm- and industry-specific 
characteristics which have been identified in the literature as affecting acquisition investments.  
Table 4.2 reports the results for this analysis. All independent variables are lagged by one 
year to reduce endogeneity concerns. As in Harford and Uysal (2014), financial firms (6000–
6999) and regulated utilities (4900–4999) are excluded. I also control for year and industry 
fixed effects. Additionally, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at 
firm-level are used due to the presence of repeated firm observations in my sample. Further, to 
ease interpretation of the results, marginal effects for all models are reported, which can be 
interpreted as the average change in the dependent variable across all observations for firms 
with asset sales relative to firms without asset sales.  
All specifications probit regressions in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 
if the firm makes at least one acquisition in a given year, and 0 otherwise. The main variable 
of interest is asset sale, which is an indicator that takes the value of 1 for firms with asset sales 
in that given year, and 0 otherwise. Specifications (1) and (2) provide results for the full sample, 
while specifications (3) and (4) report results for financially constrained firms, and 
specifications (5) and (6) results for firms that are not constrained. Financial constraint is 
measured using the Size/Age index as in Hadlock and Pierce (2010).37 Firms with a Size/Age 
index in the top quartile of the year and industry are considered to be constrained. Further, the 
same controls as in Harford and Uysal (2014) are employed for comparison reasons, which 
consist of the existence of bond rating (rated), size, cash reserves, leverage, stock return, 
market-to-book ratio, ROA, industry M&A liquidity, and Herfindahl index. To reduce 
                                                 
37 The KZ index, developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), has also been employed as an alternative proxy for 
financial constraints and the results are qualitatively similar. 
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concerns that time invariant unobservable firm characteristics may bias my results, 
specification (2), (4), and (6) also includes the lagged dependent variable.38 
Coefficients on asset sale is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. In 
economic terms, having asset sales increases a firm’s probability of conducting an acquisition 
by a significant 0.66% for the overall sample, which is an increase of 11.58% relative to the 
mean value of acquisition probability in the sample. For financially constrained firms, 
specification (6) shows a 0.97% increase in the likelihood of acquisition, a 17.02% increase 
over the sample mean. In contrast, results are insignificant at conventional levels for firms that 
are not financially constrained. This finding, that firms with asset sales are more likely to make 
more acquisitions, is consistent with the literature supporting that an increase in firm cash-
richness (i.e., capital liquidity) is positively associated with corporate acquisitions. The results 
of the control variables for the full sample are in agreement with prior work, indicating that 
firms are more acquisitive when they have a credit rating, larger size, more cash reserves, less 
debt, strong stock performance, good growth opportunities, higher operating returns, higher 
industry M&A volume, and are from more concentrated industries. Overall, these results imply 
that asset sales are likely to offer financially constrained firms the essential capital liquidity 
needed to proceed to an acquisition bid.  
[Please See Table 4.2] 
  
 Endogeneity Control 
In this section, the potential for bias resulting from endogeneity is addressed. In particular, 
the main estimates in previous tables could suffer from potential bias arising either from reverse 
                                                 
38 In unreported tests, a linear probability model (LPM) is also run using firm fixed effects to further reduce 
concerns about unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-level that can affect acquisition decisions. Additionally, for 
the full sample, the asset sale dummy is interacted with the financially constrained dummy to more fully determine 
whether the effect of asset sale is dependent on whether the firm is financially constrained. In both tests, the results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4.2.  
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causality or omitted variables that drive both asset sales and acquisition investments. 39 
Controlling for endogeneity requires further analysis by using: i) a Granger causality test; ii) a 
coefficient stability approach; iii) an instrumental variable (IV) approach; and iv) propensity 
score matching techniques.  
 
4.4.1. Granger Causality Test 
One possible issue that could confound the results would be that of reverse causality, 
suggesting that it is, in fact, acquisitions that cause asset sales. In support of this view, Kaplan 
and Weisbach (1992) study the success of acquisitions by looking at a sample of 282 
acquisitions with subsequent divestitures, giving some evidence that acquisitions lead to 
divestitures, without, however, performing any tests to alleviate reverse causality concerns. To 
determine whether there is a predictive relationship between asset sales and acquisitions and 
which direction this relationship runs, a Granger causality test established by Granger (1969) 
is implemented, using forward-looking predictive regressions to measure the ability to predict 
the future values of one time series (i.e., acquisitions) using prior values of another time series 
(i.e., asset sales). 
Table 4.3 displays results from the Granger causality test, following Ahern and Harford 
(2014), to determine whether acquisitions are Granger caused by asset sales or vice versa. 
Panel A displays predictive vector autoregressions (VARs) with the lagged values of 
acquisition probability and asset sale as the main endogenous variables. Tests for the full 
sample are in specifications (1) and (2), and specifications (3) and (4) and specifications (5) 
                                                 
39 An alternative argument to asset sales increasing firm-specific capital liquidity, with the proceeds being used 
to fund acquisitions, is that firms could also be selling assets in anticipation of making acquisitions, because they 
know that antitrust rules would require them to divest certain assets before a deal can be closed. Antitrust 
authorities routinely make asset sales a requirement to clearing mergers. Importantly, this argument is toward the 
notion that asset sales most likely precede acquisitions, thereby attenuating concerns about reverse causality (i.e., 
for antitrust reasons, firms will sell assets before conducting acquisitions, but it is unlikely the reverse to occur 
for antitrust reasons). 
Chapter 4 Asset Sales and Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 113  Nathan P. McNamee 
and (6) are tests for the financially constrained and not constrained subsamples, respectively. 
The lagged asset sale variable is positively related to acquisition probability, as shown in 
specifications (1), (3), and (5), while lagged acquisition probability is not associated with asset 
sales, as found in specifications (2), (4), and (6). Panel B reports the Granger causality Wald 
tests, in which the first null hypothesis assumes that asset sales do not Granger cause 
acquisitions, and the second assumes that acquisitions do not Granger cause asset sales. Again, 
the sample is split by financial constraint status. The results in Panel B allow us to reject the 
null that asset sales do not Granger cause acquisitions. These results confirm that there is a 
strong positive time-series relation between asset sales and acquisitions. On the other hand, the 
null that acquisitions do not Granger cause asset sales cannot be rejected. 
Overall, these predictive tests show that asset sales lead to acquisitions, rather than 
acquisitions causing asset sales, alleviating concerns of bias from reverse causality.  
[Please See Table 4.3] 
 
4.4.2. Coefficient Stability Approach 
To further evaluate the robustness of the results to omitted variables bias, the coefficient 
stability approach of Oster (2016) is implemented. A common method found in the literature 
to assuage omitted variable bias concerns is to explore the sensitivity of the treatment effect to 
the addition of observable control variables. However, coefficient movements alone are not a 
sufficient statistic to determine omitted variable bias. To be an effective tool for diagnosis, 
researchers must observe how much of the variance in the outcome is explained by the 
inclusion of the control variable, or in other words, by how much the R2 moves when that 
particular control is added. In this respect, Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) propose a method 
which assumes that, if one could observe the full set of observable and unobservable 
characteristics, the outcome variance could be fully explained and the regression would have 
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an R2 of 1. Building on their method, Oster (2016) proposes a new approach for evaluating 
robustness to omitted variable bias with the assumption that the relationship between the 
treatment and unobservable characteristics can be informed by the relationship between the 
treatment and observables. This is because omitted variables bias is proportional to coefficient 
movements, if those movements are scaled by the change in R2 when the observables are 
included. Based on these assumptions, one can estimate the effect of the omitted variables on 
the coefficient of asset sale and identify bounds of the bias-adjusted asset sale coefficient.  
Results for this analysis are displayed in Table 4.4. As recommended by Oster (2016), it 
is assumed that the omitted and the controlled variables have equal effect on treatment 
coefficient outcomes (δ=1), and that the addition of omitted variables can lead to a maximum 
R2 (Rmax) of 1.3 times the estimated R2 in the controlled regression. Panel A displays results 
for the full sample, while Panels B and C show results for the financially constrained and 
unconstrained subsamples, respectively. The results from this analysis show that potential 
omitted variables do not significantly affect the primary estimates, as the bias-adjusted asset 
sale coefficient meets both robustness criteria of Oster (2016). First, while the bias-adjusted 
asset sale coefficient (Panel A=0.0042; Panel B=0.0094; and Panel C=0.0024) is less than my 
controlled coefficient in each panel (Panel A=0.0081; Panel B=0.0113; and Panel C=0.0057), 
the identified set displayed in column (3) does not include zero. Second, the changes on the 
adjusted coefficient fall well within the 95% confidence interval of the estimated coefficients 
in the controlled regression as shown in column (4). Additionally, the bound estimates for delta 
in column (5) show that unobservable variables would need to have a much higher effect than 
the observed variables on the outcome in order to bias my results. For instance in Panel B, 
unobservables would need to have over 5.4 times the effect of the observables on the outcome 
in order to bias the results. Assuming a good set of control variables has been used, the 
likelihood of unobservables confounding the main results is very unlikely. 
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[Please See Table 4.4] 
 
4.4.3. Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 
To further reduce concerns that the findings could be attributed to some unobservable 
characteristics that might affect both asset sales and acquisitions, an IV approach using a 
method developed by Lewbel (2012) is employed.40 This approach estimates an instrumental 
variables regression model with heteroskedasticity-based instruments generated using 
Lewbel's method. This technique allows the identification of structural parameters in regression 
models with endogenous regressors when traditional identifying information, such as external 
instruments, is absent. Identification is accomplished in this context by having regressors that 
are uncorrelated with the product of heteroskedastic errors, which is a feature of many models 
where error correlations are due to an unobserved common factor. Using this form of Lewbel's 
method, instruments are constructed as simple functions of the model's data. Thus, this 
approach can be applied when no external instruments are available, or, alternatively, used to 
supplement external instruments to improve the efficiency of the IV estimator.41, 42  
Table 4.5 displays results from the first and second stage of my IV approach. 
Specification (1) reports the first stage regression including Lewbel estimated instruments 
which are based on the control variables in the model. The Lewbel estimated instruments 
provide a strong set of instrumental variables. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic for the 
weak identification test is 30.15 which is comfortably higher than the critical value prescribed 
by Stock and Yogo (2002) (i.e., LIML Size of Nominal 10% Wald that is 11.46 in this case), 
                                                 
40 Recent studies using the Lewbel (2012) approach include work by Schlueter, Sievers, and Hartmann-Wendels 
(2015) and Ivanov, Santos, and Vo (2016). 
41 The Stata command ivreg2h by Baum and Schaffer (2012) is used to estimate Lewbel instruments. 
42 A caveat is in order: In the absence of a source of exogenous variation in the asset sale decisions, I stop short 
of making strong causal statements. Nevertheless, even relatively noisier than a convention IV approach, the 
Lewbel’s method still allows to draw some useful inferences on whether the results are robust to potential 
unobservable characteristics. 
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allowing us to reject the null of weak identification. Additionally, the Hansen J statistic is not 
significant, which gives an indication that there is not an overidentification problem.  
Specifications (2), (3), and (4) report the second stage, with asset sales exhibiting a 
positive and significant association to acquisition probability for the financially constrained 
subsample in specification (3). Further, the Wu-Hausman tests show insignificance, indicating 
that the variables are exogenous and do not suffer from endogeneity concerns; therefore, the 
results found in the main tests in Table 4.2 can be relied upon. 
[Please See Table 4.5] 
 
4.4.4. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
To further reduce concerns of bias based on observable characteristics, a propensity score 
matching (PSM) process is implemented as in Subrahmanyam et al. (2014). Firms with asset 
sales (treated) are matched with firms exhibiting analogous characteristics but did not have an 
asset sale (control). The treatment effect from the PSM estimation is the difference between 
the treated sample and the matched control sample, as measured by the asset sale coefficient. 
In order to match firms, a one-dimensional propensity score is calculated, which is a function 
of observable characteristics used in Table 4.2 for acquisition probability tests. A one-to-one 
(i.e., nearest neighbor) matching estimator is used.43  
Table 4.6 reports the PSM results for the main regressions, with specification (1) 
displaying results for the full sample, and specifications (2) and (3) providing results from the 
constrained and not constrained subsamples. The treatment effect of asset sales is significantly 
positive at conventional levels, supporting the finding that asset sales are positively related 
                                                 
43 For robustness, 30-nearest-neighbors, 50-nearest-neighbors, and Gaussian and Epanechnikov kernel-based 
matching estimators have also been used. Similar results are found with these different estimators. 
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with acquisition probability. Thus, it appears that selection on observable characteristics does 
not bias the results. 
[Please See Table 4.6] 
 
 Further Findings 
This section examines the effects on sample firms that pursue this type of selling-to-buy 
asset restructuring. Specifically, Section 4.5.1 investigates the impact of asset sales on long-
run operating performance for firms that subsequently conduct acquisitions. 
 
4.5.1. Long-run Operating Performance 
Prior empirical research shows that focus increasing asset sales result in improved 
operating efficiency (John and Ofek, 1995; Daley et al., 1997). However, past empirical work 
has not examined the efficiency effects derived from the double benefit of a focus increasing 
asset sale followed by an acquisition. In particular, firms that sell unrelated assets have a first 
benefit of increasing industry focus which improves their operating efficiency. This effect is 
magnified, offering a double benefit, if the firm uses the proceeds of the asset sales to buy an 
asset that improves its focus and operating efficiency. This effect is expected to be most 
pronounced for financially constrained firms. Therefore, the three-year industry-adjusted 
operating performance from the date of the asset sale announcement is examined to detect any 
efficiency improvements resulting from these two events for firms that used the proceeds of 
unrelated asset sales to conduct acquisitions versus those that did not make post asset sale 
acquisitions. This approach allows us to capture, not only the effect of the asset sale, but also 
the effect on operating efficiency coming from the use of the asset sale proceeds to conduct 
acquisitions. Additionally, this effect is expected to be more pronounced for firms that sell 
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unrelated assets and acquire target firms that further increase their industry focus. The results 
are in line with these expectations. 
Table 4.7 displays the OLS estimates from long-run operating performance tests, using a 
sample of focus increasing asset sales, which is the group of asset sellers who divest a unit that 
has a different 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code relative to their core 
operations. To avoid the potential confounding effects of firms having multiple asset sales in 
the same year, any firms that had more than one asset sale in that year are eliminated. The 
dependent variable is the three-year industry-adjusted operating performance as in Healy et al. 
(1992) and Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012). In specifications (1), (3), and (5), 
the main variable of interest is post-sale acquisition, which is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm has an acquisition in the year following the asset sale, and 0 otherwise. In 
this case, the main variable of interest shows whether firms that made an acquisition after a 
focus increasing asset sale experience higher operating efficiency relative to firms that did not 
make a post-sale acquisition. In addition to the customary control variables in the operating 
performance tests, the lagged industry-adjusted operating performance is included as in Healy 
et al. (1992) and Harford et al. (2012) because past performance is a strong predictor for future 
performance. Including the lagged dependent variable also helps to control for any time-
invariant omitted variables. Additionally, the sample is further split by financially constrained 
and unconstrained firms. Firms that sell unrelated assets and use the proceeds to fund a 
subsequent acquisition experience significantly higher operating returns at the 5% level 
(specification (1)) with results driven from my financially constrained subsample as shown in 
specification (3).  
This result is further driven by firms that use the proceeds of unrelated asset sales to make 
focus increasing acquisitions as shown in specifications (2) and (4). In specifications (2), (4), 
and (6), the main variable of interest is post-sale focus increasing acquisition, which is a 
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dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a focus increasing acquisition in the 
year following the focus increasing asset sale, and 0 otherwise. An acquisition is focus 
increasing if the bidder has the same 2-digit SIC code as the target. Firms in the full sample, 
that sell unrelated assets and conduct focus increasing acquisitions, improve their three-year 
operating performance by 1.61%. This finding is consistent with the notion that firms which 
concentrate their assets around their core industry (by selling unrelated assets and buying 
related assets) experience a double benefit effect, improving their operating efficiency. This 
effect is substantially larger for financially constrained firms, with an estimated increase in 
three-year operating performance of 9.14%. 
[Please See Table 4.7] 
 
 Implications at the Industry Level 
This section examines effects from asset sales at the industry-level as implied by this type 
of selling-to-buy asset restructuring. In particular, the impact of industry asset sale waves on 
the occurrence of industry merger waves are investigated. 
Prior empirical research shows that both asset sales and mergers and acquisitions cluster 
in time resulting in industry waves.44 Industry asset sale waves can provide increased liquidity 
for financially constrained firms by transferring liquidity from unconstrained to constrained 
firms, allowing constrained firms to participate in a merger wave that they might otherwise 
have been forced to sit out. Thus asset sales, when clustered at the industry level, could serve 
to amplify merger waves. 
To identify merger waves, this study follows Harford (2005) and assigns each bidder and 
target firm in the M&A sample to one of the 49 industry groups based on the Fama and French 
                                                 
44 See for instance, Mulherin and Boone (2000) and Brauer and Wiersema (2012) who both find evidence of asset 
sale and acquisition waves. 
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(1997) industry classification codes. The sample is further split into three separate time periods: 
period 1 is from 1990 to 2000 and includes a distinct aggregate merger wave characterized by 
the buildup of the dotcom bubble as described by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001); 
period 2 is from 2001 to 2007 and includes the period leading up to the credit crisis as identified 
by Alexandridis et al. (2012); and period 3 is from 2008 to 2014, which includes the increased 
merger activity that has developed during the recovery following the 2007-2009 recession. 
Finally, all 24-month periods with actual acquisition activity higher than 95% of the highest 
simulated distribution in each of the three time periods are observed. Using this method, 65 
merger waves from 45 industries across the three time periods are identified.  
Following this same process with asset sales, 82 asset sale waves from 40 industries across 
the three time periods are found. Additionally, Panel A of Table 4.8 shows that asset sale waves 
often precede merger waves. Overall, 32% of industry merger waves are preceded by an asset 
sale wave, providing some initial evidence that asset sale waves can lead to or amplify merger 
waves. In period 1, 28% of merger waves were preceded in the year before by an asset sale 
wave. Further, 43% and 38% of merger waves are preceded by asset sale waves in periods 2 
and 3, respectively. Additionally, only 15% of industries appear to have a concurrent start of 
an asset sale wave and a merger wave. Finally, and most importantly, only 10% in total asset 
sale waves are preceded by a merger wave in the overall period, with 0% of asset sale waves 
preceded by merger waves in periods 2 and 3, which implies merger waves are most likely to 
follow asset sale waves and not vice-versa. 
Panel B presents results from probit analysis, with marginal effects reported for ease of 
interpretation. In all specifications, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the industry 
is experiencing a merger wave in that year, and 0 otherwise. Similar to Table 4.2, the lagged 
dependent variable is included to ameliorate concerns that time invariant unobservable industry 
characteristics may bias the results.  
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The main variable of interest in these specifications is the asset sale wave dummy, which 
takes the value of 1 if the industry experiences an asset sale wave in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
For comparison reasons, the same industry controls as in Harford (2005) are used, which 
consist of market-to-book value, the three-year industry stock return, the standard deviation of 
the three-year industry stock return, the C&I rate spread, a dummy for years with deregulatory 
events, the economic shock index, and an interaction term where the economic shock index is 
interacted with a dummy variable for tight capital.45 In all specifications, the coefficients for 
the asset sale wave variable are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Economically, asset sale waves increase the likelihood that an industry will have a merger wave 
start in the following year by 11.81% for the full sample. 
As shown above, Panel A provides the first indication that the results do not suffer from 
reverse causality concerns, showing that merger waves are more likely to be preceded by asset 
sale waves, with almost no asset sale waves being preceded by merger waves in period 1 and 
none preceded by merger waves in periods 2 and 3. Additionally, as found in Panel B, the 
positive relation between asset sales waves and merger waves remains strong when focused on 
the latter period (2001 to 2014), in which 0% of asset sale waves are preceded by merger waves.  
In addition to the descriptive statistics already provided, Panels C and D display results 
from a Granger causality test, following Ahern and Harford (2014), to determine whether 
industry merger waves are Granger caused by industry asset sale waves or vice versa. Panel C 
displays predictive vector autoregressions (VARs) with the lagged values of industry merger 
wave and industry asset sale wave as the main endogenous variables. The lagged asset sale 
wave variable is positively related to merger waves, while lagged merger wave is not associated 
with asset sale waves. Panel D reports the Granger causality Wald tests, in which the first null 
                                                 
45 Controlling for increased cash flow uncertainty, which is a determinant of merger waves, as per Garfinkel and 
Hankins (2011), does not alter the results. 
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hypothesis assumes that asset sale waves do not Granger cause merger waves, and the second 
assumes that merger waves do not Granger cause asset sale waves. The results in Panel D allow 
us to reject the null that asset sale waves do not Granger cause merger waves, confirming a 
strong positive time-series relation between asset sale waves and merger waves. Conversely, 
the null that merger waves do not Granger cause asset sale waves cannot not be rejected. 
Overall, these predictive tests provide evidence that asset sale waves lead to merger waves, 
rather than merger waves causing asset sale waves.46 
[Please See Table 4.8] 
 
 Robustness Tests 
To further substantiate this study’s results, a number of additional robustness tests are 
conducted. In particular: i) financial firms (6000-6999) and regulated utilities (4900-4999) are 
excluded from the operating returns and merger wave samples (to be comparable with the 
sample of Harford and Uysal (2014), which is used as the benchmark in the acquisition 
investment tests, where financial and utility firms had already been excluded for those tests); 
ii) equity and debt flows are included as other potential sources of financing in the firm-level 
regressions; iii) measures of firm distress and further measures of financial constraints, which 
are commonly cited motivations for asset sales, 47  are added to the main regressions: in 
particular, the distance to default as in Campbell et al. (2008) and the Altman Z score as in 
Altman (1968) to control for financial distress; also added are the Size-Age (SA) index as in 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and rating level as in Karampatsas et al. (2014) to capture further 
                                                 
46 To deal with potential unobservable characteristics that might drive both industry asset sale waves and industry 
merger waves, I have performed the coefficient stability approach (Oster, 2016), and the instrumental variable 
approach with Lewbel’s instruments, and obtain qualitatively similar results. 
 
47 For instance, Brown et al. (1994) show that creditors strongly influence asset sale decisions by financially 
distressed firms to pay down debt. Alternatively, Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Borisova and Brown (2013) 
provide evidence that financially constrained firms use proceeds from asset sales for corporate investment. 
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financial constraint concerns; and iv) the existence of multicollinearity amongst the variables 
is tested using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests and confirm there are not any 
multicollinearity issues that would materially affect the estimates.  
Altogether, this section confirms that the main findings are robust and provide further 
evidence to substantiate the initial results, that asset sales are positively associated with 
acquisitions.  
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter provides new evidence on the reallocation of firm assets through the 
combined restructuring activities of asset sales and subsequent acquisitions. More specifically, 
it offers empirical support for the role of asset sale proceeds as a source of funds in acquisitions, 
particularly for financially constrained firms. These results are robust after controlling for 
potential endogeneity issues. Additionally, this type of selling-to-buy asset restructuring may 
result in a double benefit for firms that sell unrelated assets and use the proceeds to conduct 
acquisitions. Particularly, these results suggest that firms might experience greater industry-
adjusted operating performance in the three years following the asset sale relative to those firms 
that do not make any acquisitions, and this result is driven by focus increasing acquisitions. 
Additionally, this analysis provides evidence that asset sale waves are likely to provide 
financially constrained firms with liquidity to make acquisitions, potentially amplifying 
industry merger waves.  
The findings of this study have important implications for both academics and 
practitioners. Specifically, the findings give evidence of the potentially significant importance 
of asset sale proceeds as an additional funding source for corporate investments, mitigating the 
negative effects associated with traditional external funding sources such as equity and debt 
issues.  
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Additionally, given the reported time-series association between asset sale waves and 
subsequent merger waves, asset sale waves could be used as a potential indicator to predict 
merger waves. Acquisitions during merger waves are shown to destroy value more than at other 
times.48 Having an indication, through the preceding asset sale wave, that a merger wave is 
likely to occur, will help managers in determining whether it is an appropriate time to engage 
in acquisitions. 
Overall, this chapter provides evidence on the role of asset sales as a source of funds in 
acquisitions and it highlights the possible benefits that could to a firm engaging in this form of 
selling-to-buy asset restructuring. 
  
                                                 
48 Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) and Duchin and Schmidt (2013) find that acquiring firms experience 
negative stock returns when they conduct acquisitions during merger waves.  
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Appendix for Chapter 4 
Variable descriptions. 
Variable Description 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Acquisition probability A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm announced at least one acquisition in year t, and 0 
otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Operating performance The three-year average industry-adjusted operating returns where operating returns are calculated as the 
operating income before depreciation, scaled by total assets. Industries are defined based on Fama and 
French 49 industry classification. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Merger wave A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a given industry was experiencing a merger wave in that 
year, and 0 otherwise. Merger waves are identified as in Harford (2005). See also Section 7. The variable 
is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Panel B: Measures of asset sales and financial constraint 
Asset sale A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the asset sale is either an SDC asset sale as in Edmans and 
Mann (2017) as defined below, or a Compustat asset sale as in Eckbo and Kisser (2016) as defined below, 
and 0 otherwise. This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC (for the SDC asset 
sales) and Compustat (for the Compustat asset sales). 
SDC asset sale A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the asset sale is a completed M&A transaction with the 
form of transaction being either acquisition of assets or acquisition of certain assets, as in Edmans and 
Mann (2017), “[…] where the acquisition technique field includes at least one out of Divestiture, Property 
Acquisition, Auction, Internal Reorganization […]” (p. 2), and “[…] none out of Buyout, Bankrupt, 
Takeover, Restructuring, Liquidation, Private, Tender, Unsolicited, and Failed […]” (p. 2), and 0 
otherwise. This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Compustat asset sale A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the asset sale is calculated according to the formula: 
asset sales = siv + min[ivstch,0]*(-1) + min[ivaco,0]*(-1) + sppe, and 0 otherwise. That is: i) the sale of 
investments, plus ii) the absolute value of the minimum of the change in short-term investments and 0, 
plus iii) the absolute value of the minimum of the investing activities and 0, plus iv) the sale of property, 
plant, and equipment as in Eckbo and Kisser (2016). This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Asset sale wave A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a given industry was experiencing an asset sale wave in 
that industry-year, and 0 otherwise. Asset sale waves are identified using the same methodology used to 
identify merger waves as in Harford (2005). See also Section 7. The variable is created using data from 
Thomson Financial SDC and Compustat. 
Financially constrained A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm has a Size/Age index (as in Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010)) in the top quartile of the year and industry. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Panel C: Variables for acquisition probability tests as per Harford and Uysal (2014) 
Rated A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is rated at fiscal year-end, and 0 otherwise. This 
variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Size Sales at fiscal year-end. This variable is created using data from Compustat. In the regressions analysis I 
use the ln(size). 
Cash reserves Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets at fiscal year-end. This variable is created using 
data from Compustat. 
Leverage Total debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) divided by total assets at fiscal year-end. This 
variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Stock return The annualized market-adjusted return (using the value-weighted CRSP index as benchmark). 
Market-to-book The market value of equity (common shares outstanding * closing price at fiscal year-end) divided by the 
book value of equity at fiscal year-end. Similar to Fama and French, book value of equity is total 
shareholders' equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus the book value of preferred stock. 
In case the data are not available, shareholders' equity is calculated as the sum of common and preferred 
equity. If none of the two are available, shareholders' equity is defined as the differences of total assets 
and total liabilities. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
ROA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by total assets. This variable is 
created using data from Compustat. 
Industry M&A liquidity Sum of acquisitions values for each year and three-digit SIC code divided by the aggregated assets of 
firms in the same three-digit SIC and year. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Herfindahl index Sum of squares of the market shares of all firms sharing the same three-digit SIC, where market share is 
defined as sales of the firm to the aggregated sales of the industry. This variable is created using data 
from Compustat. 
Panel D: Variables for long-run operating performance tests as per Healy et al. (1992)  
Post sale acquisition A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has an acquisition in the year following the asset 
sale, and 0 otherwise. This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Post sale focus increasing 
acquisition 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a focus increasing acquisition in the year 
following the asset sale, and 0 otherwise. An acquisition is focus increasing if the bidder has the same 2-
digit SIC code as the target. This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Industry-adj operating 
returns(lagged) 
The industry-adjusted operating return in the year prior to the asset sale, where operating returns is 
calculated as the operating income before depreciation, scaled by total assets. Industries are defined based 
on Fama and French 49 industry classification. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
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Size Firm market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. This variable is created using 
data from CRSP. In the regressions analysis I use the ln(size). 
Asset sale relative size The ratio of the asset sale value (from Thomson Financial SDC) to the seller’s market value of equity 4 
weeks prior to the asset sale announcement (from CRSP database).  
Leverage Total debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) divided by total assets at fiscal year-end. This 
variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Cash reserves Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets at fiscal year-end. This variable is created using 
data from Compustat. 
Book-to-market Book value of equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition announcement divided by the market 
value of equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. Book value of equity is from Compustat, 
market value of equity is from CRSP. 
Asset turnover Total sales divided by total assets. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Capital expenditures The ratio of capital expenditure over the lagged total assets. This variable is created using data from 
Compustat. 
Relative size The ratio of the deal value (from Thomson Financial SDC) to the bidder market value of equity 4 weeks 
prior to the acquisition announcement (from the CRSP database).  
Diversifying deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for intra-industry transactions, and 0 otherwise. Industries are 
defined at the 2-digit SIC level from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Hostile deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals defined as hostile or unsolicited, and 0 otherwise. 
This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Tender offer A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals defined as tender offers, and 0 otherwise. This 
variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Private target A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals where the target is a private firm, and 0 otherwise. 
This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Competing deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals where there is a competing bidder, and 0 otherwise. 
This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Rating level A continuous variable for rated bidders: 1 to 22, AAA level takes 22 and D takes 1. This variable is 
created using data at fiscal year-end. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Collateral The ratio of firm's property, plant and equipment to total assets at the fiscal year immediately prior to the 
acquisition announcement from Compustat. 
C&I rate spread The spread on the interest rate charged for all commercial and industrial (C&I) loans over intended federal 
funds rate. The spread is from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending published by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York in its E2 release. 
Run-up Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of the firm over the period starting (−205, −6) days prior to the 
acquisition announcement from CRSP. 
Blockholder ownership Aggregate holdings of blockholders who own at least 5% of the company's stock from Thomson One 
ownership database. 
Free cash flows Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common and preferred stock 
divided by the total assets at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the announcement from Compustat. 
Number of analysts The number of equity analysts following the firm replaced by 0 for firms not covered by IBES. 
Panel E: Variables for merger wave tests as per Harford (2005) 
Net income/sales The industry median net income/sales. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Asset turnover The industry median asset turnover ratio. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
R&D The industry median research and development scaled by total assets. This variable is created using data 
from Compustat. 
Capital expenditures The industry median capital expenditure scaled by total assets. This variable is created using data from 
Compustat. 
Employee growth The industry median employee growth. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
ROA The industry median return on assets. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Sales growth The industry median sales growth. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Market-to-book The industry median market-to-book ratio. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
3 Year return The median return in the industry for the three years ending at the end of year t-1. This variable is created 
using data from CRSP. 
Std dev 3 year return The intra-industry standard deviation of the three-year return. This variable is created using data from 
CRSP. 
C&I rate spread The spread on the interest rate charged for all commercial and industrial (C&I) loans over intended federal 
funds rate. The spread is from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending published by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York in its E2 release. 
Deregulatory event A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for years that are preceded by a major deregulatory event, and 
0 otherwise. 
Economic shock index The first principal component of the seven economic shock variables, including: net income/sales, asset 
turnover, R&D, capital expenditure, employee growth, ROA, sales growth. 
Tight capital liquidity A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for years when market-to-book ratios are below their industry-
specific time-series median or the C&I rate spread is above its time-series median, and 0 otherwise. 
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Figure 4.1  
Asset sales by year. 
 
This graph presents the number of asset sales by year for the years 1989 to 2013 which immediately precede the years of the 
M&As in my study from 1990 to 2014.  
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Tables for Chapter 4 
Table 4.1 
Sample descriptive statistics by asset sale.  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for firm-year observations with acquisitions announced over the period 1990-2014 for the universe of US publicly listed with data from SDC and Compustat. 
The mean, median, and number of observations are reported for the dependent variable in Panel A, firm characteristics in Panel B, and industry characteristics in Panel C. The sample is further 
classified by whether the firm had an asset sale. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Statistical tests for differences in means and equality of medians for each characteristic 
between the two categories are also included. 
 
 Full sample  
(1) 
 Asset sale 
(2) 
 No asset sale 
(3) 
 Difference (p-value) 
(2) – (3) 
 Mean Median N  Mean Median N  Mean Median N  Mean Median 
Panel A: Dependent variable               
Acquisition probability 0.057 - 190,190  0.076 - 104,643  0.033 - 85,547  0.000 - 
Panel B: Firm characteristics               
Rated 0.170 - 190,190  0.233 - 104,643  0.093 - 85,547  0.000 - 
Size 2,407.29 264.09 147,632  2,770.08 312.48 104,577  1,526.10 171.52 43,055  0.000 0.000 
Cash reserves 0.152 0.075 148,596  0.161 0.084 104,555  0.131 0.057 44,041  0.000 0.000 
Leverage 0.261 0.214 148,654  0.257 0.213 104,583  0.270 0.216 44,071  0.000 0.178 
Stock return 0.029 -0.054 111,165  0.044 -0.059 66,538  0.005 -0.051 44,627  0.000 0.002 
M/B 2.460 1.667 131,107  2.553 1.738 93,453  2.229 1.505 37,654  0.000 0.000 
ROA 0.093 0.111 147,458  0.098 0.115 104,295  0.080 0.101 43,163  0.000 0.000 
Panel C: Industry characteristics               
Industry M&A liquidity 0.057 0.033 143,987  0.057 0.033 95,555  0.058 0.034 48,432  0.000 0.002 
Herfindahl index 0.164 0.111 150,761  0.163 0.110 99,846  0.166 0.114 50,915  0.011 0.000 
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Table 4.2 
Asset sales and acquisition likelihood.  
 
This table presents the effect of asset sales on acquisitions announced over the period 1990-2014 for the universe of US publicly listed firms. 
The sample is further split by financial constraint status. Marginal effects of probit analysis are presented where the dependent variable takes 
the value of 1 if the firm undertakes an acquisition in year t, and 0 otherwise. All control variables are measured at year t-1. Refer to Appendix 
for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on fiscal year and Fama-French 
49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistic are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Full sample  Financially constrained  Unconstrained 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Asset sale 0.0084*** 
(2.91) 
0.0066** 
(2.43) 
 0.0121*** 
(2.82) 
0.0097** 
(2.22) 
 0.0054 
(1.55) 
0.0043 
(1.36) 
Acquisition probability(lagged)  
 
0.1179*** 
(36.70) 
  
 
0.0892*** 
(14.22) 
  
 
0.1224*** 
(34.15) 
Rated 0.0249*** 
(5.67) 
0.0212*** 
(5.60) 
 0.0131 
(0.96) 
0.0084 
(0.63) 
 0.0316*** 
(6.49) 
0.0269*** 
(6.40) 
Size 0.0098*** 
(8.38) 
0.0081*** 
(7.95) 
 0.0090*** 
(3.91) 
0.0091*** 
(3.96) 
 0.0087*** 
(5.96) 
0.0070*** 
(5.65) 
Cash reserves 0.0330*** 
(3.70) 
0.0449*** 
(5.63) 
 0.0320*** 
(2.60) 
0.0513*** 
(4.25) 
 0.0304*** 
(2.81) 
0.0405*** 
(4.26) 
Leverage -0.0289*** 
(-3.92) 
-0.0271*** 
(-4.05) 
 -0.0135 
(-1.24) 
-0.0061 
(-0.56) 
 -0.0368*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.0350*** 
(-4.46) 
Stock return 0.0224*** 
(14.07) 
0.0215*** 
(13.25) 
 0.0198*** 
(8.59) 
0.0178*** 
(7.37) 
 0.0232*** 
(11.88) 
0.0226*** 
(11.51) 
M/B 0.0013*** 
(3.89) 
0.0010*** 
(3.15) 
 0.0005 
(1.13) 
0.0006 
(1.23) 
 0.0015*** 
(3.79) 
0.0011*** 
(2.95) 
ROA 0.1299*** 
(11.85) 
0.1240*** 
(12.05) 
 0.0553*** 
(4.50) 
0.0533*** 
(4.27) 
 0.1436*** 
(9.92) 
0.1391*** 
(10.56) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.1327*** 
(8.93) 
0.1056*** 
(7.03) 
 0.0447 
(1.57) 
0.0392 
(1.28) 
 0.1559*** 
(9.12) 
0.1220*** 
(7.18) 
Herfindahl index 0.0233* 
(1.73) 
0.0195* 
(1.67) 
 0.0119 
(0.53) 
0.0104 
(0.46) 
 0.0221 
(1.42) 
0.0184 
(1.41) 
Constant         
         
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 81,544 77,292  16,469 14,550  65,040 62,707 
Pseudo R2 0.0605 0.0970  0.0586 0.0921  0.0594 0.0953 
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Table 4.3 
Granger causality test for asset sales and acquisition probability.  
 
This table presents results from panel vector autoregression and Granger causality tests for the full sample and also after 
partitioning the sample by financial constraint status. Panel A displays panel vector autoregressions with the lagged values of 
acquisition probability and asset sale as the main endogenous variables. p-values are reported in parentheses from standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. Panel B reports the Granger causality Wald tests, following Ahern 
and Harford (2014), wherein the null hypothesis for the first test assumes that asset sales do not Granger cause acquisitions, 
and the second null that acquisitions do not Granger cause asset sales. The χ2 and p-value are reported for each test. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Predictive vector autoregressions 
 Full sample  Financially constrained  Unconstrained 
 Acquisition  
probability  
(1) 
Asset sale 
(2)  
Acquisition  
probability  
(3) 
Asset sale 
(4)  
Acquisition  
probability  
(5) 
Asset sale 
(6) 
Acquisition probability(lagged) 0.1807*** 
(26.10) 
0.0082 
(1.39) 
 0.2048*** 
(11.48) 
0.0239 
(1.38) 
 0.1777*** 
(23.30) 
0.0061 
(0.98) 
Asset sale(lagged) 0.1160*** 
(21.50) 
0.2625*** 
(28.14) 
 0.0902*** 
(7.96) 
0.2316*** 
(11.87) 
 0.1679*** 
(20.25) 
0.2837*** 
(23.79) 
         
No. of obs. 127,292 127,292  16,391 16,391  65,873 65,873 
 
Panel B: Granger causality Wald tests 
 Full sample  
Financially  
constrained  Not constrained 
H0: Asset sales ⇏ Acquisitions      
Wald χ2 462.238  63.399  410.027 
(p-value) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
      
H0: Acquisitions ⇏ Asset sales      
Wald χ2 1.934  1.902  0.951 
(p-value) (0.164)  (0.168)  (0.328) 
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Table 4.4 
Sensitivity to unobservable characteristics. 
 
This table presents the robustness test for the treatment effect of asset sales on acquisitions following the coefficient stability 
approach of Oster (2016). Panel A presents the results for the full sample, and Panels B and C for financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms, respectively. Baseline effect in column (1) includes only asset sale, while controlled effect in column (2) 
includes all controls from Table 4.2. The identified set in column (3) is bounded below by the estimated beta and above by the 
controlled beta, calculated based on Rmax and δ=1. Column (4) gives the confidence interval for asset sale. Column (5) shows 
the value of 𝛿𝛿 for β= 0 given the value of Rmax reported in column (2). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
Treatment 
variable 
Baseline effect 
[R2] 
(1) 
Controlled effect 
[R2] 
(2) 
Identified set 
(3) 
Controlled 
confidence 
interval 
(4) 
𝛿𝛿 for β= 0 
Given Rmax 
(5) 
Reject null 
(6) 
Asset sale 0.0199*** 
[0.001] 
0.0081*** 
[0.040] 
0.0042,0.0081 0.0035 to 
0.0127 
2.051 Yes 
 
 
Panel B: Financially constrained 
Treatment 
variable 
Baseline effect 
[R2] 
(1) 
Controlled effect 
[R2] 
(2) 
Identified set 
(3) 
Controlled 
confidence 
interval 
(4) 
𝛿𝛿 for β= 0 
Given Rmax 
(5) 
Reject null 
(6) 
Asset sale 0.0172*** 
[0.001] 
0.0113*** 
[0.028] 
0.0094,0.0113 0.0035 to 
0.0191 
5.418 Yes 
 
 
Panel C: Unconstrained 
Treatment 
variable 
Baseline effect 
[R2] 
(1) 
Controlled effect 
[R2] 
(2) 
Identified set 
(3) 
Controlled 
confidence 
interval 
(4) 
𝛿𝛿 for β= 0 
Given Rmax 
(5) 
Reject null 
(6) 
Asset sale 0.0166*** 
[0.001] 
0.0057*** 
[0.042] 
0.0024,0.0057 0.0003 to 
0.0112 
1.706 Yes 
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Table 4.5  
Endogeneity control for asset sales and acquisition probability.   
 
This table shows first and second stage results from a 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) approach to test for potential endogeneity. Specification 
(1) shows the first stage regression measuring the likelihood of asset sales, with heteroskedasticity-based instruments estimated following 
Lewbel (2012) methodology. Specifications (2), (3), and (4) provide coefficients from the second stage analysis for the full sample, financially 
constrained firms, and financially unconstrained firms, respectively. The dependent variable is the acquisition probability, which is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm undertakes an acquisition in year t, and 0 otherwise, with acquisitions announced between January 
1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 for the universe of US publicly listed firms. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and 
industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on fiscal year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, 
respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  2nd stage 
 
1st stage  
(1) 
Full sample  
(2) 
Financially 
constrained  
(3) 
Unconstrained  
(4) 
Asset sale  
 
-0.0086 
(-0.74) 
0.0117*** 
(2.91) 
0.0107 
(0.78) 
Lewbel rated 0.0709* 
(1.72) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewbel size -0.0968*** 
(-9.27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewbel cash reserves -0.8803*** 
(-10.61) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewbel leverage -0.0007 
(-0.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewbel stock return 0.0214*** 
(2.62) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewbel M/B -0.0032 
(-1.33) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewbel ROA -0.2725*** 
(-3.68) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewbel industry M&A liquidity -0.2515** 
(-2.44) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewbel Herfindahl index 0.2295*** 
(3.16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rated -0.0172** 
(-2.03) 
0.0228*** 
(4.98) 
0.0160 
(0.86) 
0.0282*** 
(5.94) 
Size 0.0334*** 
(15.83) 
0.0108*** 
(8.12) 
0.0095*** 
(3.76) 
0.0092*** 
(6.04) 
Cash reserves 0.2357*** 
(14.68) 
0.0392*** 
(3.96) 
0.0332** 
(2.57) 
0.0330*** 
(2.71) 
Leverage -0.0025 
(-0.19) 
-0.0200*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.0089 
(-0.94) 
-0.0258*** 
(-3.48) 
Stock return -0.0038 
(-1.61) 
0.0228*** 
(12.35) 
0.0242*** 
(7.80) 
0.0238*** 
(10.53) 
M/B -0.0008 
(-1.36) 
0.0017*** 
(4.79) 
0.0005 
(1.11) 
0.0020*** 
(4.48) 
ROA 0.1112*** 
(6.43) 
0.1102*** 
(11.77) 
0.0459*** 
(4.40) 
0.1280*** 
(9.64) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.0169 
(0.68) 
0.1616*** 
(8.84) 
0.0543* 
(1.67) 
0.1905*** 
(8.95) 
Herfindahl index -0.0143 
(-0.59) 
0.0251** 
(2.00) 
0.0062 
(0.30) 
0.0264* 
(1.87) 
Constant 0.5245*** 
(10.84) 
-0.0388 
(-1.56) 
-0.0401 
(-1.31) 
-0.0483 
(-1.54) 
     
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 83,352 83,352 16,653 66,699 
Adjusted R2 0.0494 0.0382 0.0232 0.0410 
K-P rk Wald F-test 30.15    
LIML size of nominal 10% Wald 11.46    
Hansen J statistic 5.736    
(p-value) (0.6768)    
Wu-Hausman  2.182 0.0937 0.1623 
(p-value)  (0.1396) (0.7595) (0.6870) 
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Table 4.6 
Propensity score matching (PSM).  
 
This table presents tests using a propensity score matching (PSM) method to control for potential endogeneity issues. A one-
dimensional propensity score is calculated, which is a function of observable characteristics used in Table 4.2, using a one-to-
one (i.e., nearest neighbor) matching estimator. Marginal effects of asset sales on acquisition probability are reported in 
specification (1). All control variables are taken at year t-1. The acquisition sample period is between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2014 for the universe of US publicly listed firms. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year 
and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on fiscal year and Fama-French 49 industry 
classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Full sample  
(1)  
Financially 
constrained 
(2)  
Not constrained 
(3) 
Asset sale 0.0123*** 
(3.40) 
 0.0118** 
(2.27) 
 0.0137*** 
(3.36) 
Rated 0.0220*** 
(3.61) 
 0.0003 
(0.02) 
 0.0241*** 
(3.92) 
Size 0.0089*** 
(5.73) 
 0.0105*** 
(3.74) 
 0.0078*** 
(4.30) 
Cash reserves 0.0217 
(1.64) 
 0.0481*** 
(2.78) 
 0.0103 
(0.70) 
Leverage -0.0278*** 
(-2.93) 
 -0.0083 
(-0.54) 
 -0.0374*** 
(-3.37) 
Stock return 0.0220*** 
(9.46) 
 0.0200*** 
(6.57) 
 0.0200*** 
(6.74) 
M/B 0.0007 
(1.63) 
 0.0002 
(0.40) 
 0.0005 
(0.94) 
ROA 0.1242*** 
(8.68) 
 0.0358** 
(2.14) 
 0.1326*** 
(6.85) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.1371*** 
(5.81) 
 0.0020 
(0.05) 
 0.1426*** 
(5.60) 
Herfindahl index 0.0140 
(0.83) 
 0.0073 
(0.26) 
 0.0326* 
(1.72) 
      
Year & industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs. 122,625  22,431  100,181 
Pseudo R2 0.0565  0.0672  0.0548 
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Table 4.7  
3 year long-run operating returns and focus increasing asset sales.  
 
This table reports coefficients from OLS regression analysis of three-year industry-adjusted operating performance for firms 
that made focus increasing asset sales, which is the group of asset sellers who divest a unit that has a different 2-digit SIC code 
relative to their core operations. The dependent variable is the three-year average industry-adjusted operating returns. The 
sample is further classified by financial constraint status. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and 
industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on fiscal year and Fama-French 49 industry classification 
dummies, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Full sample  
Financially 
constrained  Unconstrained 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Post sale acquisition 0.0181** 
(2.35) 
 
 
 0.0911** 
(2.31) 
 
 
 0.0070 
(1.06) 
 
 
Post sale focus increasing 
acquisition 
 
 
0.0161* 
(1.71) 
  
 
0.0914* 
(1.87) 
  
 
-0.0009 
(-0.12) 
Industry-adj operating 
returns(lagged) 
0.4632** 
(2.10) 
0.4641** 
(2.10) 
 0.3177 
(1.22) 
0.3206 
(1.23) 
 0.5394*** 
(6.71) 
0.5406*** 
(6.67) 
Size 0.0122*** 
(3.90) 
0.0124*** 
(3.90) 
 0.0201** 
(2.25) 
0.0196** 
(2.21) 
 0.0054*** 
(4.33) 
0.0055*** 
(4.37) 
Asset sale relative size -0.0102** 
(-2.16) 
-0.0102** 
(-2.15) 
 -0.0273 
(-1.34) 
-0.0278 
(-1.35) 
 -0.0083** 
(-2.41) 
-0.0083** 
(-2.40) 
Leverage 0.0083 
(0.39) 
0.0079 
(0.37) 
 -0.0069 
(-0.06) 
-0.0061 
(-0.06) 
 0.0195 
(1.34) 
0.0188 
(1.29) 
Cash reserves -0.1110** 
(-2.31) 
-0.1114** 
(-2.31) 
 -0.2343 
(-1.38) 
-0.2387 
(-1.40) 
 -0.0150 
(-0.51) 
-0.0146 
(-0.50) 
B/M 0.0001 
(0.73) 
0.0001 
(0.59) 
 0.0005 
(0.48) 
0.0005 
(0.50) 
 0.0001 
(0.64) 
0.0001 
(0.49) 
Constant -0.0028 
(-0.03) 
-0.0086 
(-0.10) 
 0.0950 
(0.63) 
0.0905 
(0.60) 
 0.0135 
(0.17) 
0.0116 
(0.15) 
         
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1,990 1,990  257 257  1,733 1,733 
Adjusted R2 0.3768 0.3761  0.2103 0.2062  0.5455 0.5451 
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Table 4.8 
Industry asset sale waves and merger waves.  
 
This table presents analysis on the effect of asset sale waves on merger waves. Panel A displays sample summary statistics on merger 
and asset sale waves for the 49 Fama-French industries. Panel B provides marginal effects from probit analysis. The dependent 
variable, merger wave, takes the value of 1 if an industry merger wave occurred in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Merger waves are 
identified as in Harford (2005). Panel C shows predictive vector autoregressions, and Panel D provides information from Granger 
Causality tests. A sample of US public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 
31, 2014 is used. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based 
on calendar year dummies. The z-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and industry 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Asset sale wave and merger wave sample statistics for the 49 industries 
 
Sample total 
Period 1 
(1990-2000) 
Period 2 
(2001-2007) 
Period 3 
(2008-2014) 
% Merger waves preceded by asset sale waves 32% 28% 43% 38% 
% Concurrent start of merger waves with asset sale waves 15% 21% 7% 0% 
% Asset sale waves preceded by merger waves 10% 19% 0% 0% 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
 Full sample 
(1) 
Period 1  
(1990-2000) 
(2) 
Period 2  
(2001-2007) 
(3) 
Period 3  
(2008-2014) 
(4) 
Periods 2 & 3  
(2001-2014) 
(5) 
Asset sale wave 0.1181*** 
(4.49) 
0.1285*** 
(3.32) 
0.1106** 
(2.33) 
0.0915*** 
(3.27) 
0.1021*** 
(3.81) 
Merger wave(lagged) 0.3946*** 
(8.24) 
0.4980*** 
(5.45) 
0.3336*** 
(6.68) 
0.4817*** 
(4.83) 
0.2978*** 
(6.39) 
Market-to-book -0.0219 
(-1.15) 
-0.0136 
(-0.47) 
-0.0232 
(-0.84) 
-0.0093 
(-0.40) 
-0.0234 
(-1.27) 
3 Year return 0.0458** 
(2.19) 
0.0406 
(0.71) 
0.0605* 
(1.67) 
-0.0214 
(-0.49) 
0.0273 
(1.14) 
Std dev 3 year return 0.0194* 
(1.89) 
0.0583*** 
(3.16) 
0.0022 
(0.11) 
-0.0232 
(-1.19) 
-0.0025 
(-0.18) 
C&I rate spread 0.0051** 
(2.34) 
-0.0240 
(-1.42) 
0.0121*** 
(3.05) 
-0.0038*** 
(-3.72) 
0.0048** 
(2.34) 
Deregulatory event -0.1925** 
(-2.36) 
-0.2114** 
(-2.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic shock index 0.0166** 
(2.28) 
0.0076 
(0.58) 
0.0173** 
(2.01) 
0.0039 
(0.60) 
0.0093* 
(1.89) 
Economic shock index * Tight capital -0.0093 
(-1.07) 
-0.0048 
(-0.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 802 370 188 244 432 
Pseudo R2 0.5516 0.5264 0.4046 0.5264 0.4805 
 
Panel C: Predictive vector autoregressions 
 Merger wave  
(1) 
Asset sale wave  
(2) 
Merger wave(lagged) 0.6301*** 
(27.47) 
0.0461* 
(1.89) 
Asset sale wave(lagged) 0.1849*** 
(4.79) 
0.4930*** 
(12.27) 
No. of obs. 1,078 1,078 
 
Panel D: Granger causality 
H0: Industry asset sale waves ⇏ Industry merger waves  
Wald χ2 22.927 
(p-value) 0.000 
H0: Industry merger waves ⇏ Industry asset sale waves  
Wald χ2 3.588 
(p-value) 0.058 
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5. Asset Sales and Method of Payment in M&As 
 
 Introduction 
Asset sales are an important means of corporate restructuring, with existing research on 
restructuring and divestitures showing that asset sale proceeds can become an important source 
of allocable capital for firms which is frequently used to fund corporate investments.49 This 
study focuses on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for two main reasons: First, recognizing 
the fact that M&As represent perhaps the most economically important corporate investment 
in the life of a firm,50 it is rather surprising that the extant literature on funding sources for 
M&As is silent on the use of proceeds from asset sales, focusing only on operating cash flows, 
debt, and equity (see, e.g., Jensen (1986), Amihud et al. (1990), Schlingemann (2004), and 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009)).51 Second, M&As following asset sales represent pure asset 
restructuring events, which are not confounded by capital structure effects associated with 
proceeds being used for retiring corporate debt, or with payout (i.e., dividends or repurchases) 
policy implications related with distribution of cash to shareholders.  
While numerous motivations for asset sales and uses of proceeds have been cited,52 no 
study, to my knowledge, has examined particularly the use of proceeds from asset sales as a 
potential source of funds in M&As. In fact, there is only a passing comment from Lang et al. 
                                                 
49 Bates (2005) argues that asset sales increase firms’ liquidity, and that cash proceeds from a sale can be re-
allocated to the unfunded projects of the divesting firm. In this respect, Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and 
Borisova and Brown (2013) provide empirical evidence that asset sale proceeds are used to fund capital 
expenditures and R&D investments, respectively. Arnold et al. (2015) also show that asset sales are often used as 
a funding source for corporate investment but find evidence that they are sensitive to business cycles.  
50 Over the period between 1990 and 2014, the U.S. takeover market has faced 396,056 deals worth almost $80 
trillion (Source: Thomson Financial SDC). 
51 In prior literature, the term ‘method of payment’ is usually considered as synonymous to the ‘sources of takeover 
funds’ (see, e.g., Travlos (1987) and Faccio and Masulis (2005)). Nevertheless, Schlingemann (2004) and 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) have reconciled the two concepts, providing evidence that the source of funds 
(in addition to the method of payment) plays an important role in acquisitions.  
52 According to the asset sales literature, the motivation to sell an asset and the intended use of the proceeds may 
come from a desire to: i) focus on the core business, ii) create synergies, iii) pay off debt, iv) raise cash, v) increase 
shareholder value, vi) reinvest in current assets, vii) improve cost efficiencies, and viii) comply with regulatory 
requirements (Lang et al. (1995), Bates (2005), and Borisova et al. (2013)).  
Chapter 5 Asset Sales and Method of Payment in M&As 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 137  Nathan P. McNamee 
(1995) which suggests that many firms "[…] seem to sell assets while engaged in a program of 
acquisitions so that the asset sales provide cash for these programs […]” (p. 9), and some 
descriptive statistics provided by Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and John and Ofek (1995), 
which show that firms raise cash through asset sales in order to fund acquisitions.53 The 
prominence of asset sale proceeds as a source of allocable capital raises an important question 
in relation to the central choice of method of payment in M&As. Do asset sales affect the 
probability of selecting cash as the means of payment in acquisitions?  
Motivated by the lack of empirical evidence on the subject, this chapter addresses this 
question and considers whether firm’s restructuring through asset sales affects the choice of 
payment method in acquisitions. Proceeds from asset sales can improve firms’ cash richness, 
offering important internal capital to fund corporate investments (Edmans and Mann (2017)). 
Therefore, if firms ultimately decide to proceed to an M&A investment, asset sale proceeds 
will allow them to increase their cash liquidity, which should in turn have an effect on the 
choice of payment method. In this respect, determinants of the choice of method of payment in 
acquisitions have been widely discussed in the literature,54 with Martynova and Renneboog 
(2009) showing also that method of payment is strongly related to the funding source. 55 
Moreover, Schlingemann (2004) documents that cash acquisitions are financed through idle 
cash generated via various financing sources in the period prior to the acquisition, but does not 
identify asset sale proceeds as a potential source of cash, focusing only on free cash flows, 
equity, and debt. In fact, Clayton and Reisel (2013), find that remuneration from asset sales is 
almost explicitly in cash, with 81% of asset sales involving 100% cash transactions. This cash 
                                                 
53 Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) show that 28% of their sample engaged in asset sales to finance an acquisition or 
leveraged buyout, while John and Ofek (1995) find that 5% of their sample used the proceeds to finance an 
acquisition. 
54  See for instance, Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Harford et al. (2009), 
Chemmanur et al. (2009), and Karampatsas et al. (2014).  
55 In particular, Martynova and Renneboog (2009) show, among others, that acquisitions with different funding 
sources are distinct and have different effects, despite having the same method of payment. They also find that a 
bidder's preferred source of financing depends largely on bidder and deal characteristics, including bidder growth 
potential and the relative size of the target. 
Chapter 5 Asset Sales and Method of Payment in M&As 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 138  Nathan P. McNamee 
increases firms’ liquidity and enables firms to fund investment projects (Bates (2005)). 
Therefore, asset sales result predominantly in increased cash liquidity, which naturally leads to 
the prediction, ceteris paribus, of a positive relation between firms’ asset sales and cash 
method of payment in M&As.  
This analysis uses a broad sample of U.S. acquisitions over the period from 1990 to 2014 
and finds strong empirical support for my hypothesis. In brief, a significantly positive relation 
is found between asset sales and the choice of cash as the method of payment at the 1% 
significance level. Firms that fund acquisitions through asset sales are approximately 42.76% 
more likely to use only cash as the method of payment relative to the cash acquisition sample 
average. Moreover, firms using asset sale proceeds as the funding source exhibit a much higher 
cash intensity and use approximately 20.38% more cash than those funded through some other 
means. 
This study also considers potential endogeneity arising either from reverse causality or 
from the choice of asset sales being correlated with potential omitted variables. To address this 
issue, three econometric methodologies (i.e., instrumental variable (IV) approach, propensity 
score matching (PSM), and impact threshold for a confounding variable (ITCV)) are employed 
to control for potential endogeneity bias and confirm the positive association between asset 
sales and cash method of payment in M&As. Finally, the results also hold to various robustness 
checks.  
This study makes several important contributions to the asset sales, M&A, method of 
payment, and sources of funding literature. First, it adds to the literature on the determinants 
of method of payment in M&As, offering an economically important omitted variable and 
particularly underlining the relation between asset sales and the use of cash as a means of 
payment in acquisitions. Second, it provides empirical evidence that proceeds from asset sales 
are likely to be used as a funding source in one of the most important corporate investments, 
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i.e., M&As. Finally, the findings also highlight an alternative type of firm’s restructuring (i.e., 
selling assets to buy assets), which has, to a great extent, been ignored by the prior literature.  
These findings also have further important implications for both academics and 
practitioners. Specifically, the findings reveal the significant importance of asset sale proceeds 
as an additional funding source for corporate investments, mitigating the negative effects 
associated with traditional external funding sources such as equity and debt issues. For our full 
sample, this is in line with the traditional pecking order theory and the preference for internal 
funds to finance corporate investments, keeping in mind this does not fully consider the 
importance of the relative financing need of the bidding firm as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, firms that sell assets are more likely to subsequently make cash acquisitions and, 
consequently, experience the positive wealth effects associated with cash as a method of 
payment. For example, previous empirical findings show that bidders experience higher short- 
and long-term abnormal returns when deals are transacted in cash.56 Moreover, the use of cash 
as a method of payment has been found to discourage rival bids (Chemmanur et al. (2009)). 
Managers and financial advisors should take this information into account when engaging in 
M&A deals. 
This study is related to the work of Bates (2005), Hovakimian and Titman (2006), and 
Borisova and Brown (2013). Bates (2005) identifies distributions to debt or equity holders, 
retention of proceeds by management, and financing of capital expenditure as potential uses of 
asset sale proceeds. Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Borisova and Brown (2013) also show 
that proceeds from asset sales are commonly deployed to finance capital expenditures (CAPEX) 
and research and development (R&D) investments, respectively. The findings of this study 
suggest that cash acquisition funding is another use of asset sale proceeds. The work on sources 
                                                 
56 Travlos (1987) and Huang and Walkling (1987) show that cash offers are positively associated with higher 
abnormal returns in the short-run for public acquisitions, while Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Megginson et al. 
(2004) find significantly higher long-term abnormal returns. 
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of corporate funding by Jensen (1986), Amihud et al. (1990), Schlingemann (2004), Martynova 
and Renneboog (2009), and Eckbo and Kisser (2013) is also extended by highlighting the 
importance of asset sale proceeds as an overlooked source of funds in acquisitions. Furthermore, 
this work is related with studies which provide associations between increases in firms’ cash 
liquidity and acquisition bids such as Jensen (1986), Blanchard et al. (1994), and Harford 
(1999), though this study focuses particularly on the choice of payment method in takeover 
bids.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes the sample 
and data. Section 5.3 provides the empirical results of the effect of asset sales on the choice of 
method of payment in M&As. Endogeneity issues are considered in Section 5.4, and additional 
auxiliary tests are provided to further substantiate the robustness of the results in Section 5.5. 
Lastly, Section 5.6 concludes this chapter. 
 
 Sample and Data 
5.2.1. Sample Selection Criteria 
The acquisition sample consists of deals announced between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2014, and is obtained from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database (SDC). Bidders are U.S. public firms, and targets are public, private, or 
subsidiary firms domiciled both in and outside of the U.S. There is a one-year lag between my 
dependent variables in a specific year to the firm’s asset sales and other control variables at the 
end of the previous year. Transactions valued at less than $1 million are eliminated.57 Bidders 
must own less than 10% of the target’s shares prior to the announcement and must be seeking 
to acquire more than 50% of the target’s shares after the acquisition. All privatizations, 
leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, repurchases, sales of a 
                                                 
57 All dollar variable values have been adjusted to 2014 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI). 
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minority interest, liquidations, restructurings, reverse takeovers, bankruptcy acquisitions, 
going private transactions, exchange offers, acquisitions of partial interest, and buybacks are 
excluded. This sample consists of 12,098 bidders that conducted 39,556 acquisitions over the 
period 1990 to 2014, out of which 37,683 are completed deals. 
 
5.2.2. Measures of Asset Sales 
One challenge in observing asset sale proceeds as a funding source for M&As is that there 
is no way to observe an exact corollary between a dollar raised in time t and a dollar spent on 
an acquisition in time t+τ (Schlingemann (2004)). Similar to Schlingemann (2004), rather than 
attempting to establish a precise correspondence, this study considers the cash made available 
to the firm through asset sales which occurred within 12 months prior to the acquisition 
announcement. For purposes of clarity, asset sales are deemed to include any divestitures or 
sell-offs of business segments, product lines, investment assets, or property, plant, and 
equipment.58  
Asset sales data is collected from the SDC and Compustat databases. Definitions for the 
asset sale measures are found in the Appendix. Similar to Edmans and Mann (2017), SDC asset 
sales (SDC asset sale) are completed M&A transactions with the form of transaction being 
either acquisition of assets or acquisition of certain assets, and where the acquisition technique 
field includes at least one out of divestiture, property acquisition, auction, or internal 
reorganization,59 and none out of buyout, bankrupt, takeover, restructuring, liquidation, private, 
                                                 
58 The term divestiture has been defined in the literature as pertaining to the modification of a firm’s productive 
assets through either sell-offs or spin-offs (Alexander et al. (1984) and Tehranian et al. (1987)). Hite and Owers 
(1983) observe that a spin-off results in the creation of an independent firm with a corresponding reduction in the 
asset base of the divesting firm. Thus, spin-offs are restructuring events that do not generate proceeds for the 
divesting firm, nor do they create an opportunity for managers to continue the control of spun-off assets, 
consequently, spin-offs will not be relevant to my study. Unless specifically noted, where the term divestiture is 
used in this paper, it refers to sell-offs only. 
59 Edmans and Mann (2017) also include spin-offs which have been excluded for purposes described in footnote 
58. While spin-offs are nominally excluded, adding this restriction does not remove any observations from my 
asset sale subsample.  
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tender, unsolicited, and failed. In these transactions, the asset seller is the firm raising funds to 
be used in a subsequent corporate investment (i.e., acquisitions). 
As in Eckbo and Kisser (2013), Compustat asset sales (Compustat asset sale) are the sale 
of investments, sale of property, plant and equipment (PPE), and cash flows from other 
investment activities (i.e., change in short-term investments and investing activities) according 
to the formula: asset sales = siv + min[ivstch,0] + min[ivaco,0] + sppe.  
Using these two asset sale measures, the main variable of interest is created, which is a 
composite asset sale dummy variable (asset sale) taking the value of 1 if i) the asset sale is 
either an SDC asset sale, as in Edmans and Mann (2017), or an Compustat asset sale, as in 
Eckbo and Kisser (2013), and ii) the ratio of the asset sale value to the cash used in the 
subsequent acquisition is greater than 1 (i.e., the asset sale proceeds cover 100% of the cash 
used in the deal). Otherwise, the dummy is set to 0. This variable, which has the advantage of 
including all possible asset sale information, is constructed in order to identify whether the firm 
had any reported asset sales within the 12 months leading up to the announcement date that 
were large enough to meet the funding needs of the acquisition. Out of the 39,556 transactions, 
676 transactions involve bidders with an SDC asset sale, 3,583 involve bidders with a 
Compustat asset sale, and 4,020 involve bidders with my composite asset sale measure, which 
suggests that 10.16% of the deals in my sample are funded by asset sale proceeds. For 
robustness reasons, in Section 5.5, analysis is run to test separately the SDC asset sale and 
Compustat asset sale variables and similar results are found. Likewise, additional tests are run 
where the asset sale only covers 75% or 50% of the cash used in the deal as opposed to 100%. 
Further, test are fun where the asset sale proceeds cover 100% of the total deal value rather 
than the cash used in the deal. In both cases comparable results are found. 
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5.2.3. Variables 
This empirical analysis controls for firm, industry, and deal characteristics, with 
definitions of all variables presented in the Appendix. At the firm level, the proxy for firm size 
used is total assets. Faccio and Masulis (2005) show that larger firms are more apt to choose 
cash as the method of payment. Conversely, Hansen (1987) suggests that the probability of a 
stock offer increases with the bidder’s size. This study also controls for other potential 
concurrent sources of firm liquidity which has been shown to serve as source of funds in 
acquisitions by including free cash flows (Jensen (1986)). Apart from size, further controls are 
included for financial constraints by using cash reserves (Harford (1999)), KZ index as in 
Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001), and leverage. Faccio and Masulis (2005) suggest that 
firms with higher leverage use stock financing more frequently than cash. However, Harford 
et al. (2009) report a positive relation between leverage and cash method of payment.  
To control for investment opportunities, the market-to-book ratio is employed. Carleton 
et al. (1983) find that the probability of a cash offer has a negative relationship with the bidder's 
market-to-book ratio. Further, sigma is used as a proxy for information asymmetry. 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2003) suggest that the higher the potential bidder information 
asymmetry, the higher the likelihood for a target firm to accept a cash offer. Additionally, 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) show that firms often issue equity after significant run-up in their 
equity values. A negative relation between run-up and cash payment is anticipated. Amihud et 
al. (1990) find that managerial ownership leads to an increased probability in cash payments. 
Thus, director/officer ownership and cash payment are expected to be positively related.60  
Also, a number of controls for deal-specific characteristics are included. Relative size has 
been shown to affect method of payment. Uysal (2011) demonstrates that relative size has a 
                                                 
60 Data for director/officer ownership are only available from 1997. This study therefore uses this variable in the 
analysis in the robustness Section 5.5.2. along with corporate governance variables. 
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negative relation to cash method of payment. Another important determinant of the choice of 
the payment method is the degree of industry relatedness between the bidder and target firms. 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) suggest that when bidders and targets are in related industries and 
the acquisition is focus increasing, the target firm will be more apt to accept payment in equity 
rather than cash.  
In addition, Karampatsas et al. (2014) provide evidence that hostile deals are positively 
associated with cash method of payment. Competing deals is also included. Chemmanur et al. 
(2009) show that the use of cash payment discourages rival bids. Further, Travlos (1987) 
documents a positive association between tender offers and cash method of payment. Faccio 
and Masulis (2005) find a positive relation between completed deals and cash means of 
exchange. Finally, Faccio and Masulis (2005) also suggest that private sellers are likely to 
prefer cash. Therefore, this analysis controls for public target status and expect a negative 
association with cash method of payment.  
At the industry level, industry M&A liquidity measures the intensity of intra-industry 
M&A activity. Uysal (2011) finds that acquirers are more likely to use equity when there is 
high M&A liquidity within their industry, thus reducing the probability of using cash. Industry 
concentration also impacts M&A activity, as firms in highly concentrated industries have fewer 
competitors that can serve as targets, which reduces the number of acquisitions between firms 
within the same industry. To control for this effect, Harford and Uysal (2014) use the 
Herfindahl index. 
 
5.2.4. Sample Statistics 
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample and is further partitioned by 
method of payment. All non-binary variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
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apart from cash reserves and leverage which have been winsorized only at the 99% percentile 
(right-hand side).61  
Panel A presents bidder characteristics. Here, the first evidence of a positive relation 
between asset sales and cash method of payment is found, showing that firms using cash have 
more asset sales than those not using cash. This difference in means is significant at the 1% 
significance level.  
[Please See Table 5.1] 
The mean (median) size for firms in the cash subsample is $8.2 billion ($1.0 billion) versus 
$5.4 billion ($434 million) for those in the non-cash subsample. The difference between the 
means and medians of the cash and non-cash subsamples is significant for free cash flows, 
showing that firms utilizing cash as the method of payment have larger free cash flows; 
however, these firms have slightly lower levels of cash reserves. Firms using cash have 
significantly higher leverage than their counterparts and lower market-to-book, with the 
difference in means and medians exhibiting statistical significance. Additionally, the difference 
in means for the KZ index is significant between my subsamples. Firms in the cash subsample 
have a significantly lower sigma. They also have significantly smaller stock price run-up in the 
period before the acquisition announcement, which is consistent with the literature that 
suggests that firms will be more likely to use stock when their stock is overvalued. Differences 
in director/officer ownership between subsamples display no statistical significance. Industry 
M&A liquidity is slightly lower in the cash subsample, with the difference in means being 
statistically significant. Additionally, firms using cash come from industries with higher market 
concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index. 
Target firm characteristics are displayed in Panel B. The mean and median target size and 
target leverage values are significantly smaller in deals with cash method of payment. 
                                                 
61 Note that the regressions use the natural logarithm of size, which is not winsorized.  
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Moreover, target market-to-book is slightly lower for the cash payment group relative to the 
non-cash payment group at conventional levels. Finally, target sigma is not significantly 
different between the subgroups.  
Panel C presents the statistics for deal characteristics. These data show that all-cash deals 
are significantly smaller in relative size and are less likely to be focus increasing. Deals with 
cash payment method tend to be more hostile and are more likely to have competing bids at 
conventional levels. Further, cash deals are almost four times as likely to be tender offers (6.35% 
versus 1.65%), are more likely to be completed deals, and are less likely to be public companies.  
[Please See Table 5.2] 
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample and is separated by whether 
the asset sale variable is equal to 1 or 0. Panel A illustrates statistics for the dependent variable 
characteristics.  
Just over a third of the sample (35.82%) comprises deals with 100% cash payment. 
However, deals funded by asset sales appear to be significantly more likely to have cash as the 
method of payment (60.35%) than those not financed by asset sales (31.78%). This difference 
is statistically significant at the 1% level, which provides an initial support to my hypothesis 
of a positive association between asset sale and cash method of payment. Similarly, the mean 
cash percentage when funded by asset sales is 77.48%, compared to 46.22% for the non-asset 
sale subsample. 
Bidder characteristics are presented in Panel B. The mean size for firms with asset sales is 
$13.6 billion versus $5.4 billion for those without asset sales. The difference between the means 
of my asset sale and non-asset sales subsamples is not significant for free cash flows, while 
firms with asset sales have significantly higher levels of cash reserves. Additionally, firms with 
asset sales have significantly lower leverage, KZ index, sigma, and stock run-up, but a higher 
market-to-book (medians only). Further, no significance in differences for director/officer 
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ownership is found. Industry M&A liquidity exhibits small economic difference between 
subsamples, with the difference in medians being significant at conventional levels. Firms 
using funds from asset sales come from industries with lower market concentration as measured 
by the Herfindahl index. 
Target firm characteristics are presented in Panel C, with the mean and median target size 
values are smaller in deals funded by asset sale proceeds, though only medians exhibit any 
statistical significance. Target leverage is significantly lower in the asset sale subsample. 
Moreover, target market-to-book and target sigma do not exhibit a statistically significant 
difference in mean or median values.  
Panel D displays the statistics for deal characteristics. Significant differences in relative 
size, focus increasing deals, hostile deals, competing bids, tender offers, and completed deals 
are found, with focus increasing and competing bids being significant at conventional levels. 
When public target status is compared, the minor differences between the two subsamples are 
not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Overall, there are significant differences between the cash/non-cash and asset sale/non-
asset sale subsamples in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, respectively, highlighting the importance of 
controlling for these variables in this empirical analysis. 
 
 Empirical Findings 
The M&A literature has identified a relation between the source of funds and a firm’s 
chosen method of payment (Schlingemann (2004) and Martynova and Renneboog (2009)). 
This section examines whether asset sale proceeds as a funding source affect the probability 
and intensity of using cash as means of payment in acquisitions. To do this, both cash payment 
and cash percentage are regressed on asset sale with the results displayed in Table 5.3.  
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Specifications (1) and (2) test whether asset sales affect the probability of selecting cash 
as the means of payment in acquisitions by using probit regressions, where the dependent 
variable, cash payment, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the method of payment 
is 100% cash, and 0 otherwise. The parameters of the probit model are computed with the 
method of Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE). Specification (1) includes only the asset 
sale dummy, and in specification (2) the controls for bidder, deal, and industry characteristics 
are added. Consistent with the prediction, both specifications show a significantly positive 
relation between asset sale and the choice of cash as the method of payment at the 1% 
significance level. This result has a strong economic significance, showing that asset sales 
increase the probability that bidder firms will use cash as the method of payment by 42.76% 
relative to the mean value of cash payment in my sample.62 
Specifications (3) and (4) employ a fractional response model to examine whether asset 
sales affect the cash intensity in acquisitions. The dependent variable, cash percentage, 
represents the percentage of cash as part of the total price offered by the bidder. Since cash 
percentage is a fractional response by definition and lies in the interval [0, 1], this study follows 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and Karampatsas et al. (2014) and use a Generalized Linear 
Model (GLM) Logit regression where the parameters of the model are obtained by the Quasi-
Maximum Likelihood Estimator (QMLE). Specification (3) presents the results for the 
fractional Logit regression and only includes my main variable of interest, asset sale, while 
specification (4) includes in addition the same control variables included in specification (2). 
The main variable of interest has a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% significance 
level. More specifically, firms with an asset sale use approximately 20.38% more cash than 
those financing through some other means.63 
                                                 
62 This is calculated by determining the marginal effect of asset sale on cash payment (15.32%) and dividing it by 
the mean cash payment for my sample (35.82%). 
63 Calculated from the results in specification (4) by determining the marginal effect of asset sale on cash 
percentage. 
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The coefficients of the control variables are generally similar in sign and significance to 
those found in prior M&A literature. More specifically, size is positively associated with cash 
method of payment. The free cash flows variable carries a positive and significant coefficient 
at the 1% level, while cash reserves exhibit a negative relation to percentage of cash. Leverage, 
which captures firm's financial condition, also shows a positive and significant coefficient. 
Market-to-book is negatively related with the use of cash, consistent with the growth 
opportunities theory. The KZ index, sigma, run-up, and relative size are negatively related with 
the use of cash in M&As. Further, in hostile deals, deals with competing bids, and tender offers, 
cash is more likely to be the means of payment, while the target public status is negatively 
associated with cash means of payment. Lastly, cash payments are more likely to happen within 
industries with higher concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index. 
In sum, the results in this section provide evidence that asset sales affect the choice of 
payment method in M&As, increasing the likelihood and intensity of cash in acquisitions. 
[Please See Table 5.3] 
 
 Controlling for Endogeneity 
5.4.1. Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 
To this point, the analysis was based on the assumption that firms’ choice to use an asset 
sale as a funding source is exogenously determined. However, one could argue that firms that 
make more acquisitions and grow larger are more likely to be candidates to sell assets (see for 
instance Kaplan and Weisbach (1992)), which could raise reverse causality concerns. 
Additionally, as shown in Table 5.2, there are significant differences in firm- and deal-specific 
characteristics between the asset sales and non-asset sales groups, suggesting that the use of 
proceeds from asset sales could be determined endogenously. A primary cause of endogeneity 
is that of omitted variables in which there is a correlation between the explanatory variables 
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and unobservable or omitted variables (Wooldridge (2002)). Many of the unobservable 
variables that could determine whether a firm engages in an asset sale may also make it more 
likely for the firm to use cash as the method of payment. Therefore, to alleviate concerns that 
the relation between asset sale and my acquisition-related dependent variables suffers from 
endogeneity bias, a two-stage instrumental variable approach is implemented.  
Because one of the dependent variables has a discrete nature (cash payment), and the other 
a continuous nature (cash percentage), and the endogenous explanatory variable, asset sale, is 
of a discrete nature, the following econometric methodologies are applied to control for 
endogeneity bias. In the case of cash payment, this study uses: i) a Control Function approach 
to test for the existence of endogeneity; and ii) a Bivariate Probit model to further control for 
endogeneity. The two-step Control Function Approach, suggested by Wooldridge (2002) as a 
valid and simple test of endogeneity, first calculates the reduced model of an endogenous 
regressor as a function of instruments, like the first stage of Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), 
and then uses the errors from the reduced model as an additional regressor in the structural 
model (second stage). If the coefficient of the included error is statistically significant, then the 
null hypothesis of no endogeneity is rejected, confirming the existence of endogeneity. 
Additionally, the Bivariate Probit model is an approach used to control for endogeneity that is 
most appropriate when both dependent and explanatory variables are discrete, as in my case. 
This approach uses Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and estimates the selection and 
structural equations simultaneously.  
In the case of the cash percentage, which is a continuous variable, this study employs: i) a 
Control Function approach similar to that in the cash payment test to identify endogeneity; and 
ii) the Instrumental-Variables (IV) Probit method as in Lee (1981) and Acemoglu, Aghion, 
Lelarge, Reenen, and Zilibotti (2007) to control for any endogeneity. The IV Probit is similar 
Chapter 5 Asset Sales and Method of Payment in M&As 
 
Selling to Buy: Asset Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions 151  Nathan P. McNamee 
to the 2SLS method, except that the structural regression is a GLM Logit model and not an 
OLS linear regression. 
In order to apply the approaches discussed above, the use of an instrument is critical; that 
is a variable which is found to be a determinant of whether the bidder sells an asset, but at the 
same time is not related with my dependent variables (cash payment and cash percentage) in 
my structural models. The chosen instrument, industry distress, represents the fraction of the 
firms in the same industry as the seller (bidder), based on the three-digit SIC code, with a credit 
rating level that is below the investment grade credit rating (i.e., BBB-) in the year of the asset 
sale. Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) use below investment grade industry credit 
ratings as a proxy for industry distress and find that firms from industries in distress are more 
likely to engage in restructuring activities. Similarly, Gopalan and Xie (2011) find that firms 
in distressed industries are more likely to sell assets. Therefore, a positive relation is expected 
between the industry distress instrumental variable and asset sales. Further, there is no reason 
to expect that the industry-level credit rating will have any effect on the method of payment 
chosen in the subsequent, to the asset sale, corporate action (i.e., acquisition) made by the 
bidder.64  
Table 5.4 reports the results of the cash payment analysis. Specification (1) presents the 
reduced probit model measuring the likelihood of an asset sale. The instrument, industry 
distress, is statistically significant at the 1% level and has the expected sign. This provides 
some initial credibility on the validity of the industry distress indicator as my instrument for 
asset sales. Additionally, this analysis follows Stock and Yogo (2002) to examine the strength 
of this instrument and use the weak identification test critical values for the maximal IV Wald 
size distortion.65 In the lower panel of Table 5.4, the F-test for the significance of the excluded 
                                                 
64 Similarly, Karampatsas et al. (2014) used the fraction of firms with credit ratings as an instrument for their 
examination of the effect of credit ratings on the choice of payment method. 
65 Nichols (2007) suggests these identification statistics only apply to the linear case. In this study, the closest 
linear analog for the first stage is either a Linear Probability Model (LPM) or a Linear Regression Model and for 
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instrument in the first-stage regression is reported, and the critical value for the desired 10% 
size distortion on a nominal 5% Wald test, computed by the Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) estimator. The F-test is larger than the corresponding critical value. 
Consequently, the null hypothesis of the instrument's weakness can be rejected. 
In specification (2), the included error, residual asset sale, is statistically significant at the 
1% level. This finding implies that the variable, asset sale, is endogenous to the model, which 
identifies the need to control for a potential endogeneity bias. Specification (3) displays the 
results from the structural equation of the bivariate probit analysis. Additionally, the lower 
panel of Table 5.4 reports the Wald test of endogeneity, which further confirms the existence 
of endogeneity. However, after controlling for this in the bivariate probit, the main result is 
shown to be robust to endogeneity concerns, and that the main variable of interest, asset sale, 
carries a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% level, even after controlling for 
endogeneity.66 
[Please See Table 5.4] 
As stated previously with regard to the correction for endogeneity in the case of cash 
percentage and asset sale, the Control Function and IV Probit methods are applied, with a Probit 
model measuring the likelihood of an asset sale being the reduced form, and GLM Logit 
equations being the structural forms. Table 5.5 shows the results for this analysis. Again, in the 
reduced model in specification (1), the instrument is statistically significant at the 1% level 
with the expected sign. As before, the results from the identification statistics reject the null 
hypothesis of the instrument’s weakness. In structural equation (2), the included residuals are 
again significant, necessitating the need for further correction of my main variable of interest, 
asset sale. Specification (3) shows that the variable of interest, as predicted by the reduced 
                                                 
the second stage is a Linear Probability Model (LPM). 
66 The reduced number of observations in specification (2) is caused by the elimination of variables that perfectly 
predict success or failure in the dependent variable along with their associated observations, which increases the 
numerical stability of the optimization process in probit models. 
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model, is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Additionally, in the lower panel 
of Table 5.5, the results from the endogeneity tests (Hausman and Wald) confirm that the asset 
sale variable is endogenous to the model. 
[Please See Table 5.5] 
To conclude, even after controlling for endogeneity using the IV approach, the main 
variable of interest remains highly significant, confirming the validity of the original results 
found in Table 5.3.  
Overall, these findings support the hypothesis of a positive association between asset sale 
and the likelihood and intensity of using cash as a method of payment in acquisitions. 
 
5.4.2. Propensity Score Matching 
This subsection further addresses the endogeneity issue. The main estimates in previous 
tables could suffer from potential bias if it is found that firms that choose to acquire using the 
proceeds from an asset sale are fundamentally different from those which choose to pay with 
other funding sources. Therefore, a propensity score matching (PSM) process is implemented 
following Drucker and Puri (2005) to match firms in the sample that engaged in an asset sale 
(treated) with firms exhibiting analogous characteristics but did not engage in an asset sale 
(control). In particular, the average differences in cash payment and cash percentage is 
calculated between firms that engaged in asset sales and matched firms that did not engage in 
asset sales. Firms are matched using a one-dimensional propensity score which is a function of 
firm- and deal-specific observable characteristics.  
Table 5.6 reports the PSM results for the main regressions, using one-to-one, 30-nearest-
neighbors, 50-nearest-neighbors, and Gaussian kernel-based econometric matching estimators. 
When each matching estimator is implemented and each asset-sale-funded deal is matched to 
those non-asset-sale-funded deals closest to the propensity score, which is a function of all the 
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control variables used in Table 5.3, the treatment effect of asset sales is significantly positive 
regardless of the matching estimator used. These patterns are similar to the previous analysis, 
showing that firms which engaged in an asset sale are more likely to offer cash as a method of 
payment and that the percentage of cash offered is significantly higher than those that did not 
engage in an asset sale. 
[Please See Table 5.6] 
 
5.4.3. Impact Threshold for a Confounding Variable 
As a last robustness endogeneity check, this analysis follows Larcker and Rusticus (2010) 
and Karampatsas et al. (2014) in investigating the possible impact of unobserved confounding 
variables using the methodology in Frank (2000). In particular, the omitted variables are most 
likely to affect these results when they are correlated with the x (endogenous) and y (dependent) 
variables. The Impact Threshold for a Confounding Variable (ITCV) approach allows us to 
determine the minimum correlations with an omitted variable required to change my results 
from statistically significant to insignificant. The higher (lower) the ITCV, the more robust 
(less robust) the results are to omitted variable concerns.  
The ITCV for asset sale in relation to cash payment and cash percentage are presented in 
Table 5.7. Column (1) shows that the threshold value for asset sale in the cash payment analysis 
is 0.1288, implying that the correlations between asset sale and cash payment with an 
unobserved confounding variable would each need to be about 0.3589 (√0.1288) for the result 
to be overturned. The ITCV appears strong enough to suggest that the main results are robust 
to omitted variable concerns. However, to assess the likelihood that a confounding variable 
exists, the impact of each control variable on the coefficient of asset sale is used as a benchmark, 
as shown in column (2). Similar to the ITCV, the impact of the control variables is defined as 
the product of the partial correlation between the x variable and the control variable and the 
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partial correlation between the y variable and the control variable. Column (3) also displays the 
calculated raw impact for each of the control variables, which is based on the simple 
correlations instead of the partial correlations and is a more conservative measure of impact. 
All of the control variables’ values in columns (2) and (3) are well below the threshold value 
for asset sale. Thus, given that this study already has all commonly used controls as identified 
in the literature, I can have confidence in the estimate of the effect of asset sale on cash payment 
in acquisitions. 
[Please See Table 5.7] 
Column (4) presents the ITCV value for asset sale in the cash percentage analysis. Again 
a high threshold of 0.1813 is observed. As with the cash payment analysis, when comparing 
this threshold to the impact and raw impact of the control variables found in columns (5) and 
(6), respectively, the impact of the control variables are considerably lower than the ITCV 
value. This implies that the main result for cash percentage is robust to omitted variable 
concerns.  
Overall, the results discussed in Section 5.4 indicate that the primary results are robust, 
even after considering potential endogeneity concerns. 
 
 Robustness Tests 
5.5.1. Choice of Method of Payment with Target Firm Control Variables 
Table 5.8 controls for target firm characteristics known from the literature to affect the 
method of payment in M&As. Particularly, past research suggests that a target firm's size 
(Chemmanur et al. (2009)), leverage (Hansen (1987)), growth opportunities (Martin (1996)), 
and information asymmetry (Fishman (1989)) impact negatively the propensity of a bidder to 
make a cash payment. To control for these effects target size, target leverage, target market-
to-book, and target sigma are added. Given the target firms’ data availability, the analysis for 
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this test is conducted for the public acquisitions sample only. A probit regression is used in 
specification (1) and a GLM Logit regression in specification (2), wherein specification (1) 
presents the results in which the dependent variable is cash payment, and specification (2) 
shows the findings for cash percentage as the dependent variable. In support of the prior results, 
a significant relationship is identified for cash payment and cash percentage with asset sale. In 
both specifications, the asset sale variable continues to be strongly and positively associated 
with cash acquisitions as it carries positive and significant coefficients at the 1% level. All of 
the target control variables are negative and statistically significant in, at least, one out of the 
two specifications. In summary, the results of this analysis provide additional evidence 
regarding the robustness of the primary findings and imply that asset sales are an important 
determinant of the payment decision in M&As. 
[Please See Table 5.8] 
 
5.5.2. Method of Payment, Corporate Governance, and Ownership 
Corporate governance and managerial ownership have been shown to affect asset sales. 
For instance, Atanassov and Kim (2009) find that managers who are also major shareholders 
are less likely to sell assets. According to the authors, this is because managers are reluctant to 
reduce the private benefits associated with a larger asset base. Additionally, they find an 
increased likelihood of asset sales in weaker investor protection countries. Further, in their 
study of European M&As, Faccio and Masulis (2005) show that method of payment is tied to 
corporate governance and that bidders prefer cash when voting control of their dominant 
shareholder is threatened. Similarly, Amihud et al. (1990) find that relatively large managerial 
ownership leads to a higher likelihood for that firm to finance acquisitions with cash rather than 
with stock. To better control for corporate governance and managerial ownership concerns that 
may potentially confound my results, several corporate governance mechanisms are included 
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such as the entrenchment index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)), board independence 
(Byrd and Hickman (1992)), board size (Yermack (1996)), CEO/Chair duality (Masulis, Wang, 
and Xie (2007)), and director/officer ownership (Amihud et al. (1990)), as shown in Table 5.9. 
The only corporate governance that displays any significance is that of board size, which is 
negatively related with cash payment and cash percentage in both specifications. Importantly, 
after having controlled for various corporate governance/ownership measures, the primary 
results remain unchanged. 
[Please See Table 5.9] 
 
5.5.3. Asset Sale Measurement Comparison 
For all tests up to this point, the main variable of interest has been asset sale, which is a 
composite of two primary measures of asset sale found in the literature. The one, SDC asset 
sale, is determined by identifying firms that sold a business unit or other asset as reported in 
the SDC database and described in Edmans and Mann (2017). The other, Compustat asset sale, 
identifies asset sales from annual accounting and financial data as reported by Compustat and 
described in Eckbo and Kisser (2013). As a robustness check, the main regressions are run 
again to assess if any materially different results are observed when using these two different 
asset sale measures.  
[Please See Table 5.10] 
Table 5.10 reports the results from these additional tests for cash payment and cash 
percentage, with models using SDC asset sale in specifications (1) and (2) and Compustat asset 
sale in specifications (3) and (4). In all specifications, the results remain strong and consistent 
with the main findings, irrespective of which asset sale measure is used.  
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5.5.4. Other Auxiliary Tests 
A number of sensitivity tests are performed to further examine the robustness of these 
results. In particular: i) financial firms (6000-6999) and regulated utilities (4900-4999) are 
excluded from my sample; ii) equity and debt flows are included as other potential sources of 
financing in the regressions; iii) also, measures of firm distress and financial constraints are 
added, which are commonly cited motivations for asset sales: in particular, the Altman Z score 
as in Altman (1968) to control for financial distress; the Size-Age (SA) index as in Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010) and rating level as in Karampatsas et al. (2014) to capture further financial 
constraint concerns; iv) the number of analysts and R&D/total assets and R&D/total sales are 
included as alternative proxies for information asymmetry; v) additional tests are conducted 
where the main variables of interest require the proceeds from an asset sale to only cover 75% 
or 50% of the cash used in the deal, as opposed to the main asset sale variable which requires 
100% coverage of cash used in the deal; vi) further, the asset sale variable is broadened by 
requiring the asset sale proceeds to cover the entire deal value rather than just the cash portion 
of the deal; vii) the existence of multicollinearity amongst my variables is tested using Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) tests and confirms there are not any multicollinearity issues that would 
materially affect the estimates; viii) finally firm fixed effects are introduced to further control 
for unobservable firm characteristics performing linear regression analysis.  
Altogether, this section confirms that the main findings are robust and provides further 
evidence to substantiate the initial results, that asset sales are an important determinant of 
method of payment in subsequent acquisition decisions.  
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter provides new evidence on the reallocation of firm assets through the 
restructuring activities of asset sales and acquisitions. More specifically, it offers empirical 
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confirmation of the role of asset sale proceeds in the choice of payment method in M&As. In 
particular, this analysis shows that asset sales have a strong positive relation with the choice of 
cash as the method of payment. These results are robust even after controlling for potential 
endogeneity issues.  
Additionally, the findings of this study imply that asset sale proceeds are an important 
source of funds for corporate investment, providing general support for the pecking order 
theory by demonstrating the preference for internal funding sources over external sources (i.e., 
debt and equity issuance), without regard to the bidder’s relative financing need. Moreover, 
because of the increased probability to make cash acquisitions after asset sales, asset sellers 
(bidders) are more likely to experience, at the announcement of an acquisition in the near future 
after the asset sale, the positive effects associated with the choice of cash as a method of 
payment, such as higher abnormal returns and the discouragement of rival bids.  
Overall, these findings collectively suggest that asset sale proceeds are an important source 
of funds in M&As and an omitted variable for the determinants of the choice of payment 
method in M&As.  
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Appendix for Chapter 5 
Variable descriptions. 
Variable Description 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Cash payment A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals where the method of payment is 100% cash, 
and 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Cash percentage The percentage of cash as part of the total price offered by the bidder to the target firm. This variable 
is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Panel B: Measures of asset sales 
Asset sale A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the asset sale is either an SDC asset sale as in Edmans 
and Mann (2017) as defined below, or an Compustat asset sale as in Eckbo and Kisser (2013) as 
defined below, and 0 otherwise. This variable is created using data from Compustat (for the 
Compustat asset sales) and Thomson Financial SDC (for the SDC asset sales). 
SDC asset sale A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the ratio of the asset sale value to the cash used 
in the deal is greater than 1, and 0 otherwise. Asset sale is a completed M&A transaction with the 
form of transaction being either acquisition of assets or acquisition of certain assets, as in Edmans 
and Mann (2017), “[…] where the acquisition technique field includes at least one out of 
Divestiture, Property Acquisition, Auction, Internal Reorganization […]” (p. 2), and “[…] none 
out of Buyout, Bankrupt, Takeover, Restructuring, Liquidation, Private, Tender, Unsolicited, and 
Failed […]” (p. 2). This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Compustat asset sale A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the ratio of the asset sale value to the cash used 
in the deal is greater than 1, and 0 otherwise. Asset sale is calculated according to the formula: 
asset sales = siv + min[ivstch,0] + min[ivaco,0] + sppe. That is: i) the sale of investments, plus ii) 
the absolute value of the minimum of the change in short-term investments and 0, plus iii) the 
absolute value of the minimum of the investing activities and 0, plus iv) the sale of property, plant, 
and equipment as in Eckbo and Kisser (2013). This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
Size Total assets at fiscal year-end. This variable is created using data from Compustat. In the 
regressions analysis I use the ln(1+size). 
Free cash flows Operating income before depreciation, minus interest expense on debt, income taxes, and preferred 
and common dividends at the fiscal year-end, normalized by the book value of the firm’s total assets 
at the previous fiscal year-end, as in Schlingemann (2004). This variable is created using data from 
Compustat. 
Cash reserves Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets at fiscal year-end. This variable is created 
using data from Compustat. 
Leverage Total debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) divided by total assets at fiscal year-end. 
This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Market-to-book The market value of equity (common shares outstanding * closing price at fiscal year-end) divided 
by the book value of equity at fiscal year-end. Similar to Fama and French, book value of equity is 
total shareholders' equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus the book value of 
preferred stock. In case this data is not available, shareholders' equity is calculated as the sum of 
common and preferred equity. If none of the two are available, shareholders' equity is defined as 
the differences of total assets and total liabilities. This variable is created using data from 
Compustat. 
KZ index The KZ index is calculated with the formula: KZ index = -1.001909 x Cash Flows / PP&E(t-1) + 
0.2826389 x Q + 3.139193 x Debt / Total Capital + -39.3678 x Dividends / PP&E(t-1) + -1.314759 
x Cash / PP&E(t-1), as in Lamont et al. (2001). This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Sigma The standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from CRSP over the 
period beginning 205 and ending 6 days before deal announcement. 
Run-up Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of the firm over the period starting (-205, -6) days prior to 
the acquisition announcement from CRSP. 
Panel D: Industry characteristics 
Industry M&A liquidity Sum of acquisitions values for each year and three-digit SIC code divided by the aggregated assets 
of firms in the same three-digit SIC and year. This variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Herfindahl index Sum of squares of the market shares of all firms sharing the same three-digit SIC, where market 
share is defined as sales of the firm to the aggregated sales of the industry. This variable is created 
using data from Compustat. 
Panel E: Deal characteristics 
Relative size The ratio of the deal value (from Thomson Financial SDC) to the bidder market value of equity 4 
weeks prior to the acquisition announcement (from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database).  
Focus increasing A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for intra-industry transactions, and 0 otherwise. 
Industries are defined at the 2-digit SIC level from Thomson Financial SDC. 
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Hostile deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals defined as hostile or unsolicited, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Competing deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals where there is a competing bidder, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Tender offer A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals defined as tender offer, and 0 otherwise. This 
variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Completed deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for completed deals, and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Public target A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals where the target is a public firm, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Panel F: Instrumental variable 
Industry distress  The fraction of the firms in the same industry, based on the three-digit SIC code, with a credit rating 
level that is below the investment grade credit rating (i.e., BBB-) in the year of the asset sale. This 
variable is created using data from Compustat. 
Panel G: Corporate governance/Ownership measures 
Entrenchment index Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index from Institutional Shareholder Services. The index is the 
sum of binary variables concerning the following provisions: 1) classified boards; 2) limitations to 
shareholders' ability to amend the bylaws; 3) supermajority voting for business combinations; 4) 
supermajority requirements for charter amendments; 5) poison pills; and 6) golden parachutes. 
Board independence The percentage of independent directors calculated as the ratio between the number of independent 
directors, and the board size from Institutional Shareholder Services. 
Board size The number of directors composing the board of directors from Institutional Shareholder Services. 
CEO/Chair duality A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of CEO and Chairman of the board are not 
split, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from Institutional Shareholder Services. 
Director/Officer ownership A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the sum of directors’ and officers’ ownership is 
greater than 5% during the firm year. This variable is created using data from Institutional 
Shareholder Services and ExecuComp. 
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Tables for Chapter 5 
Table 5.1 
Sample descriptive statistics by payment method. 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of U.S. public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014, with data drawn from 
the Thomson Financial SDC database. The mean, median, and number of observations are reported for: bidder characteristics (Panel A), target characteristics (Panel B), and deal characteristics 
(Panel C). The sample is further classified by whether the cash dummy value is equal to 1 or 0. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Statistical tests for differences in means and 
equality of medians for each characteristic between the two categories are also included. 
 
 Full sample  
(1) 
 Cash=1  
(2) 
 Cash=0  
(3) 
 Difference (p-value)  
(2)-(3) 
 Mean Median N  Mean Median N  Mean Median N  Mean Median 
Panel A: Bidder characteristics 
Asset sale 0.102 - 39,556  0.238 - 10,176  0.087 - 18,230  0.000 - 
Size 6,561.25 720.34 26,974  8,191.45 1,048.12 7,685  5,353.61 433.88 11,402  0.000 0.000 
Free cash flows 0.061 0.103 24,014  0.110 0.117 7,112  0.013 0.077 10,627  0.000 0.000 
Cash reserves 0.167 0.077 26,920  0.167 0.089 7,676  0.200 0.097 11,360  0.000 0.015 
Leverage 0.234 0.191 26,922  0.224 0.184 7,677  0.198 0.139 11,361  0.000 0.000 
Market-to-book 3.278 2.181 25,787  3.039 2.209 7,423  3.754 2.333 10,831  0.000 0.000 
KZ index -2.601 0.920 26,973  -2.909 0.452 7,684  -3.369 0.276 11,402  0.007 0.028 
Sigma 0.029 0.024 27,153  0.024 0.021 7,727  0.034 0.028 11,498  0.000 0.000 
Run-up 0.116 0.023 23,578  0.082 0.019 6,931  0.170 0.042 9,804  0.000 0.000 
Director/Officer ownership 0.275 0.000 12,401  0.281 0.000 4,451  0.269 0.000 4,356  0.216 0.215 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.067 0.040 26,270  0.066 0.044 7,529  0.072 0.043 10,975  0.000 0.600 
Herfindahl index 0.127 0.087 26,448  0.136 0.094 7,579  0.118 0.082 11,036  0.000 0.000 
Panel B: Target characteristics 
Target size 3,093.89 344.31 4,176  831.43 208.15 1,076  4,007.91 446.96 2,942  0.000 0.000 
Target leverage 0.198 0.137 4,163  0.142 0.068 1,069  0.219 0.166 2,936  0.000 0.000 
Target market-to-book 2.476 1.649 4,111  2.300 1.612 1,060  2.572 1.671 2,893  0.017 0.255 
Target sigma 0.037 0.031 4,350  0.037 0.031 1,141  0.037 0.031 3,045  0.978 0.703 
Panel C: Deal characteristics 
Relative size 0.186 0.065 27,091  0.140 0.049 7,709  0.254 0.102 11,475  0.000 0.000 
Focus increasing 0.557 - 39,556  0.564 - 10,176  0.596 - 18,230  0.000 - 
Hostile deal 0.010 - 39,556  0.015 - 10,176  0.010 - 18,230  0.000 - 
Competing deal 0.012 - 39,556  0.017 - 10,176  0.014 - 18,230  0.023 - 
Tender offer 0.025 - 39,556  0.063 - 10,176  0.016 - 18,230  0.000 - 
Completed deal 0.953 - 39,556  0.962 - 10,176  0.937 - 18,230  0.000 - 
Public target 0.162 - 39,556  0.164 - 10,176  0.240 - 18,230  0.000 - 
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Table 5.2 
Sample descriptive statistics by asset sale. 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of U.S. public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014, with data drawn from the Thomson Financial 
SDC database. The mean, median, and number of observations are reported for: cash measures (Panel A), bidder characteristics (Panel B), target characteristics (Panel C), and deal characteristics (Panel D). The sample 
is further classified by whether the asset sale dummy value is equal to 1 or 0. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Statistical tests for differences in means and equality of medians for each characteristic 
between the two categories are also included. 
 
 Full sample  
(1) 
 Asset sale=1  
(2) 
 Asset sale=0  
(3) 
 Difference (p-value)  
(2)-(3) 
 Mean Median N  Mean Median N  Mean Median N  Mean Median 
Panel A: Cash measures 
Cash payment 0.358 - 28,406  0.603 - 4,020  0.318 - 24,386  0.000 - 
Cash percentage 0.506 0.514 28,406  0.775 1.000 4,020  0.462 0.400 24,386  0.000 0.000 
Panel B: Bidder characteristics 
Size 6,561.25 720.34 26,974  13,644.59 1,489.73 3,832  5,388.35 650.03 23,142  0.000 0.000 
Free cash flows 0.061 0.103 24,014  0.064 0.094 3,526  0.060 0.105 20,488  0.560 0.000 
Cash reserves 0.167 0.077 26,920  0.232 0.160 3,832  0.156 0.069 23,088  0.000 0.000 
Leverage 0.234 0.191 26,922  0.193 0.133 3,832  0.241 0.203 23,090  0.000 0.000 
Market-to-book 3.278 2.181 25,787  3.345 2.307 3,764  3.267 2.153 22,023  0.266 0.000 
KZ index -2.601 0.920 26,973  -5.512 -1.138 3,832  -2.119 1.174 23,141  0.000 0.000 
Sigma 0.029 0.024 27,153  0.026 0.022 3,831  0.029 0.024 23,322  0.000 0.000 
Run-up 0.116 0.023 23,578  0.075 0.002 3,483  0.123 0.027 20,095  0.000 0.000 
Director/Officer ownership 0.275 0.000 12,401  0.273 0.000 2,193  0.275 0.000 10,208  0.868 0.868 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.067 0.040 26,270  0.066 0.044 3,815  0.067 0.040 22,455  0.498 0.006 
Herfindahl index 0.127 0.087 26,448  0.111 0.075 3,823  0.130 0.089 22,625  0.000 0.000 
Panel C: Target characteristics 
Target size 3,093.89 344.31 4,176  1,923.12 262.855 468  3,241.65 356.86 3,708  0.209 0.031 
Target leverage 0.198 0.137 4,163  0.163 0.087 468  0.202 0.145 3,695  0.000 0.000 
Target market-to-book 2.476 1.649 4,111  2.254 1.682 458  2.504 1.646 3,653  0.107 0.671 
Target sigma 0.037 0.031 4,350  0.038 0.030 483  0.037 0.031 3,867  0.250 0.809 
Panel D: Deal characteristics 
Relative size 0.186 0.065 27,091  0.085 0.030 3,825  0.203 0.074 23,266  0.000 0.000 
Focus increasing 0.557 - 39,556  0.570 - 4,020  0.556 - 35,536  0.096 - 
Hostile deal 0.010 - 39,556  0.004 - 4,020  0.010 - 35,536  0.000 - 
Competing deal 0.012 - 39,556  0.009 - 4,020  0.012 - 35,536  0.093 - 
Tender offer 0.025 - 39,556  0.041 - 4,020  0.023 - 35,536  0.000 - 
Completed deal 0.953 - 39,556  0.979 - 4,020  0.950 - 35,536  0.000 - 
Public target 0.162 - 39,556  0.167 - 4,020  0.161 - 35,536  0.310 - 
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Table 5.3 
Choice of method of payment. 
 
This table presents the results of probit regression analysis in specifications (1) and (2) and (GLM) Logit regression analysis 
in specifications (3) and (4). The dependent variable in probit models takes the value of 1 if the method of payment was 100% 
cash, and 0 otherwise. In (GLM) Logit analysis, the dependent variable is the percentage of cash used in the transaction. A 
sample of U.S. public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 is 
used. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, 
are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in 
parentheses, for probit and (GLM) Logit analysis, are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Probit  
(1) 
Probit  
(2) 
GLM Logit  
(3) 
GLM Logit  
(4) 
Asset sale 0.5657*** 
(16.97) 
0.4812*** 
(13.40) 
1.1274*** 
(21.57) 
1.1380*** 
(18.93) 
Size  
 
0.0428*** 
(4.18) 
 
 
-0.0097 
(-0.61) 
Free cash flows  
 
0.3679*** 
(4.87) 
 
 
0.7062*** 
(6.58) 
Cash reserves  
 
-0.1691 
(-1.56) 
 
 
-0.5806*** 
(-3.87) 
Leverage  
 
0.2262** 
(2.53) 
 
 
0.5149*** 
(3.86) 
Market-to-book  
 
-0.0183*** 
(-3.68) 
 
 
-0.0498*** 
(-6.51) 
KZ index  
 
-0.0004 
(-0.25) 
 
 
-0.0049** 
(-2.24) 
Sigma  
 
-13.6074*** 
(-10.63) 
 
 
-23.6554*** 
(-13.68) 
Run-up  
 
-0.1344*** 
(-5.41) 
 
 
-0.1559*** 
(-4.36) 
Relative size  
 
-0.4608*** 
(-8.90) 
 
 
-0.2365*** 
(-4.16) 
Focus increasing  
 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.0222 
(-0.56) 
Hostile deal  
 
0.4044*** 
(3.22) 
 
 
0.8536*** 
(4.65) 
Competing deal  
 
0.0416 
(0.41) 
 
 
0.2429* 
(1.66) 
Tender offer  
 
1.0490*** 
(14.40) 
 
 
2.1936*** 
(17.93) 
Completed deal  
 
0.0062 
(0.09) 
 
 
0.3008*** 
(3.26) 
Public target  
 
-0.5259*** 
(-13.59) 
 
 
-1.0764*** 
(-19.89) 
Industry M&A liquidity  
 
-0.1606 
(-0.85) 
 
 
-0.3343 
(-1.22) 
Herfindahl index  
 
0.5002*** 
(3.88) 
 
 
1.1143*** 
(5.27) 
Constant -0.6797** 
(-2.19) 
-0.5033* 
(-1.67) 
0.2385 
(0.54) 
0.8264 
(1.37) 
     
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 19,273 15,242 19,273 15,242 
Pseudo R2 0.0977 0.1762 0.1468 0.2332 
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Table 5.4 
Endogeneity control for asset sale and cash payment. 
 
This table shows control function and bivariate probit results to test and control for potential endogeneity of asset sale. 
Specification (1) shows the reduced probit model with the probability of asset sales as the dependent variable and includes 
instrumental variables shown to impact asset sale likelihood. Specification (2) shows results from the structural regression of 
the control function approach. Specification (3) provides results from the structural regression of the bivariate probit analysis. 
The dependent variable for specifications (2) and (3) takes the value of 1 if the method of payment was 100% cash, and 0 
otherwise. The sample period is between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 for the universe of U.S. publicly listed firms. 
Refer to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are 
based on fiscal year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Reduced  
(1) 
Structural  
(2) 
Structural  
(3) 
Asset sale  
 
3.0491*** 
(7.72) 
1.4597*** 
(16.72) 
Residual asset sale  
 
-1.0345*** 
(-6.63) 
 
 
Industry distress 0.7382*** 
(3.55) 
 
 
 
Size 0.1328*** 
(12.25) 
-0.0285* 
(-1.90) 
-0.0122 
(-1.10) 
Free cash flows -0.0048 
(-0.07) 
0.3572*** 
(4.75) 
0.3354*** 
(4.76) 
Cash reserves 1.0556*** 
(10.20) 
-0.7602*** 
(-5.59) 
-0.4494*** 
(-4.39) 
Leverage -0.0911 
(-0.99) 
0.2702*** 
(2.99) 
0.1959** 
(2.33) 
Market-to-book -0.0144*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.0113** 
(-2.32) 
-0.0122*** 
(-2.84) 
KZ index 0.0015 
(1.07) 
-0.0013 
(-0.91) 
-0.0008 
(-0.54) 
Sigma 6.1187*** 
(5.04) 
-16.9188*** 
(-12.42) 
-14.7231*** 
(-12.33) 
Run-up -0.1061*** 
(-4.04) 
-0.0817*** 
(-3.12) 
-0.0926*** 
(-3.87) 
Relative size -0.8370*** 
(-8.16) 
-0.1953*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.3266*** 
(-6.55) 
Focus increasing -0.0085 
(-0.31) 
0.0078 
(0.29) 
0.0105 
(0.40) 
Hostile deal -0.2097 
(-1.35) 
0.4856*** 
(3.98) 
0.4043*** 
(3.42) 
Competing deal -0.1977* 
(-1.69) 
0.1483 
(1.45) 
0.1020 
(1.07) 
Tender offer 0.3583*** 
(5.11) 
0.8628*** 
(11.12) 
0.8864*** 
(12.28) 
Completed deal 0.1143 
(1.42) 
-0.0389 
(-0.58) 
-0.0042 
(-0.07) 
Public target -0.0390 
(-0.94) 
-0.4953*** 
(-12.65) 
-0.4042*** 
(-10.40) 
Industry M&A liquidity -0.3919* 
(-1.86) 
-0.0092 
(-0.05) 
-0.0538 
(-0.30) 
Herfindahl index -0.3380** 
(-2.15) 
0.6863*** 
(5.18) 
0.5504*** 
(4.08) 
Constant -3.7542*** 
(-9.00) 
-0.2139 
(-0.70) 
-0.7080*** 
(-8.30) 
    
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 20,702 15,238 15,242 
Pseudo R2 0.1329 0.1792 0.1581 
F-test 17.18   
LIML size of nominal 5% Wald 16.38   
Wald test   12.61 
(p-value)   (0.00) 
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Table 5.5 
Endogeneity control for asset sale and cash percentage. 
 
This table shows control function and IV probit results to test for potential endogeneity of asset sale on cash percentage. 
Specification (1) shows the reduced regression with the probability of asset sales as the dependent variable and includes 
instrumental variables shown to impact asset sale likelihood. Specifications (2) and (3) provide results from the structural 
regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage of cash used in the transaction. The sample period is between 
January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 for the universe of U.S. publicly listed firms. Refer to Appendix for detailed variable 
descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on fiscal year and Fama-French 49 
industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Reduced  
(1) 
Structural  
(2) 
Structural  
(3) 
Asset sale  
 
5.1882*** 
(9.46) 
 
 
Residual asset sale  
 
-1.6227*** 
(-7.63) 
 
 
Asset sale (predicted)  
 
 
 
4.5057*** 
(8.97) 
Industry distress 0.7382*** 
(3.55) 
 
 
 
 
Size 0.1328*** 
(12.25) 
-0.1171*** 
(-5.27) 
-0.0960*** 
(-4.45) 
Free cash flows -0.0048 
(-0.07) 
0.6895*** 
(6.50) 
0.6827*** 
(6.42) 
Cash reserves 1.0556*** 
(10.20) 
-1.4622*** 
(-7.89) 
-1.3524*** 
(-7.39) 
Leverage -0.0911 
(-0.99) 
0.5777*** 
(4.33) 
0.5815*** 
(4.33) 
Market-to-book -0.0144*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.0393*** 
(-5.33) 
-0.0418*** 
(-5.42) 
KZ index 0.0015 
(1.07) 
-0.0064*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.0052** 
(-2.42) 
Sigma 6.1187*** 
(5.04) 
-28.7167*** 
(-15.38) 
-27.1254*** 
(-14.82) 
Run-up -0.1061*** 
(-4.04) 
-0.0766** 
(-2.06) 
-0.0966*** 
(-2.63) 
Relative size -0.8370*** 
(-8.16) 
0.1762** 
(2.37) 
-0.0229 
(-0.36) 
Focus increasing -0.0085 
(-0.31) 
-0.0092 
(-0.23) 
-0.0089 
(-0.23) 
Hostile deal -0.2097 
(-1.35) 
0.9486*** 
(5.29) 
0.9461*** 
(5.37) 
Competing deal -0.1977* 
(-1.69) 
0.3929*** 
(2.69) 
0.3564** 
(2.44) 
Tender offer 0.3583*** 
(5.11) 
1.9111*** 
(15.08) 
1.8778*** 
(14.61) 
Completed deal 0.1143 
(1.42) 
0.2224** 
(2.41) 
0.2400*** 
(2.59) 
Public target -0.0390 
(-0.94) 
-1.0322*** 
(-18.82) 
-1.0455*** 
(-18.78) 
Industry M&A liquidity -0.3919* 
(-1.86) 
-0.1155 
(-0.42) 
-0.1116 
(-0.40) 
Herfindahl index -0.3380** 
(-2.15) 
1.3851*** 
(6.45) 
1.3364*** 
(6.46) 
Constant -3.7542*** 
(-9.00) 
1.2288** 
(2.15) 
1.3338** 
(2.42) 
    
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 20,702 15,238 15,238 
Pseudo R2 0.1329 0.2360 0.2128 
F-test 33.35   
2SLS size of nominal 5% Wald 16.38   
Hausman (Wald) test   48.43 
p-value   (0.00) 
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Table 5.6 
Propensity score matching (PSM). 
 
This table presents differences between cash payment and cash percentage for firms that engaged in asset sales (treated sample) 
and those that did not engage in asset sales (control sample) using propensity score matching. The sample period is between 
January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 for U.S. public and private acquisitions. Methods for matching are one-to-one, 30- 
and 50-nearest neighbors, and Gaussian kernel. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
   One-to-one 30 Nearest 50 Nearest 
Gaussian 
Kernel 
Cash payment Treated mean 
 
0.6153 0.6153 0.6153 0.6153 
 Control mean 0.4128 0.4141 0.4121 0.4017 
 Difference  0.2025*** 0.2012*** 0.2032*** 0.2136*** 
       
Cash percentage Treated mean 
 
0.7861 0.7861 0.7861 0.7861 
 Control mean 0.5529 0.5491 0.5478 0.5386 
 Difference  0.2332*** 0.2370*** 0.2383*** 0.2475*** 
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Table 5.7 
Impact of unobservable confounding variables. 
 
This table shows an evaluation of the impact of unobserved confounding variables based on Frank (2000). The ITCV, columns 
(1) and (4), is defined as the product of the correlation between the x-variable (asset sales) and the confounding variable and 
the correlation between the y-variable (cash payment or cash percentage) and the confounding variable. To assess the 
likelihood that such a variable exists, columns (2) and (5) show the impact of each independent variable on the coefficient of 
asset sales. The impact is defined as the product of the partial correlation between the x-variable (asset sales) and the control 
variable and the correlation between the y-variable (cash payment or cash percentage) and the control variable. Columns (3) 
and (6) show a more conservative measure of impact, which is the product of the simple correlation between the x-variable 
and the control variable and the simple correlation between the y-variable and the control variable. The sample period is 
between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 for U.S. public and private acquisitions. Refer to Appendix for detailed 
variable descriptions. 
 
 Cash payment  Cash percentage 
 
 
ITCV 
(1) 
Impact 
(2) 
Impactraw 
(3) 
 ITCV 
(4) 
Impact 
(5) 
Impactraw 
(6) 
Asset sale 0.1288    0.1813   
Size  0.0129 0.0286   0.0035 0.0208 
Free cash flows  -0.0004 0.0005   -0.0006 0.0007 
Cash reserves  0.0050 -0.0101   0.0040 -0.0120 
Leverage  -0.0012 -0.0049   -0.0019 -0.0068 
Market-to-book  0.0016 -0.0006   0.0032 -0.0009 
KZ index  -0.0001 -0.0021   0.0005 -0.0004 
Sigma  -0.0026 0.0121   -0.0039 0.0133 
Run-up  0.0020 0.0025   0.0021 0.0029 
Relative size  0.0069 0.0195   0.0037 0.0144 
Focus increasing  0.0003 -0.0003   0.0003 -0.0003 
Hostile deal  -0.0003 -0.0005   -0.0005 -0.0005 
Competing deal  -0.0001 -0.0001   -0.0002 -0.0002 
Tender offer  0.0054 0.0042   0.0069 0.0045 
Completed deal  0.0000 0.0022   0.0004 0.0032 
Public target  0.0035 -0.0005   0.0050 -0.0008 
Industry M&A liquidity  -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0001 0.0002 
Herfindahl index  -0.0029 -0.0042   -0.0041 -0.0072 
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Table 5.8 
Choice of method of payment with target firm control variables. 
 
This table presents the results of probit regression analysis in specification (1) and (GLM) Logit regression analysis in 
specification (2). The dependent variable in probit models takes the value of 1 if the method of payment was 100% cash, and 
0 otherwise. In (GLM) Logit analysis, the dependent variable is the percentage of cash used in the transaction. A sample of 
U.S. public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 is used. Refer 
to Appendix for detailed variable descriptions. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based 
on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses, 
for probit and (GLM) Logit analysis, are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Probit 
(1) 
GLM Logit 
(2) 
Asset sale 0.5360*** 
(5.39) 
1.4072*** 
(10.01) 
Size 0.1607*** 
(4.66) 
0.1966*** 
(3.99) 
Free cash flows 0.7482*** 
(2.70) 
1.1798*** 
(3.42) 
Cash reserves 0.3868 
(1.25) 
0.2696 
(0.63) 
Leverage 0.0588 
(0.24) 
0.4474 
(1.32) 
Market-to-book -0.0443*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.0639*** 
(-3.32) 
KZ index -0.0040 
(-0.91) 
-0.0088 
(-1.55) 
Sigma -19.5947*** 
(-4.45) 
-29.2280*** 
(-4.99) 
Run-up -0.2777*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.3449*** 
(-2.77) 
Target size -0.3356*** 
(-7.79) 
-0.4677*** 
(-8.29) 
Target leverage -0.8684*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.5467* 
(-1.79) 
Target market-to-book -0.0504*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.0673*** 
(-3.75) 
Target sigma -3.5280 
(-1.38) 
-10.3006*** 
(-2.78) 
Relative size -0.1980 
(-1.49) 
0.2141 
(1.39) 
Focus increasing -0.0130 
(-0.17) 
0.0360 
(0.32) 
Hostile deal 0.5240*** 
(3.03) 
0.9494*** 
(3.62) 
Competing deal -0.1068 
(-0.72) 
0.0474 
(0.23) 
Tender offer 1.2331*** 
(12.26) 
2.5129*** 
(16.16) 
Completed deal -0.2351* 
(-1.88) 
-0.1083 
(-0.61) 
Public target 0.2844 
(1.18) 
0.3040 
(0.78) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.7581 
(1.45) 
0.9058 
(1.32) 
Herfindahl index 0.9327** 
(2.57) 
1.8079*** 
(3.57) 
Constant 0.6354 
(1.00) 
1.8485** 
(2.41) 
   
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 2,387 2,402 
Pseudo R2 0.3781 0.3764 
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Table 5.9 
Choice of method of payment, corporate governance, and managerial ownership. 
 
This table presents the results of probit regression analysis in specification (1) and (GLM) Logit regression analysis in 
specification (2) with corporate governance and ownership measures included. The dependent variables in specifications (1) 
and (2) are cash payment and cash percentage, respectively. A sample of U.S. public and private acquisitions announced over 
the period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 is used. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on fiscal year and Fama-French 49 industry 
classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Probit  
(1) 
GLM Logit  
(2) 
Asset sale 0.5671*** 
(8.55) 
1.4738*** 
(11.35) 
Entrenchment index 0.0196 
(1.03) 
0.0469 
(1.49) 
Board independence 0.1640 
(1.00) 
0.3936 
(1.54) 
Board size -0.0225** 
(-2.22) 
-0.0350** 
(-2.10) 
Director/Officer ownership 0.0441 
(0.74) 
0.1559 
(1.61) 
CEO/Chair duality 0.1030 
(1.22) 
0.0452 
(0.33) 
Size 0.0424** 
(2.03) 
-0.0286 
(-0.83) 
Free cash flows 0.3295* 
(1.76) 
0.5852** 
(2.02) 
Cash reserves -0.0231 
(-0.10) 
-0.2953 
(-0.85) 
Leverage 0.4369** 
(2.30) 
0.7076** 
(2.26) 
Market-to-book -0.0363*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.0695*** 
(-4.98) 
KZ index -0.0029 
(-0.88) 
-0.0089 
(-1.49) 
Sigma -16.7269*** 
(-6.33) 
-36.2548*** 
(-8.57) 
Run-up -0.1538*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.2864*** 
(-3.60) 
Relative size -1.0427*** 
(-7.75) 
-0.6930*** 
(-4.73) 
Focus increasing -0.0833* 
(-1.73) 
-0.1032 
(-1.33) 
Hostile deal 0.4082* 
(1.90) 
0.8269** 
(2.26) 
Competing deal 0.0443 
(0.29) 
0.1291 
(0.58) 
Tender offer 0.9397*** 
(9.54) 
2.1933*** 
(13.00) 
Completed deal -0.0269 
(-0.20) 
0.1872 
(0.96) 
Public target -0.5051*** 
(-8.19) 
-1.1232*** 
(-12.09) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.1938 
(0.58) 
0.0338 
(0.07) 
Herfindahl index 0.1659 
(0.80) 
0.8373** 
(2.14) 
Constant 0.6100 
(1.27) 
2.1880*** 
(3.01) 
   
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 5,042 5,047 
Pseudo R2 0.2258 0.3152 
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Table 5.10 
Asset sale measure comparison. 
 
This table presents the results of probit regression analysis in specifications (1) and (3) and (GLM) Logit regression analysis 
in specifications (2) and (4). The dependent variables in specifications (1) and (3) and (2) and (4) are cash payment and cash 
percentage, respectively. The variable of interest in specifications (1) and (2) is SDC asset sale, and the variable of interest in 
specifications (3) and (4) is Compustat asset sale. A sample of U.S. public and private acquisitions announced over the period 
between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014 is used. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Year and 
industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on fiscal year and Fama-French 49 industry classification 
dummies, respectively. The z-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and firm clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Probit  
(1) 
GLM Logit  
(2) 
Probit  
(3) 
GLM Logit  
(4) 
SDC asset sale 0.3945*** 
(5.06) 
0.8882*** 
(6.78) 
 
 
 
 
Compustat asset sale  
 
 
 
0.4720*** 
(12.65) 
1.1186*** 
(17.96) 
Size 0.0621*** 
(6.09) 
0.0311** 
(2.01) 
0.0440*** 
(4.31) 
-0.0072 
(-0.46) 
Free cash flows 0.3675*** 
(4.90) 
0.7059*** 
(6.57) 
0.3616*** 
(4.81) 
0.6962*** 
(6.51) 
Cash reserves 0.0024 
(0.02) 
-0.2316 
(-1.49) 
-0.1764 
(-1.62) 
-0.5935*** 
(-3.94) 
Leverage 0.2223** 
(2.48) 
0.5082*** 
(3.80) 
0.2368*** 
(2.64) 
0.5338*** 
(4.00) 
Market-to-book -0.0201*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.0536*** 
(-6.57) 
-0.0187*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.0506*** 
(-6.56) 
KZ index -0.0000 
(-0.02) 
-0.0039* 
(-1.79) 
-0.0004 
(-0.29) 
-0.0049** 
(-2.27) 
Sigma -12.4828*** 
(-9.69) 
-21.1071*** 
(-12.25) 
-13.5585*** 
(-10.59) 
-23.5447*** 
(-13.64) 
Run-up -0.1478*** 
(-5.98) 
-0.1862*** 
(-5.26) 
-0.1350*** 
(-5.42) 
-0.1572*** 
(-4.39) 
Relative size -0.5236*** 
(-9.82) 
-0.3587*** 
(-6.24) 
-0.4698*** 
(-9.06) 
-0.2526*** 
(-4.44) 
Focus increasing 0.0009 
(0.03) 
-0.0222 
(-0.57) 
-0.0008 
(-0.03) 
-0.0252 
(-0.64) 
Hostile deal 0.3957*** 
(3.13) 
0.8318*** 
(4.53) 
0.4050*** 
(3.24) 
0.8541*** 
(4.65) 
Competing deal 0.0176 
(0.17) 
0.1856 
(1.26) 
0.0409 
(0.40) 
0.2409 
(1.64) 
Tender offer 1.0664*** 
(14.60) 
2.2202*** 
(17.96) 
1.0563*** 
(14.52) 
2.2057*** 
(18.02) 
Completed deal 0.0127 
(0.19) 
0.3214*** 
(3.43) 
0.0084 
(0.13) 
0.3067*** 
(3.33) 
Public target -0.5458*** 
(-14.13) 
-1.1036*** 
(-20.43) 
-0.5316*** 
(-13.71) 
-1.0871*** 
(-20.02) 
Industry M&A liquidity -0.2153 
(-1.14) 
-0.4549 
(-1.64) 
-0.1481 
(-0.79) 
-0.3075 
(-1.12) 
Herfindahl index 0.4701*** 
(3.71) 
1.0618*** 
(5.19) 
0.4883*** 
(3.79) 
1.0924*** 
(5.17) 
Constant -0.0132 
(-0.07) 
1.2718*** 
(4.09) 
0.0487 
(0.26) 
1.3947*** 
(4.53) 
     
Year & industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 15,242 15,242 15,242 15,242 
Pseudo R2 0.1642 0.2107 0.1749 0.2311 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 Summary and Implications 
The principal aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of asset sales on the outcomes of 
M&As, motivated by the literature review, in Chapter 2, which identifies a substantial gap in 
the prior research on asset sales and sources of financing in M&As. This in-depth analysis 
investigates: i) the effects of asset sale proceeds relative to equity issues based on a new 
theoretical framework; ii) the impact of asset sales on the likelihood of firms to subsequently 
make acquisitions, including the operating efficiency effects of this double transaction of asset 
sales followed by acquisitions; and iii) the effect of asset sales on the choice of payment method 
in acquisitions.  
Chapter 3 provides evidence supporting the new theoretical framework by Edmans and 
Mann (2017), which examines the choice between asset sale proceeds and equity as a source 
of funds in an M&A setting. This chapter offers empirical confirmation of the growing 
importance of asset sales as a funding source in M&As. Specifically, it gives empirical support 
for the theory of Edmans and Mann (2017), providing fresh evidence that the relative size of 
the target firm (i.e., relative financing need) is a an important but overlooked determinant of 
financing choice in M&As. This result supports the predictions of the balance sheet effect 
where equity is preferred when the relative size is large and growth opportunities are good. 
Alternatively, asset sale proceeds are favored if the relative size is small. These outcomes detect 
possible limitations of popular theories on financing choice, such as the pecking order theory, 
which do not consider the importance of the relative size of the financing need. Additionally, 
this chapter provides validation of the camouflage effect, where low quality firms will take 
advantage of periods of increased industry asset sale activity by selling assets at the same time 
in order to hide the motives for the sale. Finally, this analysis gives support for the correlation 
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effect, showing that conglomerates are more likely to fund acquisitions by selling assets than 
by issuing equity. 
The implications from Chapter 3 are important for managers and investment bankers. First, 
in agreement with Edmans and Mann (2017) and in contradiction to other existing theories 
where equity issuance is seen as the financing source of last resort, this chapter shows that 
equity financing can be favored over internal sources of funding. Second, these findings imply 
that target firm characteristics, such as relative size and growth opportunities, are factors 
managers consider when selecting the best funding source for M&As. Third, this chapter stands 
as a warning to would-be asset buyers during periods of increased asset sale activity, 
demonstrating that they could inadvertently purchase a low quality asset from a low quality 
firm that is using the camouflage effect to hide the true value of the asset. Finally, these results 
suggest that conglomerate firms can benefit from the financial slack offered by the option to 
sell uncorrelated assets rather than issue equity. 
The outcomes from Chapter 3 provide robust empirical confirmation on the importance of 
asset sales as a source of funds in acquisitions and of the validity of the new theory on financing 
choice by Edmans and Mann (2017).  
Chapter 4 offers new evidence on the probability of firms to engage in acquisitions 
following asset sales, particularly for financially constrained firms. These results are robust 
after controlling for potential endogeneity issues. Moreover, the findings from this analysis 
show that this type of selling-to-buy asset restructuring results in a double benefit for firms 
when they sell unrelated assets and use the proceeds to conduct acquisitions. In particular, 
industry-adjusted operating performance in the three years following a focus-increasing asset 
sale is greater for firms that make acquisitions with the asset sale proceeds relative to those 
firms that do not make any acquisitions, and this result is driven by focus increasing 
acquisitions. Additional analysis shows that asset sale waves allow financially constrained 
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firms to make acquisitions because of improved firm liquidity resulting from asset sales, with 
some evidence that asset sale waves potentially amplify industry merger waves.  
The implications of this chapter are important for both academics and practitioners. 
Specifically, these findings recognize the significance of asset sale proceeds as an important 
funding source for M&As and other corporate investments, assuaging the adverse effects 
related with traditional external financing sources such as equity and debt. Further, resulting 
from the evident time-series association between asset sale waves and subsequent merger 
waves, asset sale waves could be used as a potential indicator to predict merger waves, allowing 
managers to avoid the mistake of making acquisitions during merger waves which have been 
shown to destroy value more than at other time.67  
Altogether, Chapter 4 provides evidence that asset sales increases the likelihood of 
subsequent acquisitions and identifies the operating improvements that come to firms that 
engage in this form of selling-to-buy asset restructuring. 
Chapter 5 offers new evidence on the role of asset sale proceeds in the choice of payment 
method in M&As. Specifically, it demonstrates that asset sales are significantly and positively 
associated with the choice of cash as the method of payment. These results are robust even 
after controlling for potential endogeneity issues. Furthermore, the findings of this analysis 
provide support for the pecking order theory by demonstrating the preference for internal 
funding sources over external sources, implying that asset sale proceeds are an important 
source of funds for corporate investment. Additionally, as a result of the increased likelihood 
to use cash to make acquisitions after asset sales, asset sellers, who are also subsequent bidders 
in this study, are more likely to experience the positive effects associated with the choice of 
                                                 
67 Moeller et al. (2005) and Duchin and Schmidt (2013) find that acquiring firms experience negative stock returns 
when they conduct acquisitions during merger waves.  
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cash as a method of payment, such as the discouragement of rival bids or higher abnormal 
returns at the acquisition announcement.  
Overall, the findings in Chapter 5 jointly show that asset sale proceeds are an important 
omitted variable for the determinants of the choice of payment method in M&As, as well as a 
legitimate source of funds that should be considered alongside debt and equity. 
Though the specific way in which asset sales influence the probability and outcomes of 
M&As may vary across the three studies in this thesis, the findings highlight the important role 
that asset sales play as a source of funds in M&As, which has been overlooked in the prior 
literature. 
 
 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
A few limitations to this analysis have been identified. Fist, as noted in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis, it is difficult to draw an exact correlation between an asset sale in time 
t with an acquisition in t+1. This makes it difficult to determine with certainty that the proceeds 
from an asset sale are indeed used to fund, in whole or in part, a subsequent acquisition. This 
thesis follows the approach of Schlingemann (2004) who, rather than attempting to establish a 
precise correspondence, considers the cash made available through the free cash flow and 
equity and debt issuance which occurred within 12 months prior to the acquisition 
announcement. This thesis uses the same approach for asset sales by identifying asset sales that 
occurred within 12 months prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Second, the true motives of management behind the double transactions of an asset sale 
followed by an acquisition are difficult to determine. Is management selling assets as part of a 
strategic restructuring because they have an acquisition target in mind? Or is management 
selling assets for other reasons (i.e., operational reasons), and then once they have the proceeds 
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in hand, do they then decide to make an acquisition using the proceeds? Management motives 
may have a positive or adverse effect (i.e., agency costs) on the outcomes of these transactions.  
Third, the availability of transaction data limits the number asset sale observations 
available for asset sale event studies. Specifically, the asset sale measures derived from 
financial and accounting information found in the Compustat database are reported on an 
annual basis. Therefore, the exact date of the asset sale is not identifiable, making any event 
study using Compustat data not feasible. Could the outcomes for these types of asset sales (i.e., 
sale of investments, or sale of property, plant, and equipment) be materially different from 
those found in the SDC database? 
The importance of asset sales as a source of funds for acquisitions has been highlighted 
throughout this thesis. In addition to the analysis of this thesis, several avenues for future 
research can be suggested. First is with regard to an investment banks’ role in acquisition 
financing as it relates to asset sales. For instance, are acquiring firms with certain types of 
advisory relationships more or less likely to use one financing source over another? Potential 
conflicts of interest could exist where investment banks may also have the opportunity to 
underwrite an equity or bond issue to fund the deal, possibly making the advice from these 
financial advisors biased against the use of asset sales and other internal sources funds to fund 
the acquisition. 
Second, while there has been significant theoretical and empirical work on the 
determinants of merger waves, little research has been conducted on possible determinants of 
asset sale waves, which are likely to different from those factors that drive merger waves. For 
example, firms are often motivated to sell assets due to financial constraint or distress, while 
on the other hand financially constrained or distressed firms are less likely to engage in 
acquisitions. This understanding at the firm level could have implications at the industry level, 
suggesting that determinants of asset sale waves could be different from those of merger waves. 
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Finally, while some prior research has investigated the outcomes for firms that acquire in 
and out of merger waves, further analysis could be conducted on outcomes for firms that sell 
assets in and out of asset sale waves. This analysis might suggest that it is beneficial for firms 
to sell assets during waves, in contrast to the identified negative wealth effects for firms that 
acquire during merger waves.  
Combined, these potential avenues for future research could provide valuable information 
for managers as they consider asset sales in their restructuring and financing decisions.  
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